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II) Kurzfassung 
 
Jonathan Stern vom Oxford Institute for Energy Studies hat in mehreren 
Publikationen eine Änderung der an den Ölpreis gebundenen Gaspreise hin zu 
einem Marktpreismechanismus propagiert. Meine Diplomarbeit nimmt diese 
Vorschläge als Ausgangspunkt für weitere Forschung und Analyse auf diesem 
Gebiet. 
 
Meine Forschungsfragen lauten: 
 
1. Darstellung eines konsolidierten Überblicks der russischen Gas-Exporte 
nach Europa, speziell über die Transitroute durch die Ukraine, und der 
Preisdynamiken der europäischen und ukrainischen Gasimporte aus 
Russland sowie der Preisdynamik im russischen Heimmarkt. 
2. Welche Auswirkungen könnte eine Änderung des ölgebundenen 
Gaspreises unter Langzeitverträgen für russische Lieferungen nach 
Europa hin zu einem Marktpreismechanismus haben? Wie würden die 
Dynamiken der europäischen Importpreise und der Ukrainischen 
Netback-Preise beeinflusst werden? 
3. Welche Vorteile und Nachteile könnte der Einsatz des European Gas 
Index (EGIX), als Mechanismus um europäische Marktpreise von Gas in 
Verträgen mit Russland zu signalisieren, haben? 
 
Um diesen Fragen nachzugehen werde ich eingangs den notwendigen politischen 
und makroökonomischen Hintergrund darstellen. Dazu werde ich zum einen auf die 
Rolle Russlands als Gasexporteur eingehen. Zum anderen werde ich auf die Rolle 
von Gazprom als politisches Instrument sowie auf den Einfluss der russischen 
Heimmarktpreispolitik auf die Bepreisung von Exporten nach Europa referenzieren. 
Hier ist auch die Rolle der Ukraine als Transitland von Bedeutung sowie der Drang 
Russlands die Exportpreise in die CIS Länder an die Preise der Lieferungen nach 
Europa anzugleichen. Dieser makroökonomische Teil wird übergehen in die 
Darstellung der Entwicklung von Gaspreismechanismen, der theoretischen Aspekte 
von Gaspreisen, der Rolle von LNG und europäischen Hubs und der Idee von 
alternativen Preismechanismen basierend auf Marktpreisen. 
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Der quantitative Teil meiner Diplomarbeit wird eine Analyse von drei primären 
Datensets und Preisdynamiken sein um die Forschungsfragen zwei und drei zu 
beantworten und zu diskutieren.     
 
- Zeitserie der russischen Gaspreise für ölindexierte Lieferungen nach Europa 
an der deutschen Grenze, Langzeitverträge 
- Zeitserie des EGIX als Marktpreisvariante 
- Zeitserie der Rohölpreise basierend auf Tagesreferenzpreisen der Marke 
Brent 
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III) Abstract 
 
Jonathan Stern, from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, proposes in several of 
his papers s shift away form oil-linked natural gas pricing to market-based pricing 
mechanisms. My thesis takes these ideas as a starting point for further investigation. 
 
My main research questions are: 
 
1. Consolidated overview of Russian gas exports to Europe, especially 
via transit through the Ukraine and the gas price dynamics of 
European and Ukraine natural gas imports from Russia and of 
Russian domestic supply. 
2. What could be outcomes to expect from a shift from oil-linked to 
market-linked natural gas prices for long-term Russian natural gas 
supply to Europe? How would the dynamics of European import 
prices and Ukraine netback prices be influenced? 
3. What can be advantages and disadvantages of using the European 
Gas Index (EGIX) to signal European market prices for natural gas in 
supply contracts for Russian natural gas? 
 
To examine these questions I first of all provide the necessary political and macro 
economical background. For this matter I will on the one hand deal with Russia’s role 
as a gas exporting country, focusing especially on the role of Gazprom as a political 
tool and on the influence of Russia’s domestic gas price policy on its foreign pricing 
policy directed towards the E.U. Here the role of Ukraine as a transit country to the 
E.U. and the Russian thrive towards European netback pricing in the CIS, 
exemplified by the Ukraine, will be taken under consideration. This macro economical 
part will lead to a brief survey of the development of gas pricing mechanisms, the 
theoretical aspects of gas pricing, the role of LNG and Continental European gas 
hubs to the ideas of alternative gas pricing mechanisms, especially a shift to market 
based pricing as we see it in Stern’s work. 
 
The quantitative part of the thesis contains an examination of three primary sets of 
data in order to answer the research questions two and three: 
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- The time series of Russian natural gas border prices to Germany: oil-linked 
price 
- The time series of the EGIX (European Gas Index) Gaspool and NCG area in 
Germany): market price 
- The time series of Brent crude oil (petroleum) as a reference price for crude oil 
in Europe 
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1. Research Questions 
 
1.1. Problem Statement 
 
“Russia is the world’s second largest producer and exporter of oil. It also is the 
largest producer and exporter of natural gas. At times of low world market 
prices for oil and natural gas, such as 1986-88 (for natural gas 1987-89) and 
1998, it experiences economical crises.”1 
 
This statement introduces us to the significance of the commodities oil and gas for 
the largest country in the world, the Russian Federation. In my thesis I will deal with 
the gas market. The deliveries of natural gas from the Russian Federation to Europe 
are on a constant basis a hot topic in a political as well as in an economical sense. 
Russia is the biggest single exporter of natural gas to Europe and the European 
Union (EU). This import-export relationship is on the one hand heavily influenced by 
the fact of transit, especially through the Ukraine, and in this case subject of 
geopolitical games. In order to secure supplies from a European point of view and in 
order to justify and to hedge investments from the Russian point of view the gas 
deliveries from Russia to Europe are mostly carried out under the regime of long-term 
contracts. The pricing mechanism of these long-term contracts is based on the idea 
of the replacement value leading to a pricing formula of oil-indexation. Several 
commentators, furthermost of all Jonathan Stern (2009), see this pricing mechanism 
as out-dated and suggest market driven pricing tools via indexation based on prices 
at European hubs. This does not necessarily indicate a certain advantage for the 
buyer or the seller side but it could mean a more direct reflection of factual market 
situations.  
Additionally domestic Russian gas prices are heavily influenced by politics leading to 
low prices as a form of subsidy for the local industry and the Russian people. This 
results in negative revenues in the home market for the Russian state-owned 
company Gazprom and the need for Gazprom to make positive revenues via the 
exports to Europe and also via the exports to the countries of the Commonwealth of 
independent Nations (CIS), for example to the Ukraine. In this case rising prices lead 
to political disputes resulting in gas wars like we faced it in January 2009. 
                                                
1 Ellmann, Michael (2006), p. 3 
 18 
So we have a climate of oil-indexed, non-market long-term contracts of European 
imports, the thrive for European netback prices for the Ukraine and very low domestic 
prices in Russia.       
 
1.2. Objective 
 
Within my thesis I want to closely examine the situation of Russian natural gas 
exports to Europe and its pricing dynamics. This shall be broadened by the 
dimension of transit via the Ukraine and the implication that European gas pricing 
dynamics have on the Ukraine import price, because here we face a massive 
externality on European and Russian gas import-export strategies due to political and 
geopolitical games.  
 
My main research questions are: 
 
1. Consolidated overview of Russian gas exports to Europe, especially 
via transit through the Ukraine and the gas price dynamics of 
European and Ukraine natural gas imports from Russia and of 
Russian domestic supply. 
2. What could be outcomes to expect form a shift from oil-linked to 
market-linked natural gas prices for long-term Russian natural gas 
supply to Europe? How would the dynamics of European import 
prices and Ukraine netback prices be influenced? 
3. What can be advantages and disadvantages of using the European 
Gas Index (EGIX) to signal market prices for natural gas in supply 
contracts for Russian natural gas? 
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1.3. Methodology 
 
My thesis consists of two major parts. On the one hand a descriptive part based on 
literature research and the discussion of the findings. This research will be based on 
acclaimed authors on the topic. It covers the role of Russia as a gas exporting 
country, especially to Europe, the role of Gazprom as a political tool, Europe as gas 
importer, Ukraine as a gas importer and a transit country, gas pricing on the oil-
indexed basis, theoretical aspects of gas pricing, the role of European hubs an LNG 
and the discussion about a market price mechanism. The goal is to give a 
consolidated picture on the topic. 
Part two will be a statistical analysis of different oil and gas price series via graphs 
and SPSS in order to answer research question two an three.  
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
 
The general structure of the thesis will be as follows: 
1. Descriptive analysis of Russia as gas exporting country to Europe and the 
Ukraine 
2. Descriptive analysis of Europe as a gas importer 
3. Descriptive analysis of the Ukraine as a gas importer and a transit country 
4. Descriptive analysis of existing gas pricing mechanisms on the oil-indexed 
replacement value basis, the role of European hubs, the role of LNG and the 
discussion on market-based gas pricing 
5. Statistical analysis of different oil and gas price series in order to answer 
research question two and three 
6. Conclusion: Summary and discussion of the findings 
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2. Russia’s Role as a Gas Exporting Country 
 
2.1. Russia’s transition period in the aftermath oft he fall of the Soviet-Union 
 
„After the CIS was formed in 1991, the former Soviet countries entered a very 
tough transition period that brought fundamental changes in their economic 
systems, institutional collapse, a substantial decline in GDP and lower living 
standards. (...) Non-payment became a huge problem in the gas sector in 
particular, because suppliers of gas – unlike coal and fuel oil – had no 
advance payment, and no legal right to cut off non-paying consumers.“2 
 
I chose this statement by Tatiana Mitrova (2009) as the opener for the first chapter 
because it illustrates the juvenile economical background that the young market 
economy of the Russian Federation provides as a breeding ground of the topics we 
are dealing with. To fully understand the natural gas sector and the price dynamics of 
Russian natural gas exports to the European Union and to Ukraine, including transit 
tariff issues concerning the latter, I wish to provide an overview on the role of the 
Russian Federation as a gas exporting country. I will start by outlining the period of 
economical transition in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the organisation 
of the post-soviet gas industry, the role of Gazprom and Russia’s natural gas 
balance. This will be followed by an outline of Russia’s natural gas export activities, 
the challenges of post-soviet CIS trade, projections of future natural gas production in 
Russia and a brief overview on the gas price reform with a focus on Ukraine. 
 
The prime role concerning scientific research on the topic of natural gas from an 
economical perspective is being taken by The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 
The institute was founded in 1982 and functions as a recognized independent centre 
of the University of Oxford. Per self-definition it has the following function: 
 
“Its unique multidisciplinary expertise allows it to examine the economics, the 
politics and the sociology of energy with a focus on oil and natural gas. Its 
research spans the international relations between producers and consumers 
                                                
2 Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), p. 13 
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of energy; the economic development of producing nations and the geo-
political aspects of all these issues alongside the economics and politics of the 
environment in relation to energy, including climate change. The Institute’s 
intellectual independence places it firmly at the centre of the dialogue between 
consumers and producers, government and industry, academics and policy 
makers. The Institute serves a worldwide audience with its research and 
continues to inform understanding of all major energy issues today.“3  
 
The now following explanations are mainly based on Tatiana Mitrova (2009), 
Jonathan Stern (2009b) and Simon Pirani (2009a). 
 
“Many concerned with the natural gas industry – as political decision makers, 
academics, or because they work in it – think of the former Soviet Union in the 
first place as a producer and exporter. Reserves in Russia and central Asia 
are among the world’s largest; Russia’s exports to Europe, and the disputes 
over getting them there, are a theme of constant discussion.”4     
 
This statement by Simon Pirani highlights the key issues, which have to be 
understood when discussing the Russian Federation and its gas exports. On the one 
hand you have to have at least a brief understanding of Russia as a gas exporter, its 
structure, challenges, prospects and also its market power. On the other hand, from 
the European point of view that this thesis takes, the issue of transport of the product 
has to be included. For that reason a part of this work will deal with the main export 
corridor from the Russian Federation to Europe, namely Ukraine.   
 
As already mentioned in the opening statement Russia had a major problem in the 
beginning of the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet-Union due to high accumulated gas 
debts, both domestic and inter-state, which could not be met. These inter-stat debts 
where mostly located within the members of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). Mitrova (2009) points out that official GDP fell by at least 20% in all the 
transition countries and even more then 40 % in many of them including Russia and 
Ukraine. As especially Ukraine is interesting for the further investigations I will focus 
                                                
3 http://www.oxfordenergy.org/, 16.4.2012 
4 Pirani, Simon (2009a), p. 1  
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on the numbers Mitrova (2009) states in this concern. Ukraine already accumulated 
$4-4.5 billion in debts for gas just between 1991 and 1994. Till July 1999 Ukraine 
owed an additional $1 billion to Russia and a substantial amount of $111 million to 
Turkmenistan. The first inter-state cut off due to non-payment already occurred in 
1993, it was already Ukraine which was not able to pay a debt of $ 238 million and 
threatened Russia to shut down the transit pipeline to Europe. At the times of the 
Soviet-Union the Soviet ministry of the gas industry dealt with the gas agenda. This 
ministry was broken up into independent ministries after the collapse of the Soviet-
Union. In Russia the company Gazprom was set up to deal first of all with the 
complete gas sector. Gazprom can be described as a state-owned, centralised 
company. Since 1993 it is a joint-stock company. Similar to Russia also other gas 
producing and gas-exporting members of the CIS set up centralised, state owned 
companies. The result was a very strong influence of politics in the gas business and 
a market of regulated prices that the companies had to deal with.5  
 
2.1.1. 1990-2000: The time of barter      
 
Many of the CIS countries were not able to live up to their debts, so the Russian 
Federation, as much as many other CIS countries, allowed barter agreements to 
settle the debts.  
 
“In the 1990s almost all CIS countries allowed gas transactions to be settled 
by barter, which they sometimes saw as the only way to get any payment at 
all. In 1994-96 the share the share of barter settlements in some CIS gas 
markets was more than 90 per cent.”6     
 
What as a barter agreement? In modern Western society we are used to make 
regular transactions of a product or service being exchanged against a monetary 
value, usually money. One of the legacies of the communistic system of the former 
USSR to the Russian Federation and the CIS countries was a form of product for 
product exchange called barter. Tatiana Mitrova (2009) finds to following explanation: 
 
                                                
5 cf. Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), pp. 13-15 
6 Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), p. 14 
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“Barter arrangements, or “bilateral clearing”, also entered into inter-state gas 
trade: Belarus paid Russia for gas with food, electrical and electronical 
equipment, construction materials, trucks, tractors and other goods; Ukraine 
paid Russia and Turkmenistan with food, chemical and engineering products, 
grain, light industrial goods, diesel locomotives, pipes and metals; Armenia 
and Georgia paid Russia with food and chemical products, pharmaceuticals, 
electric power, car tyres, and paint and varnish products. Other assets besides 
manufactured products were bartered: for example, Ukraine has paid 
Turkmenistan with ships and factories. On the other hand goods supplied 
under barter arrangements were often of low quality and overpriced; some 
were completely useless. (…) Barter continued to figure in Ukrainian-Turkmen 
transactions until their trading relationship ended in 2006”.7     
 
This intense explanation by Mitrova (2009) is for the case of this paper from 
relevance when we have a closer look on the gas trade between the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine. Ukraine was until several years ago using the way of barter 
agreements to get parts of its gas debts settled.  
Mitrova (2009) also points out that the most important type of barter was the gas for 
transit barter. Also up until 2006, so quite shortly before the recent impactful gas 
crisis between Ukraine and Russia, which resulted in a temporary stop of gas 
supplies in January 2009, evolved, Russia paid the transit to Europe via Ukraine 
through the supply of very cheap gas to Ukraine. Mitrova considers this as the largest 
gas-for-transit deal.8  
 
Another important issue when it comes to barter agreements is the politically 
important fact, that the gas supply was in many cases linked to some completely 
different issue. 
 
“Another common phenomenon in the 1990s was the linking of payment for 
gas supplies with a wide range of issues not associated with the gas industry. 
For example, under the Russo-Ukrainian agreements of 1997, Russia wrote 
                                                
7 Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), p. 14 
8 cf. Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), p. 14 
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off $521 million of Ukrainian gas debts in exchange for 31% of the Black Sea 
fleet.”9 
 
Jonathan P. Stern (2005) however argues that barter agreements and the on going 
use of those agreements might have its roots not just an a communistic country on 
the path of transition to a market economy and the legacy of its habits but also in the 
domestic support of a kind of virtual economy. This would mean, that the Russian 
government used Gazprom as a tool for subsidizing a weak economy with cheap gas 
supply in order to keep unprofitable businesses alive and maintain employment.10 
 
“The specific gas-related argument is that Gazprom was a willing party to non-
payment in return for being allowed to keep revenues from exports. But it is 
important to ask whether the problems in the domestic market were the 
creation of Gazprom or successive governments struggling through an 
economic transition. Viewed by this author over the past decade, Russian 
governments bore overwhelming responsibility for the non-payment crisis.”11 
 
Stern (2005) explains, that this form of subsidy to an unhealthy domestic economy 
made Gazprom fully dependent on the revenues of gas exports, especially to the 
European Union. From a point of view of the Russian governments it might also be 
argued that those actions were a necessity in order to keep a certain level of stability 
within the domestic Russian economy. Nevertheless I would like to follow Stern 
(2005) when he points out, that a shift of Gazprom’s domestic price structure to 
marginal cost pricing and strict payment discipline would of course have resulted in 
sharp decline of gas demand due to a cooling off within the industry. On the other 
hand Gazprom would have had more time to establish a profitable network in its 
home market rather than being forced to rapidly build up a new and expensive export 
infrastructure.12          
 
                                                
9 Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), p. 14 
10  cf. Stern, Jonathan P. (2005), pp. 198-199 
11 Stern, Jonathan P. (2005), p. 199 
12 cf. Stern, Jonathan P. (2005), p. 199 
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The most important facts that should be kept in mind from this sections are the 
significant size and therefore the importance of gas-for-transit barter between the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine and the use of gas supply as a political asset to 
settle all kinds of political issues and to keep the domestic economy stable. Exactly 
those practices will be important concerning the gas price dynamics in the Ukraine, 
which will be discussed later on and will also serve as an explanatory for the deep 
natural gas import-export bond and dependencies between the Russian Federation 
and Europe.   
 
2.1.2. 2000-2007: Stabilisation 
 
While the period of economic transition from the planned economy of the former 
USSR to a market economy brought habits like barter agreements along in the 
1990s, it has to be mentioned, that the century concluded with the Russian financial 
crisis of 1998. The causes and effects of this crisis are not major subject of this 
thesis, important is, that it lead to a massive cooling down of the economies of not 
just the Russian Federation but also of other interrelated CIS countries. Of 
significance for this authors explanation is the period after the crisis of 1998, which 
marked a massive economic recovery in the years from 2000 until 2007, before the 
global financial and economical crisis of 2008 hit the Russian economy as well. 
 
“Between 2000 and 2006, all CIS countries pulled out of the economic crisis of 
the 1990s and achieved stable GDP growth. (…) For the gas sector, the first 
significant result of the improved economical situation was a reduction in non-
payments and barter.”13        
 
This is an important statement to keep in mind. As the economies, especially the 
economy of the Russian Federation, were in a state of recovery, a more market 
driven dynamic resulting in a thrive for reduction of barter and non-payment occurred. 
The significant GDP growth in Russia and the CIS countries is being highlighted in 
graph 2.1.  
 
 
                                                
13 Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), p. 18  
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Graph 2.1: GDP dynamics in CIS countries, 2000-05 (Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), p. 19) 
Source used by Mitrova (2009): Mezhgosudarstvennyi statisticheskii komitet SNG, Osnovnye 
makroekonomicheskie pokazateli stran SNG. 1995-2004 (Moscow, 2005) 
 
 
 
Those years did not just bring a stabilisation for the natural gas industry in Russia, 
but due to investments into exploration, production and transportation of gas also a 
substantial growth of the industry. Mitrova (2009) regards this as the main 
achievement within that period.14  
 
Graph 2.2 highlights the substantial growth in production volumes between 2000 and 
2006 and graph 2.3 shows the growth in net gas exports since 2000. 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                
14 cf. Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), p. 20 
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Graph 2.2: Gas production in CIS countries, 1990-2006 (bcm) (Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), p. 20) 
Source used by Mitrova (2009): Mezhgosudarstvennyi statisticheskii komitet SNG, Osnovnye 
makroekonomicheskie pokazateli stran SNG. 1995-2004 (Moscow, 2005) 
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Graph 2.3: Net gas exports of CIS countries, 1990-2006 (bcm) (Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), p. 21) 
Source used by Mitrova (2009): Mezhgosudarstvennyi statisticheskii komitet SNG, Osnovnye 
makroekonomicheskie pokazateli stran SNG. 1995-2004 (Moscow, 2005) 
 
 
Despite all these important achievements, the natural gas industry was still the least 
major sector of the Russian Federation functioning on the basis of free markets. It 
has become clear that the gas sector’s particular political and economical role will 
produce specific CIS gas sector regulation regimes lead by Russia and being unlike 
European models. The principles being set by Russia include: 
- Vertically integrated, state-owned companies 
- Favourable production conditions for foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
private investors, with dominant state-owned companies 
- State control over transportation networks 
- Strict distribution regulations15   
 
                                                
15 cf. Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), pp. 21-22  
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2.2. Organisation of the post-soviet gas industry in Russia   
 
As we already know the post-Soviet gas industry is mainly controlled by integrated 
state-controlled companies, which are in many cases 100 per cent state owned. 
These companies were mainly formed around 1992 and include names like 
Gazprom, Turkmengas, Ukrgazprom, Uzbekneftegas and many more. Integration in 
terms of gas companies means owning more or less the complete value chain, 
starting from exploration and production but also including activities like distribution, 
transmission and engineering. These state-controlled companies can be interpreted 
as ‘quasi-ministries’. Their role goes beyond market driven parameters, there is a 
broad strategic and political context involved.16  
 
“Gazprom is the best example of a post-Soviet vertically integrated state-
 controlled company, which dominates both upstream and downstream 
activities. It has roughly a 60 % share of Russia’s proven gas reserves and 
84.7 % in total productions, it owns all the main gas-processing facilities; owns 
and operates Russia’s high-pressure pipelines; is sole owner of gas storage 
capacity; and has a legal export monopoly. Further downstream, Gazprom 
owns ‘blocking stakes’ in more than 70% of gas-distribution organisations, and 
controls many of the larger ones.”17 
 
For this paper it is important to keep this illustration of Gazprom’s substantial market 
power and strategically important political role in mind. One of the major outcomes of 
Gazprom’s role as a political tool results in the companies export dynamics. As we 
already understand domestic gas supply is carried out by Gazprom with major losses 
in order to subsidize the domestic industry and also the private sector.  
Also the Russian Federation knows certain bodies of regulation. There are no 
regulatory bodies in charge, which are exclusively dealing with the natural gas 
industry, but there are at least two bodies to be mentioned: The Federal Tariff 
Service and the Federal Antimonopoly Service. Their main issues are: 
- Anti-monopoly issues 
- Establishing gas tariffs for consumers and gas transportation tariffs 
                                                
16 cf. Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), p. 22  
17 Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), p. 23 
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- Development of regulatory documents 
- Creation of methods of tariff calculation 
- Treatment of cases related to the violation of legislation18   
  
2.3. The role of Gazprom 
 
In the context of my thesis I would like to have a brief look at the role of Gazprom 
especially when it comes to an entity of gas pricing and also on the current self-
definition of the company in order to get a feeling of what to think of Gazprom as a 
player in gas exporting.  
 
“In the post-Soviet period, CIS domestic gas markets have been markets in 
the name only. In reality they were rationing mechanisms with market-based 
activity at the fringes.”19  
 
This statement highlights the fact that the domestic Russian and CIS post-Soviet gas 
market was not a market at all. 
The industry was dominated by one player, state-owned Gazprom. 
 
“This company, newly-formed from the Soviet Ministry of Gas, produced 94% 
of Russia’s total annual output of 643 bcm, and as the country’s remaining gas 
was merely being generated as a by-product by Russia’s oil companies and 
transferred into the gas system at very low cost, Gazprom was the only 
significant seller of gas in the Russian market. As a result, it was by far the 
largest player not only in Russia’s energy industry but also in the country’s 
economy. Consequently, while other commodity prices were liberalised during 
the first reform period of the early 1990s, it was decided that gas prices 
charged by Gazprom needed to remain under strict government control.” 20  
                                                
18 cf. Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), p. 25 
19 Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), p. 26 
20 Henderson, James (2011), p. 5 
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The main domestic target for Gazprom was more or less providing a subsidy to the 
domestic industrial and private sector via regulated gas, which was and is being sold 
substantially under market price. 
There are two interesting streams, which may or may not impact on a possible 
redefinition of Gazprom and its pricing strategies.  
On the one hand there is a changing structure of the domestic gas market by the 
emergence of independent gas producers such as Novatek and Itera. Those 
independent producers are not legally bound to the regulated price restrictions and 
can effectively sell at a proper market price. As a result a two-tier market exists with 
Gazprom selling at a very low regulated price and independent producers at market 
prices.21   
Why would anyone buy for a higher market price? The answer lies in the ‘Gas 
Balance’. Gazprom and the Russian government negotiate on an annually basis 
which volumes of gas to sell at regulated prices domestically. This is being followed 
by a bidding process to allocate the volumes. But usually there is extra gas needed 
on top of those volumes and this is, where the independent producers enter the 
stage.22     
On the other hand, and most probably also interrelated with the existence of this two-
tier market, there is a political thrive to transfer Gazprom into a global player in the 
gas and oil business. On Gazprom’s website the following statement can be found. 
 
“Gazprom is a global energy company. Its major business lines are geological 
exploration, production, transportation, storage, processing and sales of gas, 
gas condensate and oil, as well as generation and marketing of heat and 
electric power. (…) Gazprom is a reliable supplier of gas to Russian and 
foreign consumers. The Company owns the world’s largest gas transmission 
network – the Unified Gas Supply System of Russia with the total length of 
over 161 thousand kilometres.”23  
 
According to this statement and the use of vocabulary like global, reliable and largest 
point out the willingness for a global self-definition. These indicators taken from 
                                                
21 cf. Henderson, James (2011), pp. 8-9 
22 cf. Henderson, James (2011), p. 9 
23 http://www.gazprom.com/about/, 17.4.2012 
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Gazprom’s self-definition combined with the threat of the political influence on the 
domestic level, which leads to unprofitable business in the Russian domestic market, 
partly explain on the one hand Gazprom’s focus and motivation on the E.U. as an 
importing partner of Russian gas on netback market price levels. On the other 
Gazprom’s relationship with the Ukraine, amongst other CIS countries like White 
Russia, and the recent focus on raising the price levels of exports to the Ukraine 
might be interconnected with this current status of the company. 
Jonathan Stern summed those ideas up by mentioning two major risks that Gazprom 
is facing already in 2005. He stated that Gazprom’s future strategy concerning supply 
and target markets will based on the willingness and ability to pay.24  
Stern draws a general scenario for possible Gazprom supply and export strategies 
based on pricing and willingness to pay, which is shown in table 2.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
24 cf. Stern, Jonathan (2005), p. 206  
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EUROPEAN 
BORDER PRICES25 
 
RUSSIAN REGULATED INDUSTRIAL PRICES26 
  
HIGH 
 
LOW 
 
 
HIGH 
Demand in both Europe and Russia is 
low but revenue and profitability is 
high allowing for domestic new large 
scale supply to be developed (eg 
Yamal) or imported form Central Asia. 
In this scenario the major risk for 
Gazprom is that volume growth in 
both domestic and export markets 
may be uncertain. In that situation, 
flexible, i.e. non-Gazprom, supply 
sources would be preferable.  
Close to the situation in 2003-
04. Expansion of Russian 
exports to Europe with strongly 
increased revenue earnings. 
Market expansion prospects are 
uncertain at these price levels. 
Developing new large-scale 
supply or imports for the 
domestic market, where 
demand is still expanding due 
to low prices, is impossible, as 
both would incur significant 
losses. 
 
 
LOW 
Additional exports to Europe become 
unattractive, especially through new 
infrastructure, such as NEP. Sales to 
the domestic market become 
extremely profitable. Investment in 
large-scale new supply and imports is 
problematic because of uncertain 
domestic demand at high prices. If low 
European gas prices continue into the 
2010s renewal of some long-term 
contracts may be questioned. 
Close to the situation Gazprom 
faced in the period 1997-2000 
(except that the domestic price 
was much lower). Very difficult 
to make a case for more than 
marginal investments or new 
infrastructure, domestic or 
imported. 
  
Table 2.1: Gas Price Scenarios for Russia and Europe in the 2010s – Consequences for Gazprom 
(Stern, Jonathan (2005), p. 207) 
 
                                                
25 Explanation by Stern (2005): High European border prices – above $120/mcm; low border prices = 
below $80/mcm; prices in 2004 dollars at the German border; 1 Euro = $1,15; 
26 Explanation by Stern (2005): High regulated domestic prices = above $60/mcm; low regulated 
domestic prices = below $30/mcm. Prices for industrial customers in 2004 dollars in the zone which 
includes the city of Moscow; $1 = RR30   
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These scheme for possible Gazprom strategies dates back to 2005, so way before 
the 2008 financial and economical crisis, yet it still contains an interesting and useful 
general nutshell point of view of the company functions and in which environment it 
functions.  
I would like to conclude this subchapter with the two major risks Gazprom has to deal 
with according to Stern’s table.  
 
1. Prices Risk: This includes the risk that the domestic market does not become 
sufficiently profitable to warrant the development of higher-cost gas sources, 
for example the Yamal Peninsula field. In terms of domestic price levels and 
this would implicate a substantial increase in prices and may lead to 
acceptance problems within the domestic market due to a more or less loss of 
the political subsidy which is carried out via cheap gas sales. 
2. Market risk: If prices are not being accepted demand might decrease and 
Gazprom may suddenly be unable to sell to supply in which it invested at a 
profitable price.27      
 
In general it is important to keep in mind form this subchapter, that Gazprom is 
challenged by the use of natural gas as a mechanism for subsidizing the domestic 
industry and the people of Russia with cheap gas and that the company has to seek 
for routes to be nevertheless profitable. The relationship with the EU as an importing 
country and the Ukraine as an importer and transit country will be influenced by this 
challenge and reflect it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
27 cf. Stern, Jonathan (2005), pp. 206-208 
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2.4. The Russian natural gas balance 
 
The Russian gas balance needs to be viewed as a matrix. This matrix includes on 
the one hand three major supply sources: 
 
- Gazprom production 
- Non-Gazprom production 
- Central Asian imports 
 
On the other hand it includes three major markets: 
 
- Russian demand 
- Exports to CIS countries 
- Exports to Europe28 
 
Jonathan Stern (2009a) sets up the Russian gas matrix based on 2008 data the 
following way: 
 
 
SUPPLY SOURCES 
 
Bcm/year 
 
MARKETS 
 
Bcm/year 
Gazprom Production 550 Russian Gas Demand 
(Unified Gas Supply 
System UGSS) 
35329 
Non-Gazprom Production 114 Exports to CIS Countries 92 
Central Asian Imports 61 Exports to Europe 15930 
 
Table 2.2: The Russian Gas Matrix: major building blocks (2008 data)31 (Stern, Jonathan (2009a), p. 
4) 
 
                                                
28 cf. Stern, Jonathan (2009a), p. 3 
29 Based on Stern (2009a): Gazprom figure of sales delivered to customers in Russia via the UGSS 
30 Based on Stern (2009a): Long-term contract sales only, total European sales were 189 bcm 
31 Based on Stern (2009a): Major building blocks only, total supply is very different to total markets 
principally because of: gas used for transportation, net changes in storage, gas used outside the 
UGSS in Siberia and in the Far East 
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„The gas industry is vital to the Russian economy, accounting for more than 
half of all the energy consumed in the country and contributing 13% of total 
export revenues.“32 
 
It is relevant to mention that the contribution oft he gas industry tot he Russian GDP 
is according to 2006 date around 8-9 per cent.33  
This contribution is significantly less than for example the contribution of the oil 
industry, which also does not have a counterpart company to Gazprom in terms of 
dominance and centrality.34   
Therefore revenues and profits from Gazprom sales are crucial for the stability of 
Russia’s economy. As we have already learned, the usage of cheap gas taken from 
Gazprom’s supply as a subsidy for the domestic industry and for the Russian people 
is still a common political method. Therefore export revenues to CIS and non-CIS 
markets are the main caretakers for Gazprom’s profits. In order to keep those 
costumers, especially the European costumers, Gazprom has to be able to full fill the 
supply contracts. As we will see later on the companies’ route of exploration in terms 
of exploiting new gas fields is vague at best. 
Nevertheless Stern argues that in case of a supply shortage it would not be the 
European costumers that would suffer from reduced availability because the long 
term delivery contracts provide, as one of their major advantages form a European 
point of view, international arbitrage clauses providing for financial damages in the 
event of non-delivery. The only consequence might be a disappearance of short-term 
sales.35  
Table 2.3 shows the export volumes to Western Europe, Eastern Europe and to the 
Baltic States, table 2.4 shows the exports to Ukraine. Both tables include data up to 
2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 Stern, Jonathan (2009b), p. 54 
33 cf. Hanson, Philipp (2008), pp- 8-11 
34 cf. Stern, Jonathan (2009b), pp. 54-55 
35 cf. Stern, Jonathan (2009a), p. 4 
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 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 
Western Europe 75,1 90,4 113,3 117,8 113,8 
Eastern Europe 42,3 39,7 42,9 43,3 39,6 
Baltic States 4,4 4,7 5,0 4,9 5,3 
Total Europe 121,8 133,7 158,2 166,4 158,3 
 
Table 2.3: Russian gas exports to Europe and Baltic countries 1995-2007 (bcm)36 (Stern, Jonathan 
(2009b), p. 79) 
 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003
37 
2004 2005 2006 2007 
Gazprom 
supply38 
27,2 21,9 25,9 26 34,34 37,6 59,0 59,2 
 
Table 2.4: Russian gas exports to Ukraine 2000-2007 (bcm)39, based on: (Stern, Jonathan (2009b), p. 
78) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
36 Stern (2009b) mentions the following sources: Gazprom in Figures 2001-05; Gazprom, Annual 
Report 2006, pp. 49-50; 2007, p. 63. Gazprom Export at 35  
37 Interpreted by Stern (2009b) based on a chart in Gazprom, Annual Report 2003, p. 67. 
38 Based on Stern (2009b): Data for 2006 and 2007 include gas purchased form Central Asia and 
resold by Rosukrenergo 
39 Stern (2009b) mentions the following sources; 
Gazprom: data for 2000-02 from Stern, The future of Russian Gas, Table 2.2, p. 69; More recent date 
from Gazprom Annual Reports: 2007, p. 63; 2006, p. 49; 2005, p. 55; 2004; p. 47; 2003, p. 67 
Rosstat: date for 2000-06: Rosstat, Rossiiskii statischeskii ezhegodnik, 2007, Table 25.17, p. 768; 
2005, table 23.17, p. 716; 2004, table 25.17, p. 666; 2003, Table 25.17, p. 647; 2002, table 24.17, p. 
627; Interstate Statistical Committee oft he CIS, External Trade of the Countries of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States in 2005, p. 154; 2008, pp. 143-144     
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I would like to conclude this subchapter with table 2.5. It includes a projection of the 
Russian gas balance for 2015. 
 
 
SUPPLY SOURCES 
 
Bcm/year 
 
MARKETS 
 
Bcm/year 
Gazprom Production 480-580 Russian Gas Demand 
(Unified Gas Supply 
System UGSS) 
385-440 
Non-Gazprom Production 150-200 Exports to CIS Countries 75-85 
Central Asian Imports 70-100 Exports to Europe 180-200 
 
Table 2.5: The Russian Gas Matrix projection for 201240 
 
The projection for 2015 is based on Jonathan Stern (2009b). He derived this 
projection according to his research. What we can see is a likely increase in non-
Gazprom production and Central Asian imports on the supply side and a rise in 
domestic demand and European demand on the demand side. If Gazprom supply 
stagnates or even falls as the projection implies at least as a possibility, the gas 
matrix might be in danger of being unbalanced, especially as the gas supply need for 
the transportation network is not even considered in this matrix. As supply is clearly 
influencing pricing dynamics, especially when we discuss spot market based pricing 
in the following chapters, I would like to have a brief look at the Gazprom investment 
and exploration projections. 
 
2.5. Future prospects for natural gas production in Russia   
 
Up to 2030 Gazprom itself has very positive projections for its gas supply. According 
to graph 2.4 Gazprom would reach the upper level of Stern’s projection for 2015 that 
we got to know in chapter 2.4 and reach around 630 bcm/year around 2030. 
 
 
                                                
40 cf. Stern, Jonathan (2009b), p. 82 
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Graph 2.4: Gazprom’s production projections until 203041  
 
Gazprom’s roadmap for gas supply development over the next several decades in 
order to reach the projections might look like this: 
Gazprom will be heavily dependent on how quickly they can bring the supergiant on 
the Yamal Peninsula and the smaller Ob-Taz Bay field on stream. All Western and 
Northern Yamal Peninsula gas will be evacuated via high pressure transportation 
across Baidarat to Uktha. The south-western part of Peninsula and also Ob-Taz Bay 
gas will use the usual corridor through Yamburg. Building up a new pipeline network 
is nevertheless seen as a very high-risk strategy.42 
 
 
 
                                                
41 Gazprom in Questions and Answers 2007, p.28. http://eng.gazpromquestions.ru/index.php?id=7, 
25.4.2012 
42 Stern, Jonathan (2009a), pp. 7-8 
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2.6. The gas price reform 
 
As we already know Russia as a post Soviet-state has a habit of treating gas supply 
and in a broader sense energy supply as a basic human right. Several circumstances 
within the last years created a surrounding that makes it economically impossible to 
deal with prices the way it was. As an introduction to this topic graph 2.5 illustrates 
the increase of gas prices in Russia and also in some CIS countries including 
Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Belarus and most important Ukraine. 
 
  
 
Graph 2.5: CIS gas prices in nominal $/mcm (Mitrova, Tatjana (2009), p. 37) 
Sources used by Mitrova (2009): regulators, energy ministries, published official information 
 
 
There are several reasons for a necessary increase in gas prices in general and 
especially within CIS and the domestic market in Russia. On the one hand the 
steadily rising global oil prices. As gas pricing is widely linked to oil prices this rises 
the price of gas on the one hand. On the other hand it makes gas more attractive as 
an energy source. In combination with GDP growth and growing industries this has 
an impact on the demand side. Rising demand finally implies exploration of new 
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sources of gas supply and new technical networks. So as a final result the levels of 
CIS and domestic Russian prices move closer to European netback prices. This 
development, which Gazprom managers refer to as market-linked pricing, but they 
actually mean a link to European netback prices, leads to CIS prices, which are being 
closely linked to European prices, of course under the consideration of lower 
transportation and transit costs in the case of most CIS countries.43 
   
„The use of the European pricing scheme as the basis to determine CIS gas 
prices means that, as long as European prices are themselves linked to those 
of oil, CIS prices will fluctuate in accordance with oil price dynamics, adjusted 
for the time gap between the date of the contract and the real date of delivery. 
If European countries were to choose not to index gas prices with oil prices, 
and to reduce the influence of that pricing structure with long-term contracts, 
then prices in former Soviet countries would also be affected.“44 
 
This close link between CIS pricing and European pricing when it comes to Russian 
natural gas exports is the reason for me to closely examine in the following chapters 
not just the influence and dynamics of a switch form the oil link to spot market linked 
pricing on European pricing but also on the interrelated CIS pricing, exemplified but 
the also in terms of gas transit relevant country Ukraine.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
43 cf. Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), pp- 33-37 
44 Mitrova, Tatiana (2009), pp- 37-38 
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3. Europe’s Role as an Importer if Russian Natural Gas 
 
It is a well-known fact that concerning natural gas Europe is heavily interconnected 
and dependent on deliveries from Russia. In the following chapter I will give a brief 
overview and relevant data to illustrate the interconnection between Russia and 
Europe, respectively the European Union and OECD Europe, when it comes to gas 
deliveries. This overview is based on three major sources: Honoré (2011), Stern 
(2005) and Mitrova, Pirani et al. (2009).  
 
3.1. The OECD Europe natural gas demand        
 
In this subchapter I will have a look on the demand side when it comes to natural gas 
in Europe. Honorè (2011) introduces a general graph, which shows the development 
of natural gas demand in OECD Europe form 1960 till 2010. 
 
Graph 3.1: Natural gas demand in OECD Europe, 1960-2010 (mcm) (Honorè, Anouk (2011a), p. 24) 
Sources used by Honorè (2011a): IEA (annual), Natural Gas Information, part IV, table 3A (several 
issues); EA (monthly); Natural Gas Survey, table 1 (various issues), and author’s analysis 
 
    
This graph introduces us to the steady increase in natural gas demand in the OECD 
countries within the last 50 years. The graph represents power (red), industry 
(yellow), green (R&C) and other (purple).  
The main implication that we can draw from this graph is on the one hand the steady 
growth over the last 20 years until 2008 by an annual average of 4,2 per cent in the 
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1990s and a slowdown in growth form 2000-2008 on a level of around 2 per cent. In 
2009 there was for the first time plunging demand mostly due to the economic 
slowdown and also due to the Russia-Ukraine dispute in 2009. Demand in OECD 
Europa basically fell back to 2003 levels.45   
Graph 3.2 gives an overview on the biggest natural gas markets in OECD Europe by 
demand. 
 
Graph 3.2: Natural gas markets in OECD Europe in 2008 (Honorè, Anouk (2011a), p. 12) 
Sources used by Honorè (2011a): IEA, Natural Gas Information 2010, part II, page 8, table 3  
 
 
Graph 3.2 points out that the United Kingdom and Germany, followed by Italy, are the 
biggest markets when it comes to natural gas demand within the OECD Europe 
countries. For the topic of this thesis it is interesting to keep it in mind, as especially 
Germany and the UK are possible positions for a natural gas hub in order to derive 
market prices.  
As we now have a general idea of the importance and the historical development of 
natural gas demand in OECD Europe I would like to introduce in table 3.1 a more 
detailed look on the natural gas cross consumption in the major European markets in 
order to create an idea of the size of the European gas market.   
 
                                                
45 Honorè, Anouk (2011a), pp- 23-24 
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Table 3.1: Natural gas gross consumption in the European major markets (Honorè, Anouk (2011a), p. 
26) 
Sources:  
*Calculated by Honorè (2011a) from IEA (annual), Natural Gas Information, Part II.8, table 3 
**Calculated by Honorè (2011a) from IEA (monthly), Natural Gas Survey, various issues, table 1 
 
 
What we can take from table 3.1 is first of all the approximate size of the natural gas 
demand in OECD Europe, which was around 555.800 mcm in the year 2008 
accounting for 93,5 per cent of total European demand. Another important fact to 
derive from table 3.1 is the general slowdown of demand since 2000 and especially a 
decline in demand by 2008.  
However the demand for 2010 already showed positive signs with consumption 
above 2009, at least for the first three quarters. Additionally it can be stated that 
some of the major markets, such as France, Germany and the Netherlands show 
clear signs of recovery. But on the other hand major drivers of growth in demand 
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since 2000, such as Greece, Hungary, Spain, Finland, Italy, UK and Portugal fell 
behind 2008 at levels, slowing down overall gas demand in OECD Europe for 2010.46 
 
3.2. The European natural gas imports from Russia    
 
A significant share of Europe’s gas demand is supplied by long-term deliveries from 
the Russian Federation, especially via Gazprom. As we know from table 3.1 total 
natural gas demand in the OECD Europe area is an approximated 555.800 mcm 
which equals 555,8 bcm. Now we can recall the following table: 
 
 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 
Western Europe 75,1 90,4 113,3 117,8 113,8 
Eastern Europe 42,3 39,7 42,9 43,3 39,6 
Baltic States 4,4 4,7 5,0 4,9 5,3 
Total Europe 121,8 133,7 158,2 166,4 158,3 
 
Table 3.2: Russian gas exports to Europe and Baltic countries 1995-2007 (bcm)47 (Stern, Jonathan 
(2009b), p. 79) 
 
The OECD Europe area includes: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland 
Island, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Check Republic, Finland, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland and the 
United Kingdom. Table 3.3 additionally includes all the Baltic States, so it includes 
additionally Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. If we subtract the demand for the Baltic 
States we are left with OECD Europe supply for 2007 of 153 bcm via gas exports 
form the Russian Federation. To have an approximate idea of the impact of Russian 
gas exports to Europe we can compare this figure roughly with the estimated OECD 
Europe gas demand for 2008 which is 555 bcm. The Russian supply share estimates 
in this case roughly around 27,5 per cent.   
 
   
                                                
46 Honorè, Anouk (2011a), pp- 26-27 
47 Sources used by Stern (2009b): Gazprom in Figures 2001-05; Gazprom, Annual Report 2006, pp. 
49-50; 2007, p. 63. Gazprom Export at 35  
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3.3. The European gas balance        
 
Chapter 3.1 as well as chapter 3.2 showed mostly data before the economic and 
financial crisis of 2008. To have an additional point of view on the pattern of the 
European gas balance I would like to additionally mention Mellling (2010). His work is 
basically dealing with gas pricing but we can also find an interesting approximation of 
the pattern of the European gas balance. 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: European gas balances 2008 and 2009 (bcm estimated) (Melling, Anthony J. (2010), p. 41) 
 
What we should keep in mind from this table is on the one hand, that the total 
demand projections that Mellling gives for 2008 are similar to what we saw in the 
work by Anouk Honorè. Additionally the rise of LNG supply by roughly 23 per cent is 
remarkable. This means that more volumes were traded on the markets, for example 
via the European Energy Exchange. Most of the supply, which is traded on spot 
markets, is delivered via LNG. The role of Russia as the biggest single supplier is 
also pointed out very clearly by this table. For 2009 we can observe a sharp decline 
in consumption mostly due to the recession. Most of the decline hit Russia and 
therefore mostly Gazprom. 
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3.4. The European dependence on Russian natural gas        
 
„For Gazprom, the crucial element of exports to Europe is not the volume of 
gas – important as these have become – but the value of these sales, which 
earned the company $40-50 billion/year in 2006-07.“48 
 
As we already know from previous chapters the Russian federation has a very high 
domestic natural gas demand and sells domestically way under market price.  
On the other hand European exports account for about 27-29 per cent of sales 
volumes but for 57-65 per cent of revenues. This share of revenues is lower than in 
the 1990s when Gazprom sold natural gas domestically for a disastrously low price 
including non-cash instruments. But it still relatively steady as prices have been 
raised domestically and within the CIS region but also export prices to Europe 
increased.49   
These facts illustrate the importance of exports to Europe for Russia and therefore 
indicate a thrive for the Russian Federation to bind Europe and to make it to a certain 
degree dependent. This is carried out on the one hand by long-term contracts, which 
of course from a European point of view also imply a certain degree of supply 
security. On the other hand Russia and Europe would move closer and are 
dependent on each other by various infrastructural projects such as North Stream or 
South Stream.  
To finalize this section I would like to refer one more time to Stern. He derived a table 
illustrating the total dependence of Europe on Russian gas supplies. This table is a 
little bit out dated as it refers back to 2003 but it still gives a rough idea of how crucial 
Russian gas deliveries are to many European countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
48 Stern, Jonathan (2009b), p. 79 
49 cf. Stern, Jonathan (2009b), p. 79 
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 % of Total Imports % of Total Consumption 
Austria 77 65 
Finland 100 100 
France 24 23 
Germany 37 33 
Greece 76 76 
Italy 32 26 
Netherlands 17 6 
EU15 28 18 
   
Czech Republic 74 73 
Hungary 86 66 
Poland 85 58 
Romania 91 29 
Slovakia 100 97 
Slovenia 60 60 
Central/Eastern Europe 87 60 
   
Turkey 61 60 
TOTAL EUROPE 38 26 
 
Table 3.4: European dependence on Russian gas supplies, 2003 (Stern, Jonathan (2005), p. 143)50 
 
As we can see from the fact that the E.U. is here referred to as the EU15, this table is 
not state of the art but it illustrates roughly that European countries are heavily 
dependent on Russian gas supply. Austria for example imports two third from Russia, 
Germany one third and total Europe around 38 per cent in 2003.Significant is of 
course also the fact that Central and Eastern imports more or less everything from 
Russia while Western Europe has a share slightly more than 25 per cent. Anyway, 
the fact of dependence shall be taken under consideration within the following 
chapters dealing with the field of gas pricing.  
                                                
50 Stern (2005) mentions the following source: Calculated from Cedigaz, Trends and Figures in 2003, 
from Natural Gas in the World 2003  
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4. Ukraine’s Role as an Importer of Russian Natural Gas 
 
The Ukraine is historically the most important transit country for gas deliveries from 
Russia to Europe. The transit infrastructure built up during the times of the Soviet 
Union is still a major strategic and political asset for Ukraine. In this context it is 
important to bring in the Ukrainian side, as the most important transit country from 
Russia to Europe. Especially I will take under consideration that Russia and Gazprom 
are forcing the move of delivery prices to Ukraine close to European netback prices 
and the recent instabilities resulting especially in the gas war of 2009 and the 2010 
gas agreement. 
In this chapter I will give a brief overview and insight on the gas balance and the gas 
dependence of Ukraine as well as its role as a transit country, This is important in 
order to understand the main implications of the Russia-Ukrainian disputes over gas 
for Europe. 
 
4.1. The Ukraine-Russia gas relationship 
 
„Ukraine’s energy sector, and its economy, are characterized by 
overdependence on imported gas. Ukraine has in recent years consumed 69-
78 bcm/year of natural gas, producing 18-20 bcm/year and importing the 
balance form central Asia and Russia. This imbalance originates in Soviet 
times, hen Ukraine’s industry, power sector and housing were geared to cheap 
gas provided first from its own onshore fields and then from Siberia.“51 
 
Based on these insights presented by Simon Pirani (2009b) we can on the one hand 
state, that Ukraine has a historical dependence on natural gas combined with the 
problem of lacking supply, which generates a dependence on deliveries from abroad.  
As we have seen it many times in the CIS area Moscow moved also the gas 
relationship with Ukraine to a barter relationship. This implies that after the fall of the 
Soviet Union a non-market barter regime evolved trading mostly gas for transit. 
Russia paid for the use of the transit pipelines running through Ukraine via gas 
supply to the Ukraine.  
                                                
51 Pirani, Simon (2009b), p. 93 
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Since 2000 rising oil prices triggered higher oil-indexed European gas prices and 
Moscow decided the end the barter cycle and to end sales to Ukraine at discounted 
prices. Moscow’s prime goals for the gas relationship with Ukraine are four folded: 
- Deliver central Asian gas rather than Russian gas 
- Raise prices to European netback levels 
- Replace barter swaps with cash relationships between corporate entities 
- Gain ownership of the transit system and a position in the domestic market of 
Ukraine via these entities 
These goals have been intensified since the cooling off of political relationships 
based on the “Orange Revolution”.52  
 
Taken these points together under the light of the fact that Ukraine is well know as 
the most energy-inefficient country worldwide53 with little progress on energy savings, 
we have a basic idea on the given issues and can now have a closer look at the 
Ukraine gas balance. 
 
4.2. The Ukraine gas balance 
 
“Ukraine is by far the largest CIS gas importer. Although most imports are 
contractually labelled as central Asian, the only transit route is through Russia, 
and it is Ukraine’s relationship with Russia on which volumes, prices and 
contractual arrangements mainly depend.”54 
   
Table 4.1 gives a general overview on the Ukraine gas balance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
52 cf. Pirani, Simon (2009b), p. 93 
53 Pirani, Simon (2009b), p. 94 
54 Pirani, Simon (2009b), p. 97 
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Table 4.1: Ukraine’s gas balance (bcm) (Pirani, Simon (2009b), p. 98) 
Sources used by Pirani (2009b): Pirani’s table is based on data published by the Ukrainian fuel and 
energy ministry, published in Energobiznes 
 
What can be derived from table 4.1 is on the one hand that Ukraine’s total natural 
gas import fell from 2004 to 2007 significantly coming hand-to-hand with a decline in 
domestic gas consumption within the same period. Also the total gas outputs fell 
within this time including a decline of transit volumes to Europe on a 2003 level and 
diminishing transit to CIS Europe.  
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4.3. The Ukraine-Russian relationship since the mid 2000s 
 
Chapter 4.1 already introduced the main goals from a Russian point of view when it 
comes to the natural gas relationship with the Ukraine: Delivery of Central Asian gas, 
European netback pricing, replacement of barter swaps and establishing a domestic 
position in the Ukraine.55  
Since the mid 2000s several political and economical factors supported these 
developments. The most important economic driver was raising oil prices. Due to the 
oil-link prices in Russian-European long-term gas delivery contracts, prices more 
than doubled from 1998 to 2006. This resulted in a major gap between European and 
CIS prices including first of all the deliveries to the Ukraine. This implicit loss on 
western CIS sales triggered lobbying for the principle of European netback pricing by 
Russian gas managers. The political factor on the other hand has to do with the so-
called “Orange Revolution” of December 2004. In the aftermath of 2004 the 
Yushchenko administration urged stronger ties with the E.U. and NATO and tried to 
distance the country from Russia. Yushchenko’s first Prime Minister Yulia 
Timoshenko determined a disruption of the energy regime, which was being installed 
by Yushchenko’s forerunner Leonid Kuchma and Gazprom. So Russia had both: A 
set of fresh economical goals and also the political opponents to put on the back 
foot.56  
 
4.4. The 2006 gas crisis 
 
As a result Moscow decided to raise import prices to the Ukraine much more rapidly 
than in countries such as Belarus that decided to share ownership of its pipeline 
systems with Russia. This erupted in the January 2006 crisis, which was one of two 
occasions when Russian supplies to European countries were significantly disrupted 
due to a dispute with the transit country Ukraine. The 2006 crisis concerned prices as 
much as import terms and resulted in the following outcomes: 
- End of barter deals: the gas for transit regime was being dismissed, instead 
the transit fees were henceforth to be paid cash 
                                                
55 cf. Pirani, Simon (2009b), p. 93 
56 cf. Pirani, Simon (2009b), p. 99 
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- Separation of transit and supply contracts 
- No future negotiations between the Ukraine and Turkmenistan, all Turkmen 
exports were to be bought directly by Gazprom and resold  
- The joint venture wholesale trader Ukrgaz-Energo was built up and given a 
dominant position in the Ukrainian domestic market   
The set up of European netback prices was not possible at this stage due to the fact 
that the Ukrainian government proved that they were not afraid to use their almost 
transit monopoly as an ultimate bargaining tool.57 
 
 
4.5. The 2009 gas crisis 
 
In this subchapter I will give a brief overview on the 2009 gas war between Russia 
and the Ukraine in order to understand the current relationship between the two 
countries as a political and economical background for my further discussion on the 
crisis. This section will just mention the basic outlines of the topic as an in-deep 
assessment has been done by the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies already. 
To start up it is crucial to have an idea of the development of transit prices and import 
prices in comparison to European netback pricing. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Illustrative European border prices, transit charges, Ukrainian netback and actual import 
prices in $/mcm (Pirani, Stern et al. (2009), p. 10) 
 
                                                
57 cf. Pirani, Stern et al. (2009), pp. 7-9 
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According to the estimates by Pirani, Stern et al. (2009) European border prices 
increased massively between 2004 and 2008, mostly due to the steady rise of oil 
prices. Import prices to the Ukraine increased substantially as well but the most 
important an interesting fact is, that the delta between the actual Ukrainian import 
prices and the European netback prices rose as well. 
In 2007 European gas prices briefly rose to 500 $/mcm. But as Russia was at that 
time in a conflict with Belarus, Ukraine’s import prices for 2007 were settled without 
any dispute. Political changes in the Ukraine occurred. Former Prime Minister Yulia 
Timoshenko took over the power again and immediately started to work against 
Russian interests. As a result Ukrgaz-Energo was being dismissed and therefore a 
major vehicle for Russia to establish its position in the domestic market of the 
Ukraine did not exist any longer.58 
The direct reason for the massive gas crisis of January 2009 are widespread but the 
trigger appears to be economical.  
A big part of the problem was that the Ukrainian gas company Naftogaz failed in 
clearing their debts to Gazprom. In mid December 2008 Gazprom already stated that 
Naftogaz had accumulated a debt of $2,195 billion. Gazprom’s CEO Miller and also 
the Russian Prime Minister Putin warned Ukraine publicly that in order of non-
payment consequences might appear. These warnings were also a hint for the 
European Commission in order to remind the Ukraine of its obligations coming with 
the ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty. Naftogaz after all paid $1,52 billion to 
Russia on the 30th of December 2008 leaving an outstanding debt delta of $614 
million. The question that has to be asked is of course why Russia and Gazprom 
allowed the debt of Ukraine to rise to those enormous proportions. Ukraine should 
have been cut off earlier. Russia should have had an interest in sending a positive 
signal to the European costumers assuring them that problems like witnessed in 
2006 would not occur again. On the other hand the financial crisis of 2008 and an 
interconnected sharp decline in oil prices started to translate negatively in Gazprom’s 
revenue outlook for 2009. Under those circumstances Gazprom had to start to collect 
all possible revenues and use the situation to establish a contract moving the prices 
closer to European netback.59     
 
                                                
58 cf. Pirani, Stern et al. (2009), pp. 7-9 
59 cf. Pirani, Stern et al. (2009), pp. 15-17 
 55 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3: Gas transported through Ukraine  (bcm ), (Pirani, Simon (2009b), p. 110) 
Sources used by Pirani (2009b): Naftogaz web site; Naftogaz, Offering Circular 2004, p. 69 
 
 
Table 4.3 shows the figures for gas transit through Ukraine from 2000 until 2007. It 
does not include the volumes for domestic use in the Ukraine. What we can see is a 
steady decline of transported volumes since 2004 going along with a decline of 
transports to Europe over the same period. In 2007 the Russian diversification 
strategy made a first significant impact. Transit to the CIS fell massively from 14,7 
bcm/year to 3,1 bcm/year. The main reason was that the gas, which used to be 
transported via Eastern Ukraine to Southern Russia was now being transported by a 
new Russian bypass pipeline on domestic soil.60  
In general gas problems may occur out of three different variations of middleman 
countries: 
- There are either one or several paths for pipelines between producer and 
consumer countries (in the case of Russia this can be Ukrainian vs. Belarus 
transit); 
- The transit country is either a net gas exporter, a net gas importer (in the case 
of Ukraine), or neither a producer nor a consumer of natural gas.  
- The transit country is potentially a member of a political block, in which case 
political interest of a fourth country could impose externalities.61 
                                                
60 cf. Pirani, Simon (2009b), p. 110 
61 Yegorov, Wirl (2009), p. 147 
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- 1 January: Gazprom cuts all supplies for Ukrainian consumption, while supplies 
to Europe continue 
- 5 January: Gazprom alleges that 65.3 mmcm of gas has been ‘stolen’ during 
the first four days of the year; Ukraine responds that in the absence of a 
supply and transit contract it is entitled to take this ‘technical’ (fuel) gas 
- 6 January: Deliveries to Europe drastically reduced  
- 7 January: Deliveries to Europe completely cut off  
- 11 January: EU monitors deployed  
- 13–17 January: Gazprom cites daily attempts to resume flows ‘blocked by 
Ukraine’  
- 14 January: Letter from Naftogaz to Gazprom cites lack of a ‘technical 
agreement’ preventing resumption of flows  
- 19 January: Ten year supply and transit contracts signed 
- 20 January: Gas flows to Ukraine and Europe restart  
- 22 January: Gas flows to all European customers returning to normal levels 
 
Box 4.1: The Russia-Ukraine crisis of 1-22 January 2009: major milestones  (Pirani, Stern et al. 
(2009), p. 19) 
 
Box 4.1 illustrates the culmination of the political and economical dispute between 
Russia and the Ukraine at the beginning of the year 2009. After all deliveries to 
Europe were cut off completely for several days until the flows were restarted around 
the 20th of January 2009. The important outcome of the crisis was a ten year supply 
and transit contract, which I will have a closer look on now. 
Table 4.4 illustrates the sharp cut off of supply during the 2009 crisis. Within just a 
week Russia reduced the flow of gas to Europe to a minimum. 
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Table 4.4: Supply of Russian natural gas to Ukraine and transit for the period 1-6 January, 2009, 
according to Naftogaz Ukrainy in Miillion cubic meters (mmcm), (Pirani, Stern et al. (2009), p. 21) 
Sources used by Pirani, Stern et al. (2009): NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine is indigant at OJSC Gazprom’s 
statements, Naftogaz Ukrainy website, 7 January, 2009 
 
 
 
4.6. The 10 year supply and transit contract as the result of the 2009 crisis 
 
The Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the Ukraine Prime Minister Yulia 
Timoshenko finally signed an agreement on gas supply and transit to covert he long-
term period of 2009 until 2019.62   
The contract has been analyzed into deep by Pirani, Stern et al. Based on their 
analysis I will give a brief overview on their findings: 
 
- The supply contract (Article 2) provides for 40 bcm of gas to be delivered to 
Ukraine in 2009 and 52 bcm annually (the annual contract quantity) from 2010 
to the end of the contract period 
- Prices will be 80 per cent of a “European price” in 2009 and 100 per cent from 
2010 (Article 4) 
- There are strict rules on taking extra gas, and strict payment terms, for 
Naftogaz Ukrainy 
                                                
62 cf. Pirani, Stern et al. (2009), p. 26 
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- Sales will be made directly by Gazprom to Naftogaz Ukrainy on Ukraine’s 
borders with Russia and Belarus (Article 2) 
- Gazprom’s wholly-owned Ukrainian trading subsidiary, Gazprom-Sbyt, will 
market at least 25 per cent of the imported gas 
- The annual transit volumes for the ten year period will be not less than 110 
bcm 
- The transit tariff will be $1,7/mcm/00km in 2009 although the revenue, which 
Ukraine will receive should take into account an advance payment of $250m 
which Gazprom made under amendment to the previous transit contract 
- Gazprom will make and advance payment for transit services of $1,7 billion, 
under an annex to the contract63 
 
In general we are facing a very strict new gas relationship between Russia and 
Ukraine and facing the fact of European netback pricing the possibility is given, that 
the Ukraine will have payment problems again which may result in another 
disconnection of European supply. The most important impact that we have to keep 
in mind form the major points of this contract is the fact that the payment 
methodology changed drastically. Before the prices charged to the Ukraine were 
netted forward from Central Asia including transportation and a profit margin for 
Russia. Now the prices will be netted backwards from European prices, which might 
be even an advantage for Ukraine, as it anyway does not have any power over the 
prices arranged between Russia and Central Asia. This might result in a risk 
reduction due to uncertainty reduction.64    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
63 cf. Pirani, Stern et al. (2009), pp. 26-28 
64 cf. Pirani, Stern et al. (2009), pp. 29-30 
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4.7. The impact of the 2009 gas crisis on Europe 
 
Within this subchapter I will briefly focus on the role of Europe within the January 
2009 gas conflict and especially on the impacts that it might have on Europe.  
Besides several official statements that were given by the European Commission on 
their leading role in the settlement of the crisis Pirani, Stern et al. (2009) seem to 
comment very plausible on the facts.  
They state that the European Commission played a rather minor role. The role was 
more or less reduced to a diplomatic one urging both parties to cooperate. Overall 
the Commission hat little monitoring capability from a technical point of view, it had 
little credibility and political leverage and it also was unwilling to provide financial 
resources in order to at least end the crisis quickly considering that it was the middle 
of winter in Europe and the Ukraine.65  
Before I move on to summarize the consequences for all the three involved parties 
Europe, Ukraine and Russia I would like to diversify the outcomes and have a look 
on Eastern Europe, which was affected the harshest way. 
 
 
Country Bulgaria Serbia Bosnia  Macedonia Croatia Moldova Romania Greece 
Shortfall 100% 100% 100% 100% 40% 100% 34% 80% 
Diversification 0% 12% 0% 0% Some 0% 0% LNG 
 
Table 4.5: South Eastern European Countries’ Positions and Responses on 7 January 2009  (cf. 
Kovacevic (2009), p. 11) 
Sources used by Kovacevic (2009): European Commission, news articles 
 
As we can see from table 4.5 especially Eastern Europe was hit massively by the 
2009 crisis. Most of the countries are solely dependent on Russian gas deliveries 
having no diversification strategy. Also most of the countries had a massive shortfall 
within the crisis period, many even 100 per cent. This combined with little stored gas 
due to little storage capacities can trigger serious issues. Western European 
countries on the contrary suffered little inconvenience when it comes to end-users. 
As we can especially see from table 4.5, no Western or Middle European country 
                                                
65 Pirani, Stern et al. (2009), pp. 46-49 
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was cut off completely from supply during the crisis. All the countries seem to have a 
diversification strategy as wee. When it comes to the diversification strategies it is 
interesting to observe that the countries seem to thrive for partial supply security 
inside of Europe with little transit issues using the supplies from Norway for example. 
Also African gas supply does not appear too much in the portfolios, only Italy has a 
clear increase in being supplied via Libya, at least before the “Islamic Spring”. In our 
further thinking about pricing scenarios this form of risk hedging being conducted by 
Middle and Western European countries will be interesting as well.   
 
Country Austria Czech 
Rep. 
Poland Germany France Italy 
Shortfall 66% 71% 33% 10% 25% 15% 
Diversi-
fication 
Norway, 
Germ-
any 
Norway, 
Yamal/ 
Germ-
any 
Norway Norway, 
Netherlands 
In-
dustry 
co-
vered 
Increasing 
(Libya, 
Norway, 
Netherlands) 
 
Table 4.6. Middle and Western European Countries’ Positions and Responses on 7 January 2009  (cf. 
Pirani, Stern et al. (2009), pp. 54-55) 
Source used by Pirani, Stern et al. (2009): Gas Coordination Group, Member State General Situation 
According to Significance of Impact, Memo 09/3, Brussels, 9 January 2009  
 
My next step now is to go more in detail when it comes to the direct outcomes that 
the 2009 gas crisis had on Russia, Europe (especially Western Europe in this 
context) and the Ukraine as we have here several implications which will be 
interesting for our further look at pricing.  
On the one hand it can be stated that the 2009 crisis was a massive damage for 
Gazprom’s image especially when it comes to security of supplies.   
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„Gazprom’s reputation for reliability of supply has been damaged, perhaps 
irreparably. This is not just because many were always predisposed, for 
ideological reasons, to believe that Gazprom was not a secure supplier, but 
because the majority of ordinary European citizens and politicians will not be 
interested in detailed legal/commercial arguments about which side was to 
blame for this crisis.“66 
 
For the Ukraine the problem should be two-folded. On the one hand it will have 
problems with the high import prices due to major economic and fiscal problems. On 
the other hand Russia might choose to diversify the transit network and run less and 
less via Ukraine. This strategy is a powerful threat to use when it comes to 
negotiations if transit tariffs and import prices. Ukraine anyway chose a more pro-
Russian path since 2010 which also resulted in a new agreement that we I will 
discuss shortly within the next subchapter. Anyway the Ukraine is heavily gas 
dependent and heavily dependent on Russian imports, so in order to reduce this 
dependence the most powerful tools would be a reduction of energy inefficiency and 
increasing domestic production.67  
This suggestion by Pirani, Stern et al. (2009) however does not include an idea of 
how to increase domestic production of natural gas in the Ukraine. I believe that the 
problem can be tackled of course on the one hand by decreasing inefficiencies but 
on the other hand natural gas deliveries from Russia can just by a very small 
percentage be replaced by domestic production. A much more feasible way might be 
to think of alternatives. Coal might be an interesting alternative to take into 
consideration. This however shall be the topic of a different paper.  
 
Europe on the other hand is dealing with short, medium and long term impacts. 
- Short-run: Interconnection between Western-Middle Europe and South-
Eastern Europe in order to reduce the risk in case of shortages 
- Medium-run (2011-2015): Pipeline diversification like Nord Stream and South 
stream, bypassing the Ukraine, will reduce the transit risk due to Russia-
Ukraine disputes, also LNG terminals will be interesting in this concern 
                                                
66 Pirani, Stern et al. (2009), p. 57  
67 cf. Pirani, Stern et al. (2009), pp. 57-58 
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- Long-run (post 2020): Large scale Caspian and Middle East pipelines such as 
Nabucco  
Anyway it is also important to keep in mind that Europe has long-term contracts with 
Russia and that the economies have to stabilize in order to live up to the contracts 
and then think of diversification issues.68   
 
4.8. The implications of the 2010 gas agreement 
 
As Timoshenko and Viktor Janukowitsch could not reach a coalition agreement in 
2009 they met as opponents at the presidential election of 2010. Yanukovich won 
and Timoshenko resigned which triggered a dramatic change in the political climate. 
Timoshenko is meanwhile imprisoned due to irregularities in the gas deals with 
Russia. At the time of writing this paper many commentators suggest that she as 
more of a political prisoner and that the new president Yanukovich wants to keep the 
opposition down. 
Yanukovich changed the political path of his country to a pro Russia course. Under 
president Viktor Yushchenko the relations with Russia reached their lowest ebbs. 
With the newly elected president both sides signalled willingness to move closer and 
increase the relations. Yanukovich replaced key positions in Naftogaz Ukrainy with 
new managers who had a loyal relationship to him and his political party, the Party of 
Regions. In the aftermath of 2008 financial crisis Ukraine is in a heavy recession 
which has to be met centrally also with a reform of the energy sector. Especially 
Ukraine’s gas import bill is e serious economic problem for the country. Russia’s 
thrive for European netback pricing lies heavily on the Ukraine and also on other CIS 
countries such as Belarus.69  
As we can see in table 4.7 all the CIS import prices are being moved closer to 
European netback but the Ukrainian price is rising faster than the price in Belarus or 
Moldavia. So the interesting question for the Ukraine is: How to find a deal with 
Russia to reach discounts like for example Belarus in order to reduce gas bills? 
 
                                                
68 cf. Pirani, Stern et al. (2009), pp. 58-59 
69 cf. Pirani, Stern et al. (2010), pp. 5-9 
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„The effect of the 2009 “gas war” and the economic crisis on Naftogaz 
Ukrainy, was the collapse of the cross-subsidization scheme it had been 
operating in its gas business. It had been using income from industrial 
customers, and state subsidies, to offset both the effect of non-payment, 
mainly by district heating companies, and prices both for those district heating 
companies and residential customers that were far below cost recovery.“ 70  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7. Some comparative CIS gas prices  (Pirani, Stern et al. (2010), p. 7) 
 
 
                                                
70 Pirani, Stern et al. (2010), p. 8 
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Table 4.8. Outline of Ukraine’s gas and transit trade with Russia  (Pirani, Stern et al. (2010), p. 9) 
Sources used by Pirani, Stern et al. (2010): Energy Charter Secretariat information, government and 
company statements, energy ministry statements (for volumes and prices) 
 
Table 4.8 gives us some figures that we are already aware of but also gives 
projections on 2010 form a 2009 point of view based on a 2010 agreement between 
Moscow and Kiev in as a result of the Ukraine’s need to get a discount. We see much 
higher transit prices with $/mcm/100km 2,75 and a milder increase on import prices 
to $255,15 per mcm. 
What did the Ukraine offer for the discount?  
 
“The agreement signed between presidents Medvedev and Yanukovich on 21 
April14 provides for discounts on gas imports worth up to $40 billion under 
current contracts that expire in 2019. In return, Ukraine will extend the lease 
on the Sevastopol base used by Russia‟s Black Sea fleet from 2017 to 2042, 
with a further five-year option.”71 
 
In the opinion of this author this agreement marks the comeback of the political and 
strategically use of gas exports and imports rather than using market mechanisms. 
Form this point of view this development has to be kept in mind for the discussion of 
possible market pricing in further chapters. 
 
                                                
71 Pirani, Stern et al. (2010), p. 12 
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4.9. Natural gas transit to Europe via Ukraine: General figures 
 
In order to close this chapter I would like to bring in some additional figures to have a 
concrete idea of the Ukrainian transit and import balance of natural gas. 
Table 4.9 gives a general overview on the topic. We can see that Ukraine had to deal 
with a massive increase in import prices since 2003, rising from $50 per mcm to at 
least $175 per mcm in a 2009 projection. As we already know from other sources 
transit to CIS countries has been reduces to a minimum due to a Russian bypass 
strategy while the volumes transported to Europe are quite steady. Costs of transit 
tariffs also increased leading to a total transit value of $2,2 bn in 2008, which 
accounts for more than 25 per cent of the value of gas imports to the Ukraine. 
Considering just this fact it is clear what a crucial part the transit network plays in 
keeping the Ukraine’s gas balance at least somehow stable. Table 4.10 also 
supports this fact. 
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 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
(projected) 
Ukraine gas 
balance 
       
Ukraine, 
consumption 
68,7 68,1 68,9 65,9 62,8 59,3 58 
Ukraine, 
technical requ. 
7,6 7,6 7,4 8,1 7,0 7,0 7,0 
Ukraine, 
imports (pres.) 
56,9 55,4 55,8 53,3 49,1 54,4 40 
Ukraine 
production 
19,4 20,3 20,5 20,7 20,7 20 20 
Import price 
($/mcm) 
$50 $50 $44-
80 
$95 $130 $179,5 $175-360 
Total value of 
imports, $ bn 
nest. 
$2,84bn $2,77bn $3,2bn $5,06bn $6,38bn $8,44bn $7,0-
14,4bn 
Transit        
Volumes 
transported 
(bcm/year) 
       
To Europe 112,4 120,3 121,5 113,8 112,1 116,9 117 
To the CIS 16,8 16,8 14,9 14,7 3,1 2,7 3 
Cost of transit 
($/100km/mcm) 
barter barter $1,09 $1,6 $1,6 $1,7 $1,7 
Value of transit 
services, $ bn, 
est. 
$1,48bn n/a $1,5bn $2,2bn $2,1bn $2,2bn $2,35bn 
 
Table 4.9. Ukraine’s gas trade and transit: an outline (cf. Pirani, Stern et al. (2009), p. 6) 
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Year Amount Method of payment 
2001 $1430,0m Cash+kind 
2002 $1647,2m Cash+kind 
2003 $1482,5m Cash+kind 
2004 n/a  
2005 $1550m Cash, incl. $250m paid in 
adv.+kind 
2006 $2200m Cash, incl. $250m paid in 
adv 
2007 $2200m Cash, incl. $250m paid in 
adv 
 
Table 4.10. Naftogaz Ukrainy income from gas transit (Pirani, Simon (2009b), p. 113) 
Source used by Pirani (2009b): Naftogaz Ukrainy, Offering Circular, p. 46 (2001-03); East European 
Gas Analysis (2005); Ukrsibbank, Naftogaz: company research (2006-07)   
 
The Ukrainian gas transport network is generally one of the largest networks (37.800 
km) worldwide. It has an input capacity of 175 bcm and an output capacity of 175 
bcm. Russia is interested in gaining possession of this transport system but so far it 
failed. This also an important strategically and political implication when it comes to 
pricing and the strategic use of pricing the Russian exports to Ukraine. As we know 
from table 4.3 transit volumes peaked in 2004 at a level of 137,1 bcm/year. There are 
four scenarios for the future use of the network: 
- Management by a consortium with 50% or greater Russian participation. This 
would be a pro Russian course which is conducted by the present president 
Viktor Janukowitsch 
- Management by a consortium with less than 50% Russian participation. This 
solution is more pro European 
- Privatisation 
- Continued management by Ukratransgaz. Here the problem will be a financial 
one implying the necessity of raising money whether from Russia or Europe.    
Generally the pipeline is getting older and older without proper maintenance, so a 
proper scenario should be chosen within a short time horizon.72  
                                                
72 cf. Pirani, Simon (2009b), pp. 109-116 
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5. Gas Pricing Mechanisms 
 
Within the former chapters I was dealing mainly with political and macro economical 
implications on the gas sector and on the co-dependent relations between Russia, 
Europe and the Ukraine. Politics, geopolitics and macroeconomics are one side of 
implications in order to derive and explain gas price developments. Another 
implication should be given by market economical thoughts as well. 
As we have already observed natural gas markets, as important as they are, do not 
function optimal. Otherwise occasions like the 2009 gas war should not be possible. 
In the United States for example there is spatial pricing that correctly reflects 
substantial delivery and infrastructure costs. Europe’s markets tend to be more and 
more liberalized but neglect spatial differences and the thrive of global market 
integration due to LNG technologies. Pure market economical arguments on gas 
pricing not always work. It becomes important to think interdisciplinary. Economics, 
politics and geopolitics should be thought as an integrated framework of inputs on the 
development of natural gas prices.73 
The externalities politics and geopolitics we have discussed so far already. In my 
further steps within this paper I would like to test pure market structures and then 
discuss my outcomes in the light of the externalities. Therefore I will first of all briefly 
describe and summarize the current pricing situation of European long-term delivery 
contracts. This will be followed by Jonathan Stern’s discussion about changing the 
oil-linked scheme to a more market driven framework such as hub pricing. Having 
introduced the framework I will put a data set consisting mainly of Russian long-term 
border prices at the German border, the European Gas Index and oil prices to the 
test in chapter 6. I will use data from the European Gas Index and compare it with 
given historical data of Russian border prices as well as the oil price volatility in order 
to be able to comment on the outcomes that a market driven pricing framework might 
have. These outcomes will be furthermore discussed with additional implications from 
politics and geopolitics.    
 
 
 
                                                
73 cf. Yegorov, Wirl (2010), pp. 2-3 
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5.1. The general context of gas pricing   
 
There are three general categories of natural gas prices, depending on the degree of 
regulation, competitiveness of the market and market liquidity: 
- Government-regulated prices 
- Price indexation to competing fuels 
- Spot market pricing in competitive gas markets 
Russian long-term contracts to Europe fall under the regime of oil-index prices, which 
basically means that the underlying principle is price competition with alternative 
fuels. For example gas used to home heating is relative to gasoil and gas used for 
industrial purposes is priced relatively to heavy fuel oil.74  
Within this paper I will not describe the historical development of European gas 
contracts in detail, as many commentators have covered this issue already. I will 
rather focus on the present situation. 
Generally the concept market value pricing goes back to early European pricing 
traditions following the early Dutch contracts in the 1960s. Central was the market 
value at the point of sale with an overhead of transportation cost and profit margin. 
The principal competing fuel was agreed to be gasoil in order to derive the market 
value or the so-called replacement value. Another important implication of those 
contracts was the possibility of price review. The netback value would change over 
time due to changing prices of competing fuels, changes in technology and the 
market shares of alternative fuels. In order to cover these changes dates were 
specified, for example once every three years, at which each party could request 
renegotiation of the contract terms. The Dutch contract’s key features where 
afterwards introduced into potential supplies from more distant countries such as 
Russia. As here distance and the needed supply network become huge cost factors 
the contracts included less upward volume flexibility as it was with the Dutch 
contracts. ‘Minimum Bill’, or ‘Take or Pay’ clauses were introduced, which means that 
typically 80 to 90 per cent of the agreed quantity had to be taken and paid.75    
 
 
                                                
74 cf. Melling, Anthony J. (2010), p. 15 
75 cf. Melling, Anthony J. (2010), pp. 16-22 
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Graph 5.1. Traditional German gas market/contracting structure (Melling, Anthony J. (2010), p. 18) 
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Graph 5.1 shows the traditional German gas market based on its contractual 
structure. Within this paper part one is the most crucial one, which defines the 
contract structure between the producing companies and the distribution companies 
and the wholesalers. Most of the Russian deliveries come via Gazprom. As we can 
see the key contract terms include oil-indexation, which would be based on the Dutch 
contracting scheme that was introduced earlier within this chapter. The contracts are 
defined as long-term contracts with a duration of 20 years and more, the ‘Take or 
Pay’ clause is on a level of around 85 per cent and contracts include price 
renegotiation clauses. As we can see the contracts stay oil-indexed until they reach 
the end-users such as large industry and small industry, but the contractual running 
times are much lower than the long-term contracts with the producers. 
An interesting side-fact that I would like to mention at this point is since the creation 
of the Interconnector between the UK and the continent also gas-to-gas competition 
as been referred to the indices in order to generate gas prices. Anyway the price of 
gas remains to be mainly linked to oil products and oil derivatives.76   
Graph 5.2 shows the average import price of natural gas to the EU compared with 
the Brent oil price. It makes clear that at least till 2006 a clear oil-link with a lag of 
about half a year is visible. 
   
 
Graph 5.2. Average import price of natural gas in EU (Davoust, Romain (2008), p. 12) 
Sources used by Davoust (2008): BP, Energy P&T 
                                                
76 cf. Davoust, Romain (2008), p. 11 
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5.2. Theoretical aspects of gas pricing 
 
This subchapter is based on Dickel, Kanai et al. (2007) in a publication of the Energy 
Charter Secretariat: Putting a price on Energy-International Pricing Mechanisms for 
Oil and Gas. 
 
Oil and gas are commodities, which distinguish themselves heavily from regular 
products and form other commodities. They are not standard textbook case when it 
comes to the functioning of markets. Here are some special characteristics: 
- High uncertainty linked to resource development 
- High specificity of investment 
- Character of natural resource 
- Involvement of two decision makers 
- Inelastic demand for energy 
- Market imperfections (unavoidable externalities)77 
 
All of these points find their background in theoretical aspects. In order to have a 
better understanding of the market that we are dealing with and as an environment 
for the further discussion of the data analysis within this paper I will give in 
subchapter 5.2.1-5.2.6 a brief link to those theoretical aspects based on Dickel, 
Kanai et al. (2007). 
 
5.2.1. High uncertainty and high specificity: Transaction cost theory 
 
The development of energy resources such as gas fields and the transport of the 
product to the final costumer and the end-users are clearly risky because it involves 
high specific investments in infrastructure. The specificity is especially true for gas 
transportation as gas has a much lower energy density than oil. Consequently 
storage and transportation costs are higher. Typically just few parties or companies 
are involved in a transaction.  
Transaction cost theory states that there are three instruments to govern 
transactions: Markets, organised firms or long-term contracts. In the case of the gas 
                                                
77 cf. Dickel. Kanai et al. (2007), p. 42 
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industry this is typically long-term contracts and not markets, leading to transaction 
costs such as negotiation and enforcement of the contracts.78   
 
5.2.2. Character of natural resource: Ricardian rent 
 
As gas is a natural resource the costs of exploration and the quality of the production 
site are dependent on the location. There are for example different techniques when 
it comes to onshore and offshore drilling. There are differences between small fields 
and let’s say super-giant fields. A regular manufactured good does not have this 
implication of location on costs. As a result different locations have different costs 
and therefore imply different rents. This rent is called a Ricardian Rent.  
 
5.2.3. Finitness of resources: Hotelling theorem 
 
It is a common fact that natural gas is a finite resource and that one day all stocks will 
be used. Anyway for some time to come the question of finite resources is not a 
question of a completely depleted planet but a question of willingness to invest in 
exploration of existing resources. The Ricardian approach already explained us the 
fact that different location qualities imply different costs and therefore different rents. 
This can bee contrasted by the Hotelling Theorem.  
 
„This approach provides the conceptual basis for an energy-pricing system 
based on replacement value. All further development of the economic theory 
on finite resources is based on Hotelling’s theorem. It claims that the depletion 
path for a finite resource will be such that the annual revenue follows the 
interest rate, and that the resulting price path is such that an alternative 
(backstop technology) will be an economic substitute when the finite resource 
is depleted.“79 
 
This implies that on the one hand there are companies who make decisions on the 
depletion of gas field based on some kind of discounted cash-flow analysis. The 
Hotelling rent shows what a resource owner gets for the depletion and what a 
                                                
78 Dickel, Kanai et al. (2007) refer to Coase, R. H., The nature of the firm, accessible at 
http://www.cerna.ensmp.fr/Enseignement/CoursEcoIndus/SupportsdeCours/COASE.pdf, 24 January 
2007  
79 Dickel. Kanai et al. (2007), p. 45 
 74 
consumer would pay beyond the marginal cost of production. Graph 5.3 illustrates 
based on oil production the difference between Ricardian Rent, which is derived by 
the cost side and Hotelling Rent, which is derived by the supply side.    
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 5.3. Rents of oil production (Dickel, Kanai et al. (2007), p. 46) 
Source used by Dickel, Kanai et al. (2007): Energy Charter Secretariat 
 
 
5.2.4. Involvement of two decision makers: Principal-Agent theory  
 
The right to natural resources is usually a state right, so the state represented by its 
government is usually the resource owner. On the other side there is the production 
company. The time horizons of the two players differ. Governments have to account 
also for future generations while companies have to satisfy present shareholder 
needs. Risks and rewards are to be split by the two parties. This scenario is 
addressed by principal-agent theory. It deals with technological knowledge owned by 
the agent production company and later on the resource risk sharing, risk of 
marketing, risk of price development and the sharing of the income. The principal’s 
decision lies on the development speed and the volume. Domestic pricing policy is 
often based on social grounds but export prices reflect a rent maximizing behaviour 
by the principal. This can also lead to restrictions of volumes in order to influence 
prices. This is true for OPEC members for example. Gas exporting countries will 
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export to attractive countries in terms of volumes and prices as much as they will 
focus on premium segments of the import country’s market.         
 
5.2.5. Inelastic demand for energy 
 
Gas is an essential good within the industrialised world. Demand for gas itself is a 
function of many factors. It includes the price of the commodity, the income levels of 
the import country, the pattern of the technologies used in the import country and 
also individual preference. On a short-term basis the demand for gas is more or less 
completely inelastic because the economy cannot immediately adjust to a different 
technology. The long-term demand gets more elastic. As we are talking about a finite 
resource the demand curve also faces a constraint on capacity. The closer the curve 
gets to the constraint the less elastic is demand. The impact of price of a highly 
inelastic demand combined with high concentration on the side of the producer is 
given by the Cournot/Nash formula. 
 
(Price-Marginal cost)/Price = HHI/ε            (equ.1)80 
 
ε implies the demand elasticity whereas HHI stands for the Hirschmann-Herfindahl 
index, which expresses market concentration. What we can see in this formula is that 
high market concentration has little effect on price as long as demand is elastic and 
vice verca. That would also mean that in a market with just few players on the supple 
side, like it is the case with the gas market, and very inelastic demand at least short-
term, this market structure has an impact on price. 
 
5.2.6. Market imperfections: Unavoidable externalities 
 
In a market like the gas market allocation by the market doe not always work 
according to the textbook, market imperfections occur. In energy markets the 
following market imperfections are typical: 
 
- Imperfect competition 
- Externalities 
- Presence of public goods 
                                                
80 Nash, J. (1951), pp. 286-295 
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A way to deal with externalities is Pigou Taxes, which charge a tax on a player who 
causes a negative externality.81 
 
5.3. Contracting practice within Russian long-term contracts 
 
This subchapter is based on Melling (2010), pp. 77-84. 
 
It is well know that Gazprom retains absolute control over Russian gas exports and 
that this situation is a major bargaining advantage for Russia. Some major principles 
of Russian gas exports are: 
 
- Long-term contracts by ‘Take or pay’ principles 
- One channel of gas exports to European countries (Gazprom Export LLC) 
- Setting gas prices on the basis of the market value of petroleum products 
using an appropriate formula 
- Monopoly of gas purchases from Central Asia  
- Investments in new gas development just on the basis of existing sales 
contracts on a long-term basis 
- Diversification of transport routes (for example Nord Stream and South 
Stream) 
 
The exports to Europe are conducted via Gazprom Export, the sales to CIS countries 
remain under more politically driven business units. Spot sales into continental 
Europe function via subsidiaries. Gazprom is keen on not upsetting long-term 
costumers who could demand renegotiations of prices as a result of the market price 
influence of spot market volumes. Gazprom is very careful when it comes to that. 
Most of Russian deliveries to Western Europe are under long-term agreements and 
indexed primarily to gasoil and secondarily to heavy fuel oil. As sales to Western 
Europe are very defined since the fall of the Soviet Union the relationship with CIS is 
yet to be defined and subject of discussion and negotiation. Anyway also the 
European contracts feature some anomalies. 
 
                                                
81 chapter 5.2 cf. Dickel, Kanai (2007), pp. 41-51 
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- Spot sales into Continental Europe: As mentioned above this could be 
problematic when it comes to renegotiation clauses in long-term contracts. 
When spot prices are higher than oil-indexed prices long-term costumers will 
by at the upper limit of their contract. If they are lower it will be difficult for 
Gazprom to release volumes directly to European spot markets, undercutting 
long-term costumers. 
- Sales by intermediaries: A non-transparent schema of entities exists to buy 
gas in CIS countries such as Turkmenistan and resell in Europe. 
- Distance discounts: Gazprom has little competition at the Eastern German 
border. This enables Gazprom to charge slightly higher prices in Eastern 
Europe.    
 
Russian sellers state the wish to maintain oil-indexed contracts over market-based 
pricing mechanisms in order to secure their future investments. The goal is to bring 
all contracts to a comparable price level without favoured nations and increase the 
Brent crude parity, which is at present times around 65 to 80 per cent. Gazprom’s 
recent goals include: 
 
- Expand Russian gas production 
- Expand sales to Europe to 220 bcm/year by 2020 
- Enhance access to European gas markets by acquiring gas distribution assets 
- Alliances with key transit states 
- Expand spot market deliveries 
- Invest in LNG business 
- Raise Russian domestic prices to European netback levels82 
 
5.4. Price Formula for long-term contracts 
 
As we already know from chapter 5.1 European long-term gas supply contracts 
mostly depend following the Dutch contract structure. Important to note is that 
contracts that followed the Dutch structure included less flexibility. The main major 
elements, which will be afterwards reflected in a stylized formula, are: 
 
                                                
82 chapter 5.3 cf. Melling, Anthony J. (2010), pp. 77-84  
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- Long-term supply obligations ensured by the minimum pay concept 
- Pricing based on the concept of netback value calculated on the basis of 
competing energies 
- Regular recalculation of the gas price  
- Delivery point and price reference point can differ 
- Regular review of price conditions (mostly three year intervals) 
Nowadays more than 250 bcm/year are imported to the EU countries under this 
concept.83  
 
Pm = Po + 0,6*0,8*0,0078*(LFOm-LFOo) + 0,4*0,9*0,0076*(HFOm-HFOo) (equ.2)84 
 
Formula 2 shows a stylized price formula under the netback concept. The formula 
consist of the following parts: 
 
(i) Pm: Gas price during the month m, it as a function of 
- Po: Starting gas price 
- Price development of competing fuel (LFO: Light fuel oil, HFO: heavy fuel oil) 
(ii)  0,6 and 0,4: Shares of gas market segments of competing with respective fuel 
(iii)  0,8 and 0,9: Pass through factors (sharing of risk and reward of the price 
development between buyer and seller) 
(iv) 0,0078 and 0,0076: Technical equivalence factors to convert the units of 
prices for fuel into units of gas prices 
(v) LFO: Price of light fuel oil, reflecting smaller costumers 
(vi) LFOo: Price of light fuel oil for starting month o 
(vii) LFOm: Price of light fuel oil resulting for month m 
(viii) HFO: Price of heavy fuel oil, reflecting larger costumers 
(ix) HFOo: Price of heavy fuel oil for starting month o 
(x) HFOm: Price of heavy fuel oil resulting for month m 
 
The starting price is negotiated on the basis of currency and determined minus 
delivery costs and minus marketing incentives. Price review clauses include the right 
for each party to suggest the reflection of external changes in the formula, which 
                                                
83 cf. Dickel, Konoplaynik et al. (2007), pp. 152-153 
84 Dickel, Konoplaynik et al. (2007), p. 154 
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cannot be controlled, by the party. The claim has to be substantiated by prove of the 
claim. Usually renegotiations are held every three years at a fixed date. When it 
comes to the relationship of Europe with Gazprom it can be stated that Russia 
prolonged its main delivery contracts with costumers like OMV, ENI, E.On-Ruhrgas 
or Gaz de France in 2006 with expiry dates between 2027 and 2036.85  
 
5.5. European netback formula for the Ukraine import price 
 
Based on the long-term contracts and the resulting prices the Russian Federal Tariff 
Service used a formula in order to derive netback prices for CIS countries such as 
Ukraine. The formula shown here is the one used for the third quarter of 2007.86   
      (equ.3)87 
 
(i) Pi: European netback price for zone i 
(ii) PE: Realised export gas price in the European market (RUR/mcm) 
(iii)  D: Export duty (%) 
(iv) Tarr: Tariffs in quarter r of base period (RUR) 
(v)  r: Current quarter of base period 
(vi) j: Current month of base period 
(vii) VEj: Gas volume exported to the European market in month (mcm) 
(viii) TC: Transportation costs outside of the Russian border 
                                                
85 cf. Dickel, Konoplaynik et al. (2007), pp. 154-158 
The authors also refer tot he following sources: Information provided on these contract extensions 
comes from the monthly edition of Gas Matters: OMV (34 Gas Matters, October 2006), ENI (24 Gas 
Matters, November 2006), E.ON Ruhrgas (26 Gas Matters, September 2006), GdF (20 Gas Matters, 
December 2006) 
86 cf. Mitrova, Pirani et al. (2009), pp. 434-435 
87 Mitrova, Pirani et al. (2009), p. 435, Sources: Russian Federal Tariffs Services 
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(ix) ΔTCaverageRussia: Difference between average transportation costs from the 
production site to the Russian border and the average transportation costs 
from the production site to the Russian consumer (RUR/mcm) 
(x)  Ci: Price zone coefficient88  
 
In general we have here a price netted back from average European sales excluding 
transportation costs and adjusted by a prize zone coefficient. The author of this paper 
assumes that the coefficient functions as a reflector of Russia’s relationship with the 
respective CIS country. In this matter via the formula Ukraine faces relatively higher 
netback prices as a closer Russian ally like Belarus. 
 
Based on the 2009 agreements between Yulia Timoshenko and Vladimir Putin there 
is also a revision formula for the Ukraine gas price available. 
 
Pgas(t) = 26,2 + 1,69*poil(t) + 3,75*poil(t-9)                   (equ.4)89  
(i) pgas: Gas price in $/tcm 
(ii) poil: Oil price in $/barrel 
 
5.6. LNG and hubs 
 
So far I have discussed the structure of long-term contracted gas pricing, which is 
mostly based on the netback value idea. If one wants to think about a different, more 
market driven concept when it comes to natural gas pricing the existence of spot 
markets has to be taken under consideration as a reference point. 
When it comes to thinking about the gas markets itself there are also commentators 
who think of a completely integrated world market for natural gas. Siliverstovs, 
Neumann et al. (2004) put this to the test. Their conclusion was that et least in the 
1990s up to 2004 there was no significant co-integration between European, 
Japanese and North American markets. The authors state that this situation might 
                                                
88 Mitrova, Pirani et al. (2009), p. 435 
89 Yegorov, Wirl (2009), p. 154 
Source: www.expert.ru/articles/2009/01/22/itogi-gazovoy-voyny 
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change as a result of emerging global LNG markets with spot trading and physical 
arbitrage between for example European and North American markets.90  
This movement would be interesting for further research but within this paper I will 
think the European market separate from other world markets. Before we think about 
spot markets it is crucial to think about how they are actually served. Most of the gas, 
which is traded on spot markets, is LNG (liquefied natural gas).    
Europe and North America are nowadays the dominating markets when it comes to 
interest in LNG deliveries. The Atlantic Basin and the Middle East are growing 
markets. Long-term contracts have remained to be the dominating contracting 
method in order to manage risk and divide it on the two sides of the partnership. But 
there is also a certain need for flexibility, the flexibility of markets, the flexibility of 
buying a commodity like gas on different way than via pipeline gas. Flexibility has 
come in two ways: 
- Small, but growing short-term market 
- Self-contracting: Partners in the LNG plant contract with one or more of their 
own partners which act as wholesalers to the market91 
 
  
 
                                                
90 cf. Siliverstovs, Neumann et al. (2004), pp. 15-16 
91 cf. Jensen, Jim (2007), p. 175  
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Graph 5.4. Growth of LNG imports by market region (bcm) (Jensen, Jim (2007), p. 177) 
 
 
Graph 5.4 shows the growth of LNG imports by market regions. From a European 
point of view it can be stated that it is globally the second biggest importer but 
compared to pipeline imports under the regime of long-term oil linked contracts LNG 
plays a rather small role. 
 
In general LNG projects are very cost intensive. The chain of investments consist of 
field development, pipeline to the coast, liquefaction facilities, tanker transportation 
and regasification. The risk-sharing logic of LNG contracts mostly embodies that the 
buyer takes the volume risk via a take-or-pay clause and the seller takes the price 
risk via a price escalation clause.92    
 
                                                
92 cf. Jensen, Jim (2007), p. 179 
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Graph 5.5. LNG trade showing the growing role of short-term sales (bcm) (Jensen, Jim (2007), p. 183) 
 
 
As we can see in graph 5.5 the role of LNG short-term sales is globally growing 
accounting meanwhile for 11,6 per cent. This fact might imply that there is a 
constantly growing need for short-term sales and also a certain acceptance of market 
price mechanisms. 
When it comes to Continental Europe most of the LNG imports come via the 
traditional long-term contracts form Algeria, Nigeria and Trinidad. Prices are generally 
indexed via oil products but there is an on-going liberalization movement making the 
LNG prices more competitive. In general it is quite obvious that the European import 
model is not very reactive on gas-to-gas competition. From a present point of view it 
is also not likely that to long-term oil-indexed contract regime will quickly change but 
at least several gas hubs have been developed within the recent years in Western 
Europe: 
- TTF: Title Transfer Facility, Netherlands, virtual 
- Zeebrugge: Belgium 
- Bunde: Germany 
- NBP: National Balancing Point, UK 
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The hubs reflect a supply-demand situation but due to low liquidity they are 
threatened by market manipulations and also the prices are more volatile as they 
display a seasonality trend.93  
 
Trading at European hubs is increasing as we can see from graph 5.6. This ensures 
additional flexibility.    
 
 
 
Graph 5.6. Developments on European continental hubs (International Energy Agency (2009), p. 29) 
Sources used by the IEA (2009): Gas Transport Services, Huberator, GRTgaz, TIGF, CEGH, E.ON 
Gas Transport, Snam, Gasunie Deutschland 
 
                                                
93 cf. Davoust, Romain (2008), p. 13 
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Table 5.1.Traded and physical volumes at European hubs (International Energy Agency (2009), p. 30) 
Sources used by the IEA (2009): Gas Transport Services, Huberator, GRTgaz, TIGF, CEGH, E.ON 
Gas Transport, Snam, Gasunie Deutschland 
 
Table 5.1 ensures us of two important facts. On the one hand it makes clear that by 
traded volume there is only one really relevant hub which is the NBP with 960,8 
bcm/2008. Also the hubs are not very liquefied with just 66,6 bcm/2008 at NBP 
accounting for approximately 7 per cent of the traded volumes. This rate is also 
called the churn rate and serves as a measurement for the liquidity of a gas trading 
spot. 
Yegorov, Wirl (2008) discuss 3 possible future scenarios for Russian strategies: 
- Fast development of gas production and pipeline capacity 
- Slow expansion of production and yet export growth due to re-export of 
Central Asian gas 
- Fast development gas production and LNG 
The last scenario is interesting in terms of overcoming transit games for Russia and 
more flexibility when it comes to selling the gas. The consumer could be anyone and 
the question would be if Russia would sell the gas for example at European hubs and 
spot markets or if it would prefer to sell to others like Japan or the United States.94 
 
                                                
94 cf. Yegorov, Wirl (2008), pp. 316-317 
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5.7. Transition from oil-linked prices to market prices 
 
„Long-term contract traditional netback market pricing based (largely) on oil 
products is no longer logical. Oil-products indexation was originally 
necessitated by an absence of liquid gas markets. Oil was chosen as gas 
competed directly with various oil products in its main markets. By 2010, the 
scope of oil products competing directly with gas had narrowed considerably, 
gas and oil product markets have diverged, fuel oil is no longer used for power 
generation except in rare cases of peak-load provision and very little switching 
capacity remains.“95 
 
This recent statement by Anouk Honorè (2011b) serves as a prelude for one stream 
of thinking when it comes to a new approach in European gas pricing. Honorè goes 
basically along with the ideas of Jonathan Stern that he set in two major publications 
in 2009 (Continental European long-term gas contracts: is a transition away from oil 
product-linked pricing inevitable and imminent?) and 2011 together with Howard 
Rogers (The transition to hub-based gas pricing in continental Europe). Within this 
section I will briefly discuss Stern’s ideas and afterwards move over to chapter 6 
which will put Stern’s ideas to further tests based on data sets for EGIX as a market 
price, the German long-term border price for Russian natural gas imports and oil 
prices. 
 
Stern (2009c) believes that there are four main reasons for a weakening of the oil link 
ratio in Continental European gas markets since the 1970s. 
- Virtual elimination of oil products from many stationary sectors 
- Cost and inconvenience of maintaining oil-burning equipment 
- Emergence of modern gas burning equipment 
- Tightening environmental standards 
In many sectors of Continental Europe it is difficult nowadays to identify fuels, which 
genuinely compete with gas on a day-to-day basis. This causes problems in the 
operation of price clauses in the long-term contracts and arbitrage scenarios. 
Although the oil-link is not the first best solution any more, there is also the fear that a 
move away from it would strengthen the market power of major players like Gazprom 
                                                
95 Honorè, Anouk (2011b), pp. 57-58 
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too much leading to a kind of gas OPEC. On the other hand the major commercial 
parties like producers and exporters are also very comfortable with their long-term 
contracts and there might be fear of lower revenues following a change in the pricing 
mechanism. The idea supported by Stern is spot gas pricing at market hubs could set 
long-term contract prices for Europe. A major problem, as we already know, is of 
course the fact that except for the NBP in the UK there is no major hub yet. A 
transition to a pricing formula including dominant spot price elements could take 
around five years and should be generated via an indexation over several European 
hubs. This would of course have the radical results of an end of existing long-term 
contracts and a formal end of the relationship between oil and gas prices. Anyway it 
should be taken under consideration that the correlation between oil and gas is not 
completely irrelevant anymore. Gas and oil prices may decouple and recouple over 
time and depending on market conditions but the difference is that the conditions are 
supply and demand not contracts. If decoupling happens we will most probably see a 
downward shift in prices for a certain period due to an existing supply surplus. Over 
time there is of course the threat of a price or volume setting cartel in form of a kind 
of gas OPEC. Price volatility should be expected to rise as real supply and demand 
conditions will be reflected. General advantages and disadvantages are uncertain but 
the concept itself much more correctly mirrors the factual supply-demand situation.96    
 
Stern also argues together with Rogers (2011) that is based on wrong assumptions, 
mainly in the aftermath of the economic recession following 2008, that gas market 
prices would always be under the level of oil-linked prices. His key propositions are: 
- Conditions in the gas market should set gas price levels 
- Gas and oil prices will not recouple because their supply and dynamics are 
different 
- There should be a single pricing mechanism97 
 
Interesting is that Stern negates his 2009 assumption of temporarily recoupling oil 
and gas prices in the 2011 paper.  
 
 
                                                
96 cf. Stern, Jonathan (2009c), pp. 1-16 
97 cf. Stern, Rogers (2011), p. 7 
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Stern, Rogers (2011) also do not forget to mention the arguments of their opponents. 
- Producers with market power favour oil-linked prices 
- Decoupling of oil and gas price after 2008 was due to the economic recession 
- European gas hubs are insufficiently liquid and prone to manipulation 
- Abandoning the oil-link would lead to price manipulation by big players like 
Gazprom and maybe encourage a Gas-OPEC   
On the contrary we face a changing commercial environment in the gas markets. 
LNG supplies starts to connect markets more and more, continents are starting to 
have an impact on each other and hubs might be the best indicators of real market 
prices under those conditions.98  
 
 
 
 
Graph 5.7. Development of traded volumes at Continental European gas hubs 2003-09 (Stern, 
Rogers (2011), p. 12) 
Sources used by Stern, Rogers (2011): IEA, Medium term oil and gas markets 2010, Paris: IEA WEO 
2010, p. 207 
                                                
98 cf. Stern, Rogers (2011), pp. 2-3  
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Graph 5.7 illustrates additional to graph 5.5 the further development of the gas 
volumes traded at European hub showing a massive increase of 56 per cent from 
2008 to 2009, indicating a steady rise in the relevance of the hubs.  
But there are also some problems: 
 
- Lack of sufficient depth and liquidity 
- Only the NBP, which is not shown in graph 5.6 is a mature hub with churn ratio 
of an estimated 15% in 2010  
- Only daily trades are possible, futures and future risk hedging are almost not 
possible 
- High price volatility due to possible market manipulation either by sellers or 
buyers 
- Oligopolistic market structure 
- Prices become subject of speculators99 
 
These fears and possible problems shall be taken under consideration within my 
further discussion of my data analysis in chapter 6. 
 
 
Graph 5.8. European gas balance for contract year 2008/09 (Stern, Rogers (2011), p. 23) 
Source used by Stern, Rogers (2011): Howard Rogers, OIES  
 
                                                
99 cf. Stern, Rogers (2011), pp. 11-16 
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Graph 5.9. European gas balance for contract year 200/10 (Stern, Rogers (2011), p. 23) 
Source used by Stern, Rogers (2011): Howard Rogers, OIES  
 
 
From graph 5.8 and graph 5.9 we can take two things under consideration. Once 
again we see an increase in LNG imports and also a shortage of pipeline imports in 
comparison with the estimated take or pay levels in 2009 while there seems to be a 
recovery and almost equality in 2010. 
   
 
 
Table 5.2 Russian gas exports to Europe, contract years 2007-2010 (bcm) (Stern, Rogers (2011), p. 
25) 
Sources used by Stern, Rogers (2011): Interfax Russia & CIS oil and gas weekly: February 14-20, 
2008, p. 20; November 12-18, 2009, p. 27; February 11-17, 2010, p. 31; November 11-17, 2010, p. 30  
 
 91 
In this context we should finally also have a look on the Russian side. Table 5.2 first 
of all gives an impression of the development of Russian gas exports to Europe from 
2007 till 2010 showing a drastic decline during the recession period but a friendly 
increase since 2009 and 2010. 
 
The crisis also showed the drastic outcomes of take or pay levels in combination with 
the pressure of market priced volumes leading to intensive renegotiation rounds 
demand by the buyers. This lead to the observation of a certain collective change in 
the mind-sets of European buyers. 
- Traditional utility mind-set: Long-term oil-indexed contracts represent a secure 
source of supply 
- Modern utility mind-set: Long-term oil-indexed contracts represent an unbound 
future exposure relative to the market price at hubs 
Gazprom of course does not favour this change in sentiment and insists on oil-linked 
pricing. The transition could be carried out via two possible scenarios. 
- Arbitration scenario: Industry enters into a substantial scenario of arbitration 
proceedings carried out by jurisdiction experts with the hope of a landmark 
arbitral judgement to set the general tone 
- Negotiation scenario: Agreement on transitional arrangements which would 
lead to negotiated settlements or contract terminations in some cases, the 
agreements would have to be based on the definition of the market price to 
which contracts will be adjusted, the period of adjustment and the price 
adjustment during the transition 
If a path of transition to market prices will be chosen, one thing is clear: The transition 
would be highly costly and complex.100 
 
An opponent of Sterns ideas is Andrey A. Konoplaynik. He sees generally five 
options for the future of gas pricing and contractual mechanisms in Europe. 
 
- Option 1: Substitution of gas price indexation by spot quotations 
- Option 2: Maintain oil-indexation 
- Option 3: Maintain oil-indexation and move to oil parity 
                                                
100 cf. Stern, Rogers (2011), pp. 25-32 
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- Option 4: Adaptation of the mostly oil-linked gas price indexation by pricing 
formulas that include a broader spectrum of non-oil gas replacement values 
- Option 5: Develop completely new concepts101 
 
Konoplaynik is in favour for option 4 proposing an adaptation of the existing formula 
without a radical cut as Stern proposed it.    
 
„Thus, we have come to the conclusion that that the way proposing to peg the 
gas prices in EU-oriented LTGECs to gas prices set as a result of gas-to-gas 
competition at the European spot trading hubs, in particular, at the UK’s 
National Balancing Point, rather than to the basket of gas substitutes based on 
their replacement value is not a valid one - at least today and in the 
foreseeable future. This way creates many additional risks for both consumers 
and, especially, producers outside the EU. The European gas market is not 
prepared (and should it be?) to switch over to gas-to-gas competition as the 
key pricing mechanism.“102 
 
According to Konoplaynik (2010) long-term pricing formulas are supposed to adjust 
gradually to the new environment of gas pricing. He states that this change will 
continue through a broader range of gas-to-gas substitutes as a part of the formula 
and a higher frequency of contract review rounds.103   
 
Konoplaynik (2011) also refers to my further subject of analysis, the possibility of the 
European Gas Index (EGIX) as a gas price indexation tool. He generally agrees that 
the oil-price indexation can be replaced by a more appropriate instrument and also 
sees a potential for EGIX to be that tool but he formulates the concern that the belief 
that at any given point of time, even 10 to 15 years ahead, delivery prices will reflect 
a justified equilibrium market price is not justified.104  
 
 
                                                
101 cf. Konoplaynik, Andrey (2011), slide 17 
102 Konoplaynik, Andrey (2010), p. 29 
103 cf. Konoplaynik, Andrey (2010), p. 30 
104 cf. Konoplaynik, Andrey (2011), slide 15 
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6. Data Analysis (Research question 2 and 3) 
 
So far I have been dealing with research question one, the consolidated overview on 
Russian gas exports to Europe, especially via transit through the Ukraine and the gas 
price dynamics of European and Ukraine natural gas imports from Russia and 
Russia’s domestic supply. This was based on findings of acclaimed authors. In the 
descriptive part of my thesis I will now focus on question two and question three and 
contribute to the discussion. 
 
2. What could be outcomes to expect from a shift from oil-linked to 
market-linked natural gas prices for long-term Russian natural gas 
supply to Europe? How would the dynamics of European import 
prices and Ukraine netback prices be influenced? 
3.  What can be advantages and disadvantages of using the European 
Gas Index (EGIX) to signal European market prices for natural gas in 
supply contracts for Russian natural gas? 
 
Within this chapter I will now discuss, following Stern and Konoplaynik, what the 
outcome of market pricing could be for the European natural gas import price for 
Russian supply and the outcome for Ukraine as a netback country. Furthermore I will 
do a general test of the EGIX price series and to find advantages and disadvantages 
that the use of EGIX as an underlying index for long-term contracts for Russian 
supply to Europe might have for both point of views. Therefore I will carry out a 
statistical analysis of a combination of different time series of prices compared with 
the EGIX price time series. 
Before I will come to this core part of my thesis I want to give a brief overview of the 
present developments European gas market at the direct time of writing this paper. 
 
- 2011 third quarter of EU gas consumption was lower than the same period 
one year before 
- Overall natural gas imports into the EU continued to grow but LNG import fell 
by 14 per cent 
- Overall trend of slight decrease in North Western European hub prices 
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- Russia’s long-term, oil-indexed import prices were amongst the highest gas 
prices 
- Level of hub prices in the UK and in Belgium starts to drive the long-term 
contract prices 
- German border prices start to converge towards German hub prices 
- Central and South Eastern gas imports from Russia exceed the average 
German border prices105 
 
This information includes the general trend of long-term oil-indexed prices starting to 
be under pressure and being influenced by market prices at hubs, especially in 
countries with strong hubs with a proper churn rate. 
 
6.1. The European Gas Index 
 
„With the introduction of the EGIX gas price index EEX is establishing a 
transparent and easily established reference price fort he gas market which 
can be integrated in the supplier-costumer relationships as a market-based 
alternative to supply contracts based on natural gas substitutes (e.g. oil or 
coal).“106 
 
With the introduction of the EGIX the European Energy Exchange (EEX) introduced a 
new promising tool for a European gas industry making efforts changing pricing to a 
new environment generating maybe a fairer balance of interest between the contract 
parties. The EGIX is published for a virtual market area of Germany as well as for 
GASPOOL and NCG market areas after the end of trading on every exchange day at 
the EEX. The daily values are rounded to two digits. Their practical application in 
contracts can be within price adjustment clauses. One of the possibilities, which I will 
also follow within my thesis, is a market priced-based use setting the EGIX equal to 
the gas price in a contract. In order to simplify my analysis I will follow this way. The 
EGIX is based on derivatives market transactions, which are concluded in the 
respectively current front month contracts for the NCG and GASPOOL areas.107  
                                                
105 cf. European Commission, 2011, p. 3 
106 EEX, 2011, p. 1 
107 cf. EEX, 2011, pp. 1-2 
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The concrete algorithm is available, but I will not reproduce it here in my paper.  
The EGIX offers the following advantages: 
 
- Efficiency: EGIX represents the current market value of gas at all time, it is 
free and publicly available 
- Transparency: Adjustment, simplification and standardisation of existing gas 
supply contracts is possible 
- Trust: The EGIX is based on concrete exchange transactions concluded on 
EEX which includes recognised monitoring108 
 
For the EEX the EGIX is a very important future tool. Their basic launch arguments 
were: 
 
- Natural gas is important and deserves its own price 
- Referring to other prices as references for the gas price is risky 
- EGIX provides a market price and hedges that risk 
- EGIX has the potential to replace oil prices in gas supply contracts 
- Transparent market gas prices based on an exchange-based index increases 
confidence of the costumers in pricing by the gas companies109 
 
Which advantages and disadvantages EGIX might have in order to be the main index 
used in Russian long-term supply contracts and how the outcome of EGIX prices in 
long-term contracts for Russian gas supply would change their dynamics shall be put 
to evaluation right now. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
108 cf. EEX, 2011, p. 1 
109 cf. Menzel, Hans-Bernd, 2011, slides 7-8  
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6.2. Data analysis 
 
I am going to deal with the following data, which in each case represents a price 
series from January 2008 until March 2012. January 2008 is the point in time of the 
first given EGIX data. 
 
- Russian natural gas: Border price Germany, €/1000 cubic meters: Russian 
pipeline price 
- EGIX market price: NCG and GASPOOL (virtual Germany), €/1000 cubic 
meters: Market price 
- Crude oil (petroleum) price index (2005=100): simple average of three spot 
prices: Dated Brent, West Texas, Dubai Fateh: Global oil price index 
- Crude oil (petroleum), simple average of three spot prices: Dated Brent, West 
Texas, Dubai Fateh, €/barrel: Global oil price 
- Crude oil (petroleum), Dated Brent, light blend 38 API, fob U.K., €/barrel: 
European oil price 
- EGIX market price: NCG and GASPOOL (virtual Germany), €/ MWh: 
European gas price for a unit of energy  
- Crude oil (petroleum), Dated Brent, light blend 38 API, fob U.K., €/MWh: 
European oil price for a unit of energy 
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Month	  
Russian	  Natural	  Gas:	  
Border	  Price	  Germany,	  
€/1000	  cubic	  meters	  
EGIX	  Market	  Price:	  NCG,	  
Gaspool,	  €/1000	  cubic	  
meters	  
Ratio	  Pipe	  vs.	  
Market	  
Jan	  2008	   251,22	   270,255	   0,929566521	  
Feb.08	   250,72	   246,548	   1,016921654	  
Mar	  2008	   238,17	   260,896	   0,912892494	  
Apr.08	   272,01	   288,366	   0,943280414	  
May	  2008	   275,39	   296,398	   0,929122329	  
Jun.08	   275,47	   323,431	   0,851711803	  
Jul.08	   327,83	   314,12	   1,04364574	  
Aug.08	   345,36	   286,542	   1,205268338	  
Sep.08	   359,85	   360,896	   0,997101658	  
Oct	  2008	   433,47	   356,385	   1,216296982	  
Nov.08	   453,01	   299,457	   1,51277145	  
Dec	  2008	   429,77	   253,206	   1,69731365	  
Jan	  2009	   435,84	   256,915	   1,696436565	  
Feb.09	   407,49	   195,718	   2,082026181	  
Mar	  2009	   316,69	   140,021	   2,261732169	  
Apr.09	   234,75	   131,021	   1,791697514	  
May	  2009	   226,88	   126,417	   1,794695334	  
Jun.09	   220,9	   120,596	   1,831735713	  
Jul.09	   173,52	   104,271	   1,664125212	  
Aug.09	   155,94	   101,841	   1,531210416	  
Sep.09	   152,81	   114,824	   1,330819341	  
Oct	  2009	   156,73	   144,424	   1,085207445	  
Nov.09	   155,7	   126,343	   1,232359529	  
Dec	  2009	   158,95	   133,409	   1,191448853	  
Jan	  2010	   191,48	   153,192	   1,249934722	  
Feb.10	   199,67	   147,602	   1,352759448	  
Mar	  2010	   201,39	   131,896	   1,526884818	  
Apr.10	   224,25	   148,099	   1,514189832	  
May	  2010	   225,36	   186,143	   1,21068211	  
Jun.10	   237,7	   219,391	   1,083453742	  
Jul.10	   239,14	   217,67	   1,098635549	  
Aug.10	   239,34	   206,553	   1,158734078	  
Sep.10	   233,87	   209,63	   1,115632305	  
Oct	  2010	   223,85	   212,517	   1,053327499	  
Nov.10	   228,35	   223,45	   1,021928843	  
Dec	  2010	   237,76	   260,375	   0,913144503	  
Jan	  2011	   247,7	   251,397	   0,985294176	  
Feb.11	   241,11	   243,33	   0,990876587	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Mar	  2011	   234,55	   271,201	   0,864856693	  
Apr.11	   250,07	   266,715	   0,937592561	  
May	  2011	   251,41	   258,303	   0,973314286	  
Jun.11	   250,23	   255,484	   0,979435111	  
Jul.11	   282,93	   245,634	   1,151835658	  
Aug.11	   278,86	   249,605	   1,117205184	  
Sep.11	   290,91	   290,115	   1,002740293	  
Oct	  2011	   318,06	   286,334	   1,110800673	  
Nov.11	   318,65	   278,536	   1,14401729	  
Dec	  2011	   330,87	   260,666	   1,269325497	  
Jan	  2012	   343,73	   248,094	   1,385482922	  
Feb.12	   332,75	   267,455	   1,244134527	  
Mar	  2012	   341,17	   274,898	   1,241078509	  
 
Table 6.1: Price series Russian natural gas, price series EGIX, ratio pipe vs. market, 2008-2012, 
€/1000 cubic meters 
Sources: EEX, Index Mundi, International Monetary Fund  
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Month	  
Crude	  Oil	  
(petroleum),	  Price	  
index,	  2005	  =	  100,	  
simple	  average	  of	  
three	  spot	  prices;	  
Dated	  Brent,	  West	  
Texas	  Intermediate,	  
and	  Dubai	  Fateh	  
Crude	  Oil	  
(petroleum),simple	  
average	  of	  three	  spot	  
prices;	  Dated	  Brent,	  
West	  Texas	  
Intermediate,	  and	  the	  
Dubai	  Fateh,	  €/barrel,	  
global	  average	  price	  
Crude	  Oil	  (petroleum)	  
Dated	  Brent,	  light	  
blend	  38	  API,	  FOB	  
	  U.K.	  	  €/barrel	  
Jan	  2008	   250	   61,71	   62,46	  
Feb.08	   258	   63,58	   64,3	  
Mar	  2008	   296	   65,6	   66,53	  
Apr.08	   312	   69,24	   70,12	  
May	  2008	   358	   78,92	   79,67	  
Jun.08	   384	   84,57	   85,55	  
Jul.08	   393	   84,06	   84,91	  
Aug.08	   322	   76,54	   76,06	  
Sep.08	   268	   69,11	   68,95	  
Oct	  2008	   181	   54,64	   54,75	  
Nov.08	   128	   42,45	   41,82	  
Dec	  2008	   104	   30,95	   30,99	  
Jan	  2009	   109	   33,18	   33,9	  
Feb.09	   100	   32,67	   33,82	  
Mar	  2009	   114	   36,01	   35,92	  
Apr.09	   124	   38,12	   38,56	  
May	  2009	   149	   42,58	   42,46	  
Jun.09	   181	   49,32	   48,94	  
Jul.09	   171	   45,89	   46,09	  
Aug.09	   192	   50,21	   50,82	  
Sep.09	   187	   46,97	   46,49	  
Oct	  2009	   206	   50	   49,4	  
Nov.09	   217	   52,01	   51,66	  
Dec	  2009	   205	   51,26	   51,11	  
Jan	  2010	   206	   54,04	   53,52	  
Feb.10	   192	   54,6	   54,3	  
Mar	  2010	   202	   58,45	   58,43	  
Apr.10	   211	   62,77	   63,36	  
May	  2010	   178	   60,09	   60,65	  
Jun.10	   171	   61,22	   61,31	  
Jul.10	   178	   58,37	   58,55	  
Aug.10	   183	   58,86	   59,49	  
Sep.10	   186	   58,24	   59,52	  
Oct	  2010	   213	   58,81	   59,68	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Nov.10	   217	   61,56	   62,39	  
Dec	  2010	   223	   68,14	   69,45	  
Jan	  2011	   232	   69,37	   72,09	  
Feb.11	   251	   71,61	   76,18	  
Mar	  2011	   285	   77,62	   81,76	  
Apr.11	   316	   80,56	   85,29	  
May	  2011	   291	   75,4	   79,78	  
Jun.11	   286	   73,57	   79,07	  
Jul.11	   289	   75,7	   81,72	  
Aug.11	   271	   70,04	   76,75	  
Sep.11	   261	   73,34	   80,65	  
Oct	  2011	   258	   72,9	   79,87	  
Nov.11	   269	   77,59	   81,37	  
Dec	  2011	   258	   79,13	   81,94	  
Jan	  2012	   260	   82,77	   85,95	  
Feb.12	   280	   85,24	   90,54	  
Mar	  2012	   293	   89,23	   94,64	  
 
Table 6.2: Crude oil (petroleum) price index (2005=100), crude oil (petroleum) simple average of three 
spot prices series, crude oil (petroleum) Dated Brent price series, 2008-2012, €/barrel 
Sources: Index Mundi, International Monetary Fund, World Bank  
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Month	  
EGIX	  Market	  
Price:	  NCG,	  
Gaspool,	  
€/MWh	  	  
Crude	  oil	  (petroleum)	  
Dated	  Brent:	  €/MWH	  
Ratio	  EGIX	  vs.	  
Dated	  Brent	  
costs	  of	  MWh	  
Jan	  2008	   24,2	   36,75414852	   0,658429075	  
Feb.08	   22,08	   37,83688361	   0,583557574	  
Mar	  2008	   23,3	   39,14911145	   0,595160379	  
Apr.08	   25,83	   41,26162175	   0,626005448	  
May	  2008	   26,54	   46,88125221	   0,566111159	  
Jun.08	   28,97	   50,34129693	   0,575471864	  
Jul.08	   28,13	   49,96469342	   0,56299755	  
Aug.08	   25,66	   44,75697305	   0,573318485	  
Sep.08	   32,32	   40,57314346	   0,796586048	  
Oct	  2008	   31,92	   32,21725315	   0,990773479	  
Nov.08	   26,82	   24,60868542	   1,08985911	  
Dec	  2008	   22,68	   18,23584795	   1,243704163	  
Jan	  2009	   23,01	   19,94821702	   1,153486549	  
Feb.09	   17,53	   19,90114158	   0,880853992	  
Mar	  2009	   12,54	   21,13687184	   0,593276058	  
Apr.09	   11,73	   22,6903613	   0,516959595	  
May	  2009	   11,32	   24,98528893	   0,453066604	  
Jun.09	   10,8	   28,79839944	   0,375020842	  
Jul.09	   9,34	   27,12133694	   0,344378303	  
Aug.09	   9,12	   29,90467224	   0,304969067	  
Sep.09	   10,28	   27,35671413	   0,375776124	  
Oct	  2009	   12,93	   29,06908321	   0,44480247	  
Nov.09	   11,31	   30,39896434	   0,372052149	  
Dec	  2009	   11,95	   30,0753207	   0,397335746	  
Jan	  2010	   13,722	   31,49346828	   0,435709395	  
Feb.10	   13,22	   31,95245381	   0,413739742	  
Mar	  2010	   11,81	   34,38272331	   0,343486462	  
Apr.10	   13,26	   37,2837472	   0,355650947	  
May	  2010	   16,67	   35,68906673	   0,467089827	  
Jun.10	   19,65	   36,0774391	   0,544661719	  
Jul.10	   19,49	   34,45333647	   0,565692673	  
Aug.10	   18,5	   35,00647287	   0,528473693	  
Sep.10	   18,77	   35,02412616	   0,535916297	  
Oct	  2010	   19,04	   35,11827704	   0,542167828	  
Nov.10	   20,01	   36,71295751	   0,545039173	  
Dec	  2010	   23,32	   40,86736495	   0,570626465	  
Jan	  2011	   22,51	   42,42085442	   0,530635234	  
Feb.11	   21,79	   44,82758621	   0,486084615	  
Mar	  2011	   24,29	   48,11109803	   0,504873116	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Apr.11	   23,89	   50,18830175	   0,47600734	  
May	  2011	   23,13	   46,94598093	   0,492693933	  
Jun.11	   22,88	   46,52818642	   0,491744935	  
Jul.11	   22	   48,08756032	   0,457498776	  
Aug.11	   22,35	   45,16299871	   0,494874137	  
Sep.11	   25,98	   47,45792633	   0,547432263	  
Oct	  2011	   25,64	   46,9989408	   0,545544209	  
Nov.11	   24,94	   47,88160527	   0,520868084	  
Dec	  2011	   23,34	   48,21701777	   0,48406146	  
Jan	  2012	   22,22	   50,57667412	   0,439332961	  
Feb.12	   23,95	   53,2776274	   0,44953203	  
Mar	  2012	   24,62	   55,69024362	   0,442088208	  
 
Table 6.3: Price series EGIX in €/MWh, price series Dated Brent in €/MWh, ratio EGIX vs. Dated 
Brent costs of one MWh, 2008-2012 
Source: EEX 
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6.2.1. Gas prices series  
 
 
 
Graph 6.1: Russian natural gas long-term supply price, EGIX, (€/1000 cubic meters) 2008-2012 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6.2: Ratio pipeline vs. market prices, 2008-2012 
 104 
Graph 6.1, graph 6.2 and additionally graph 8.1 and graph 8.2 in the appendix 
introduce us to a general comparison of Russian long-term oil-indexed gas prices, 
exemplified by the German border price, compared to a possible market price via the 
EGIX price series. Obvious is, that the long-term price is at a peak, like it was before 
the crisis 2008 hit, higher than the market price: Long-term prices peaked at around 
450 €/1000 cubic meters around October 2008 while the market price peaked 
already around July 2008 at around 370 €/1000 cubic meters. This also implies that 
market prices react faster to given market situations than the oil-indexed prices. This 
can be explained on the one hand by the renegotiation rounds, which are of course 
not as fast as a market. In order to be closer to the market situation and to reflect a 
clearer picture of the market in the pricing schema more frequent renegotiation 
rounds can be considered. 
About one year later in August 2009 oil-indexed prices hit their lowest level at 150 
€/1000 cubic meters while the market price fell to 100€/1000 cubic meter already in 
July of the respective year. So market price also seems to imply lower prices than 
indexed prices, which is interesting in terms of risk hedging. The comparison draws a 
clear picture of a pricing system, which is more in favour of the supply side. Prices 
tend to be higher when positive peaks are the case and they stay higher than the 
market prices in a situation of negative peaks. What we can also examine from the 
given graphs is a high volatility of market prices and long-term prices in 2011 
including a time period of approximately half a year from October 2010 until early 
summer 2011 were market prices for gas were above the long-term prices. Since 
autumn 2011 however a strong trend of decoupling between the two price series is 
observable implying high long-term prices for Russian gas supply to Europe and 
significantly lower gas market prices. The inception point for this development lies 
according to the opinion of this author in a decoupling movement of oil and gas 
market prices which is via a certain time delay of course reflected in the pricing 
formula for Russian long-term deliveries. The oil-indexed versus market price ratio 
increased tremendous levels within and in the aftermath of the crisis but stabilized 
since then, in some time periods of 2011 prices were almost equal and as we already 
observed market prices were temporarily above oil-indexed long-term prices. At the 
time of writing the ratio is slightly rising again. This fact illustrates the already 
observed fact of a decoupling movement between oil and gas market prices and 
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therefore also a decoupling between gas market prices and gas long-term oil-indexed 
prices.  
 
 
 
6.2.2. Oil price series 
        
 
 
 
Graph 6.3: Crude oil index, 2008-2012 
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Graph 6.4: Dated Brent (€/barrel), daily 2008-2012 
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Graph 6.3, graph 6.4 as well as graph 8.3 and 8.4 from the appendix visualize the 
situation with oil prices for the respective time frame of 2008 until March 2012.  
On the one hand I chose to use the index with a level of 100 per cent for the year 
2005 in order to get an idea of global oil prices movements within the last several 
years. This is also interesting as the level of 100 per cent is set several years before 
the financial and economical crisis of 2008. The index is built up based on a simple 
average of three major spot prices: West Texas, Dubai Fateh and Dated Brent. The 
index is given in graph 6.3. It is basically and index of an average global crude oil 
price. What we can observe here is an extremely heated up situation right before the 
crisis. Average global crude oil prices reached a level of almost 400 per cent of the 
2005 price level in summer 2008. The oil price reacted heavily to a heated up overall 
economical situation. Within just six months the average global crude oil price was hit 
back to 2008 levels. Since then it is recovering, pending around 300 per cent of the 
2005 level. Additional to the index graph 8.3 gives the real figures for this trend in 
€/barrel. In total numbers the global average world price fell down to almost 30 
€/barrel in the autumn of 2008. In March 2012 it rose steadily up to around 90 
€/barrel. The trend is upward moving at the time of writing.  
Graph 8.4 shows the respective curve for the European oil brand Brent. The curve 
corresponds very close with the global average curve reaching also a low peak in the 
autumn of 2008 at around 30 €/barrel and showing an upward moving trend of 
already prices above 90 €/barrel at the time of writing. As oil prices are generally 
more volatile than gas prices, which are mostly, fixed via long-term delivery contracts, 
I also included a curve for the Brent crude oil prices based not on monthly averages 
but on daily prices. This curve is given in graph 6.4. The respective detailed data is in 
the appendix in table 8.3. This graph shows that the exact negative peak of Brand 
spot prices was in December 2008 with prices way below 30 €/barrel. Since then we 
can examine the upward moving trend, which is accompanied by very high volatility 
on a day-to-day basis. The latest relevant implication is that at the beginning of 2012 
Brent peaked at almost 100 €/barrel and shows a slight downward drift at the 
moment. The general trend however is upward moving.     
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6.2.3. Gas and oil price series in comparison 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6.5: Russian natural gas long-term supply price (€/1000 cubic meters), EGIX (€/1000 cubic 
meters), crude oil world price average (€/barrel), 2008-2012 
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Graph 6.6: Russian natural gas long-term supply price (€/1000 cubic meters), EGIX (€/cubic meters), 
crude oil Dated Brent (€/barrel), 2008-2012 
 
Graph 6.5 and graph 6.6 show the comparison of what we saw in graph 6.1, which 
was the price curves of EGIX, and Russian gas border price in Germany put 
together, in comparison with the oil-index based on the average global price from 
graph 6.3 and the Dated Brent reference price series for Europe from graph 6.4 and 
8.4. Technically it is important to take under consideration that the vertical axis is 
defined as €/1000 cubic meters for the oil prices and €/barrel for the oil prices. Oil is 
not generally cheaper for the energy unit than gas. The graphs are supposed to show 
trends. 
Here we can again examine that the first significant price moves seem to come from 
oil directly followed by the gas market price around one month later. The oil-indexed 
prices respond very slowly to the market, usually almost one quarter later. This 
implies that with an EGIX price formula indexed gas prices in long-term contracts 
would be closer to real market situations given additionally more frequent 
renegotiation rounds. Later on when it comes to the statistical analysis of this paper I 
will on the one hand test for general relations between those curves via correlations 
and also the interdependences of these curves via regressions. 
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6.2.4. Energy unit price series gas and oil 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6.7: EGIX, Dated Brent, (€/MWh), 2008-2012 
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Graph 6.8: Ratio EGIX vs. Dated Brent, (€/MWh), 2008-2012 
 
 
Graph 6.7, graph 6.8 and graph 8.5 and graph 8.6 from the appendix give us 
additional information on the de facto energy production prices of gas compared to oil 
showing the price of a produced MWh in Euro. The price of a unit of energy so to say 
also gives some hint on the interrelations between gas and oil. Here we can see that 
oil prices respond much faster to market situations than gas prices. The Dated Brent 
reached its lowest point already in November 2008 while the EGIX negatively peaked 
just in summer 2009. Graph 6.7 also implies that the gas MWh is generally cheaper 
than the oil MWh, just at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009 the oil MWh was 
a little cheaper than the gas MWh. At the time of writing this paper the two prices 
diverge showing a much more expensive oil MWh than gas MWh. This is an 
interesting fact. Just back at the end of 2008 until the beginning of 2009 gas prices 
and oil prices recoupled introducing even a slight period where the gas MWh was 
more expensive than the oil MWh. This might be due to the Ukraine transit crisis of 
January 2009 when spot gas was a relatively more scarce good than maybe oil. 
Since then the price for the oil MWh is steadily rising while the gas MWh is flattening 
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within the last year, pending around 25 €/MWh. This might be a systemic change. Oil 
becomes a generally more scarce good while gas is an available good, which is 
introduced to the European economies more and more.  Additionally it also has to be 
stated that the ratio between the oil MWh and the gas MWh is smoothing out on a 
high oil MWh, implying the gas MWh is pending between 40 per cent and 60 per cent 
of the price of the oil MWh (graph 6.8).  
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6.2.5. Econometrical analysis of oil and gas time series 
 
To analyse the data I used simple descriptive analysis of the price series, correlations 
and regressions.  
The descriptive analysis has the general idea of the development of the respective 
time series.  
Correlations I used in order to find out if there are any significant relationships 
between the different prices series. For example it is interesting if oil global market 
prices and oil European market prices are correlated with the market gas prices 
series represented by the EGIX. Correlations offer a simple tool in order to find 
indicators for relationships between data sets.  
Additionally I used regressions in order to interpret the interdependence between oil 
market prices and EGIX gas market prices as well as gas prices for Russian long-
term contracts and EGIX market prices on an additional level. Linear regression is 
here my tool of choice in order to try to find out more about the interrelations between 
Russian long-term prices and gas market prices represented by the EGIX price 
series and also between EGIX market prices and oil market prices. It is important to 
mention that the regression analysis is not yet enough to determine the causality 
between two time series. It is still working on a correlation basis, not yet definitely 
saying, if one time series influences the other directly. The next step for future 
research, which is not featured in this paper, would be to run a Granger causality test 
in order to test causality between time series. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 114 
6.2.6. Descriptive analysis 
 
 
Table 6.4: Russian natural gas long-term supply price (€/1000 cubic meters), EGIX (€/1000 cubic 
meters), Average oil world price (€/barrel), Dated Brent (€/barrel), EGIX (€/MWh), Dated Brent 
(€/MWh), descriptive analysis  
 
 
Table 6.4 gives the general arithmetic means and standard deviations for the 
Russian long-term border price to Germany, the EGIX, the oil-world average, the oil 
Dated Brent, the EGIX gas MWh and the Brent oil. The most important thing is to 
look at gas market, gas pipe and oil Europe. It is important to mention that standard 
deviations and in that matter volatility is always relative. To get comparable figures 
for volatility I divided the standard deviations by the respective means, so we have a 
volatility of 0,2828 for the pipe gas, 0,3040 for EGIX gas and 0,26 for oil Europe. As a 
matter of fact that implies that EGIX gas is slightly more volatile than pipe gas under 
Russian long-term contracts. This implies that the gas market is more volatile than 
oil-indexed long-term delivery prices. Compared to the Brent oil we can see a lower 
volatility for oil prices. Here it is important to mention that this is true for the €/barrel 
unit. If we would examine a unit like ton of oil the volatility would be higher. When we 
compare the €/MWh price for oil and gas we have, using the same method, a higher 
volatility for the gas energy unit than for the oil energy unit.   
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Table 6.5: Russian natural gas long-term supply price (€/1000 cubic meters), EGIX (€/1000 cubic 
meters), Average oil world price (€/barrel), Dated Brent (€/barrel), EGIX (€/MWh), dated Brent 
(€/MWh), descriptive analysis part 2 
 
 
From the descriptive analysis of table 6.5 it is clear that the spread between minimum 
and maximum prices of the 2008 until 2012 time series is much higher for the pipe 
prices than it is for the EGIX market prices. Also the maximum price of 360 €/1000 
cubic meters is much lower on the market than the maximum of 453 €/1000 cubic 
meter while the minimum is lower on the market with 225 €/1000 cubic meters 
compared to the Russian pipe price of 268 €/1000 cubic meters. The average pipe 
delivery price for Russian long-term contracts is with 268 €/1000 cubic meters much 
higher than the average market price which lies around 225 €/1000 cubic meters for 
the respective time period. In relative figures this implies a 19 per cent ad on for 
Russian oil-indexed prices on the actual market price. This trend implies that the 
Russian contracts for long-term supply are in favour for the supply side rather than 
the buyer side. The average gas MWH hour was around 20 €/MWh while the oil MWh 
cost on average 37 €. This implies again the situation of much higher energy unit 
prices for oil than for gas. Table 8.1 in the appendix shows additionally the 
descriptive analysis for the daily Brent price series. Means and standard deviations 
are just slightly different and do not add any additional interesting insights.     
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6.2.7. Correlations 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.6: Russian natural gas long-term supply price (€/1000 cubic meters), EGIX (€/1000 cubic 
meters), correlation 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.7: Russian natural gas long-term supply price (€/1000 cubic meters), Average oil world price 
(€/barrel), correlation 
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Table 6.8: Russian natural gas long-term supply price (€/1000 cubic meters), Dated Brent (€/barrel), 
correlation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.9: EGIX (€/1000 cubic meters), Average oil world price (€/barrel), correlation 
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Table 6.10: EGIX (€/1000 cubic meters), Dated Brent (€/barrel), correlation 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.11: EGIX (€/MWh) Dated Brent (€/MWh), correlation 
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After the basic descriptive analysis of the time series my next step is to search for 
correlations between the time series in order to find significant relations between 
them. 
Table 6.6 until table 6.11 show the significance of the correlations between the 
different price series. Exactly we are dealing with a Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient. Correlation can reach outcomes of -1 till +1. -1 would be a 
total negative correlation, whereas +1 would be a total positive correlation. 
The following existing correlations we can examine: 
 
- Russian pipeline gas and the EGIX market price are significant on the 0,01 
level, 2-tailed and show a Pearson correlation of 0,674 (table 6.6) 
- EGIX market price and the average oil world price are significant on the 0,01 
level, 2-tailed and show a Pearson correlation of 0,594 (table 6.9) 
- EGIX market price and Dated Brent Europe gas reference price are significant 
on the 0,01 level, 2-tailed and show a Pearson correlation of 0,595 (table 6.10)  
- EGIX MWh and Dated Brent MWh price are significant on the 0,01 level, 2-
tailed and show a Pearson correlation of 0,596 (table 6.11)  
 
Not significant are: 
- Russian pipeline gas and the oil world market reference price, Pearson 
correlation 0,029 (table 6.7) 
- Russian pipeline gas and the Dated Brent Europe oil reference price, Pearson 
correlation 0,05 (table 6.8) 
 
These are very interesting findings. On the one hand we see that market prices for oil 
and gas are significantly correlated at least moving along similar curves. The EGIX 
price series is positively correlated with the average crude oil world price and also the 
Brent price series. This does not mean that the directly influence each other but the 
possibility of such an influence is given. If there is any deeper relationship will be 
tested within the following regression analysis. Also we see that the Russian pipeline 
gas is at least developing correlated to the EGIX market price but there is no 
significant correlation to the world market reference price of crude oil and the 
European reference price of crude oil. This might be reasoned by the fact that the 
Russian long-term pricing formula is based on light fuel oil and heavy fuel oil rather 
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than on crude oil. So the correlation would be more dependent on the dynamics of 
the fuel oil price series in this case. 
 
 
6.2.8. Regressions 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.12: EGIX (€/1000 cubic meters) independent, Russian natural gas long-term supply price 
(€/1000 cubic meters) dependent, regression 
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Table 6.13: Dated Brent daily (€/barrel) independent, EGIX (€/1000 cubic meters) dependent, 
regression 
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The final statistical analysis that I carried out was a simple linear regression analysis 
in order to test two hypotheses concerning the dependence of the most important 
price series more in detail.  
Hypothesis 1 tests if Russian long-term prices are dependent on the gas market 
represented by EGIX. Here I expected a negative outcome as the prices are derived 
via the oil-indexation. 
Hypothesis 2 tests if EGIX gas prices are actually dependent on the oil price. Here I 
also expected a negative outcome as we already before saw a decoupling movement 
of oil and gas prices at the time writing.  
 
- Hypothesis 1: Russian long-term gas price is dependent on EGIX gas market 
prices. 
- Hypothesis 2: EGIX gas market price is dependent on the European market 
price for oil represented by the Brent series 
 
In order to examine hypothesis 1 one I did a regression analysis with the EGIX price 
series being the independent variable and the Russian long-term delivery prices at 
the German border as the dependent variable. The linear regression equation for this 
relationship looks like this: 
 
Russia_pipe = 100,142 + 0,746 * EGIX_market           (equ.5) 
 
100,142 is where the regression line hits Y-axis at zero and 0,746 is the ascending 
slope. So that means if the EGIX market price changes by one point, the Russian 
pipe gas prices would change by 0,746. To measure the quality of the model and to 
get the significance of the regression equation we need to have a look at 
column R square in the model summary of table 6.12. 45,4 per cent of the variance 
of Russian delivery prices can be explained via the market price. This is less than 
half of the cases. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) field implies redundant 
information. So what we face is Russian delivery contracts that move along market 
prices but the actual natural gas market does not significantly influence them. The 
prices in the Russian contracts can hardly be determined through the given situation 
in the natural gas market. Hypothesis 1 is not supported. 
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An additional finding for hypothesis 2 we see in table 6.13. Here the oil market price 
for Europe represented through the daily Brent curve is the independent variable 
while the EGIX series is dependent.  First the regression equation: 
 
EGIX_market = -424,295 + 10,101 * BRENT_daily           (equ.6) 
 
-424,295 is where the regression line hits Y-axis at zero and 10,101 is the ascending 
slope. So that means if the BRENT price changes by one point, the EGIX prices 
would change by 10,101. To measure the quality of the model and to get the 
significance of the regression equation we need to have a look at 
column R square in the model summary of table 6.13. 18,5 per cent of the variance 
of Russian delivery prices can be explained via the market price. This is very minor. 
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) field implies redundant information. 
The market price for natural gas can be explained through the market price for crude 
oil just in 18,5 per cent of all cases. This we can see in the R square column. The 
prices in EGIX market prices can not be determined through the given situation in the 
crude oil market. Hypothesis 2 is not supported.  
 
So we can keep in mind: Gas market prices do not significantly mirror oil prices and 
the Russian long-term contracts do hardly mirror actual market situations.  
 
At this stage it is important to mention again that regression analysis is close to 
correlations. To get exact more significant causality measures a next step for further 
research has to be a test for Granger causality between the respective price series. 
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6.3. Interpretation 
 
The goal of my data analysis was to generate fresh findings and new input when it 
comes to the discussion of linking long-term natural gas delivery contracts between 
Russia and Europe to a different derivative than oil, which is closer to the real market 
situation and gives a more realistic market indexation than oil. I would like the 
highlight that I am indifferent when it comes to support either the side of supporters of 
the oil-linked pricing or the side of market prices supporters like Jonathan Stern. I am 
trying to add new input to the discussion and give possible advantages and 
disadvantages of EGIX as much as I will try to highlight possible outcomes for the 
Ukraine as a netback priced transit country. I also believe that a market price 
generally appeals to me as a fair price to both sides, the demand and the supply 
sides. Anyway the idea of fairness might not be a relevant parameter in the 
discussion.  
As a prelude to the interpretation of my findings I would like to recall the main topics 
of this thesis: In chapter two we learned that Russia and Gazprom are financially very 
dependent on the supply of natural gas to Europe as they use gas as a political 
subsidy to the domestic industry and the people of Russia and produce a negative 
revenue in the home market. Additionally there is a thrive towards raising CIS 
delivery prices to European netback in order to make higher revenues in those 
countries as well. A major question mark is Gazprom’s gas exploration programme, 
which is yet unclear. The exploration strategy can serve as a tool in order to make 
natural gas scarcer and raise margins. On the other hand such a strategy is a threat 
to supply security and to Russia’s image as a gas supplier. The Ukraine on the other 
hand is dealing with heavily rising gas delivery prices, a very inefficient energy use 
and uses transit as geopolitical tool in order to pressure Russia. Europe finally is 
widely dependent on Russian supply. In chapter 5 we learned about the rising 
influence of LNG and gas hubs leading to the possibility of setting a market price for 
gas, which is exemplified by, the EGIX issued by the EEX. This opens the possibility 
of using a natural gas market price as a derivative in the Russian pricing formula for 
supply to Europe. This possibility is addressed in research question two.       
In research question three I followed the idea of a rather new index, the EGIX to 
deliver that job. One of the main objectives of the EGIX is, according to the EEX, 
establishing it as and index that mirrors natural gas market prices in order to be a tool 
that is being used in long-term contracts. 
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In order to contrast my findings especially with the propositions of Jonathan Stern I 
would like to recall also his major points: 
 
- The oil-link is not logical as it does not reflect real market situations: Oil 
products are virtually eliminated form stationary sectors, oil-burning equipment 
is highly costly, new modern gas burning equipment is coming up, 
environmental standards are tightening 
- Correlation between oil and gas prices does not exist, they do not temporarily 
recouple and decouple 
- Higher volatility as real market situations are being reflected 
- Possibility of a price and/or volume setting gas OPEC 
- European gas hubs are insufficiently liquid and prone to manipulation 
- But LNG supplies and the liquidity of hubs are increasing 
- Mind-sets: Long-term oil-indexed contracts represent on the one hand secure 
supply and on the other hand exposure relative to the market price110    
 
Konoplaynik is one of the commentators who already discussed the EGIX as a 
possibility of a gas price indexation tool also in long-term contracts. But he believes, 
that the EGIX will not represent a justified market price equilibrium 10 to 15 years 
ahead.111 
 
The major points of my analysis were as follows: 
 
- Market prices have lower peaks than oil-indexed prices 
- Market prices peak around 3 months earlier than the oil-indexed prices 
- Market prices fall lower than oil-indexed prices when it comes to negative 
peaks 
- Russian long-term contracts favour the supply side 
- Oil prices respond fastest to market situations, closely followed by gas market 
prices, the oil-indexed gas price takes the longest to react 
- The gas MWh is generally cheaper than the oil MWh, prices are decoupling, 
ratio stabilizes 
                                                
110 cf. Stern (2009) and Stern, Rogers (2011)  
111 cf. Konoplaynik, Andrey (2011), slide 15  
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- Oil and gas prices are at the moment decoupling 
- Gas prices are highly volatile, the market price is more volatile than the long-
term oil-indexed price  
- Russian oil-indexed gas prices are not correlated to crude oil prices 
- EGIX has a positive correlation with the crude oil market price and with 
Russian oil-indexed gas prices 
- EGIX is not widely influenced by the Brent oil price series 
- Russian long-term delivery prices are hardly influenced by gas market prices 
 
If I now contrast my findings with Jonathan Stern I can state the following: 
 
The oil-indexation in Russian long-term contracts with Europe does by far not fully 
reflect true market situations. The market is around three months ahead of the oil-
indexed prices, which I believe has its roots in the regular renegotiation rounds. 
Additionally the existing contracts favour the supply side in a way that the price peaks 
upwards stronger than the market and downward prices stay higher than market 
prices. So generally Stern is on the right track when he says that the current pricing 
formula for long-term gas contracts does not reflect market situations. When it comes 
to the correlation between oil and gas prices in general, my data cannot fully prove 
Stern’s assumptions. In his latest paper he believes that a correlation does not exist 
at all. It is true that at the time writing there is a decoupling process going on, but my 
findings also showed positive correlations of gas market prices with crude oil market 
prices. So on the basis of my data a strict decoupling cannot be proved. When it 
comes to volatility Stern is right. Gas prices are generally highly volatile and market 
prices have an even higher volatility than long-term prices. That oil-indexed gas 
prices of Russian long-term contracts are not correlated to the crude oil prices might 
have its roots in the fact that the pricing formula mainly includes fuel oils. 
Gas market prices are not significantly influenced by oil market prices and gas 
market prices are hardly mirrored in Russian long-term delivery prices. These are 
actually my most important findings. I observed a decoupling of oil and gas prices in 
the recent years and I showed that gas prices are not dependent on oil prices as 
much as Russia’s pricing formula does not reflect given gas market situations. All of 
those findings are of course just true for the time period of 2008 until March 2012 and 
lack an additional Granger causality test. Now, when Stern says that the oil-link for 
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gas prices is not logical anymore he seems to be right. In order to increase the 
reflection of true market situations long-term contracts should include a certain index 
that reflects market situations in the gas market in the pricing formula. If this index 
should be EGIX or not is a different question. A turn to market implications will lead to 
advantages for the demand side compared to the current situation. Prices fall lower 
and also peak lower in the market so the supply side would be worse off and most 
probably start to influence the markets via strategically volume setting. This might 
imply a dangerous situation for supply security.   
If now think this analysis one step further assuming that the Ukraine would face a 
European netback price for gas supply we would see relatively volatile pricing 
dynamics which implies a certain form of instability and might lead to new geopolitical 
games. So a netback of European long-term prices indexed via market prices to 
Ukraine might bear a higher risk of transit games. On the other hand markets seem 
to be more buyer friendly than the existing long-term contract so with lower import 
costs Ukraine might also be able to purchase a certain degree of political freedom, as 
it does not have to repay debts barter style. This is especially interesting taking into 
consideration that Russia’s ultimate barter with the Ukraine might be taking passion 
of the transit network. 
The EGIX itself is a very young tool in order to mirror given market situations but as 
my analysis showed it has the potential to do so. The main question that will remain 
is the low churn rate that it is based on. Yes, EGIX showed in this analysis that the 
dynamics at spot markets for natural gas are indeed different than in the oil market 
but how realistically does it reflect the true market situations as it is based on just a 
rather small percentage of the whole market. And how much is it in danger to be 
influenced by price and volume setting activities from the supply side? Those 
questions can just be addressed after a certain period of development for the EGIX. 
In a few years it might be possible to examine the true relevance of the EGIX based 
on the market share of the EEX spot market.         
Table 6.14 sums up my findings and picture them contrasted with official EGIX 
statements issued by the EEX and Jonathan Stern’s main points. 
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EEX112 Stern113 Hochreiner 
EGIX is free and publicly 
available 
Oil-linked pricing is not 
logical 
Russian oil-indexed prices are 
generally higher than EGIX 
prices, EGIX would be more 
demand friendly  
Transparent, recognised 
monitoring 
No correlation between 
oil- and gas prices 
Oil and gas prices are 
decoupling 
Gives market prices Market volatility is too 
high for oil-indexed 
prices 
Oil/gas price ratio is stabilizing 
Potential to replace oil-link 
in long-term contracts 
Possibility of a volume 
setting gas OPEC 
Generally upward moving oil 
prices 
Strengthens consumer 
confidence in gas prices 
Insufficient churn rates 
at European hubs 
Oil-indexed prices respond 
three months later than EGIX 
to market situations 
  Gas energy unit is cheaper 
than oil energy unit 
  EGIX has a higher volatility 
than oil-indexed prices 
  The spread between min. and 
max. prices for the given price 
series is bigger for oil-indexed 
prices 
  Russian oil-indexed gas and 
EGIX are correlated 
  Russian long-term prices are 
hardly influenced by EGIX 
market prices  
  EGIX market price does not 
mirror oil market prices  
 
                                                
112 cf. Stern (2009) and Stern, Rogers (2011) 
113 cf. EEX, 2011, p.1 and Menzel, Hans-Bernd, 2011, slides 7-8 
 129 
  Churn rates at European hubs 
are still rather small and give 
just a small market share 
which can not represent the 
whole market 
  European hubs do not have 
safety measures to prevent 
manipulation by an 
oligopolistic supply side 
  
Table 6.14: EEX and Jonathan Stern contrasted with the findings of this paper 
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7. Conclusion 
 
Within this thesis I followed three main objectives: 
 
- Up-to-date overview on the Russian-European gas import-export relationship 
including the Ukraine as a transit country and gas price dynamics 
- Statistical examination of the implications that a shift from oil-indexed to 
market-indexed pricing formulas in Russian long-term contracts with Europe 
could have based on specific data sets of price dynamics 
- Possible Advantages and disadvantages of EGIX as a suggested indexation 
tool for Russian long-term gas supply to Europe 
 
The first part of the thesis was a descriptive part based on acclaimed authors and 
commentators in order too answer research question number one. Based on the 
most relevant literature available I tried to draw a consolidated picture on the gas 
supply relations between Russia and Europe including the externality of the most 
important transit country Ukraine. This part culminated in the description of gas 
pricing and its mechanisms. The overview started out with a description of the use of 
barter agreements in the post-Soviet times as a payment method. Barter payments 
were step by step abandoned and replaced by monetary payment methods. Russia 
turned out to have basically three major markets: the domestic market, the CIS 
market and the European market. As Gazprom is a state-owned entity with massive 
market power natural gas is used in the home market as a political subsidy for the 
domestic industry and domestic people. No surprise that Gazprom does not make 
revenues in its home market. In that sense the European market and the deliveries to 
Europe are from great relevance as prices are much higher on the exports than on 
domestic supply and therefore generate the needed revenues and profits for 
Gazprom. Step by step net backed European prices are also to be introduced for 
deliveries to CIS countries like Ukraine and Belorussia in order to generate additional 
profits. So in this way Gazprom and gas deliveries are used as a political and a 
strategical tool by Russia. One of the big challenges for Gazprom however is to find 
the right exploration path for new natural gas resources in order to meet the Russian 
natural gas balance. 
On the European side it can be stated that demand for gas is steadily increasing and 
that Europe shows a dependence on Russian gas supply, which differs country wise. 
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The Ukraine has a very difficult post-Soviet gas relationship with Russia. Starting out 
with barter agreements in order to clear gas debts Russia meanwhile follows a strong 
agenda of raising prices to European netback. Russia’s real goal however seems to 
be again political. Russia wants to obtain the transit network of the Ukraine and 
therefore sets heavy pressure on the country. Ukraine on the other side is also willing 
to use the transit network as a geopolitical tool. This lead to the gas wars of 2006 and 
2009. The relationship between Russia and the Ukraine is also very dependent on 
the political climate in the Ukraine. At the time of writing we face a very pro Russian 
atmosphere leading to discounts in gas pricing for the Ukraine. Ukraine’s major 
problems are the gas dependence on Russia and the inefficient use of gas. So in 
order to stabilize the situation Ukraine would have to technically increase the 
efficiency of its gas use and to find new resources to deplete. As the gas reserves on 
Ukraine soil are very modest coal might be a potential substitute. Anyway, this is a 
question of long run and free to further investigation. 
The link between the theoretical part of my thesis and the practical analysis is gas 
pricing. As the theoretical part gave an overview on political and geopolitical 
implications of gas prices as a next step I introduced the theoretical background of 
gas pricing. I started out by a brief introduction to the replacement value and followed 
the way via theoretical links of gas pricing to concepts like Ricardian Rent, Hotelling 
Theorem and Principal-Agent Theory to the contracting practice in Russian long-term 
supply contracts to Europe including an exemplified pricing formula. Additionally I 
featured I possible netback pricing formula for Ukraine prices.            
In order to link the theoretical background with the idea of market pricing the 
development of European gas hubs and the relevance of LNG was introduced. The 
technical necessities of LNG production are met more and more and therefore also 
the churn rates of European natural gas hubs, which are mostly served via LNG, are 
increasing. Anyway the churn rates are still very small in order to serve as a real 
significant gas market.   
The empirical part of the thesis added new input to Jonathan Stern’s ideas of linking 
long-term gas prices to a certain market index. For the purpose of testing Stern’s 
propositions the I used the price series relatively new EGIX as vehicle to statistically 
test some of Stern’s assumption and show possible advantages and disadvantages 
that the use of EGIX is the derivative for long/term contracts with Russia could have. 
The outcome is many-folded: 
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- Russian oil-indexed prices are generally higher than EGIX prices, EGIX would 
be more demand friendly 
- Oil and gas prices are decoupling at the moment of writing this paper 
- Oil/gas price ratio is stabilizing 
- Generally upward moving oil prices 
- Oil-indexed prices respond three months later than EGIX to market situations 
- Gas energy unit is cheaper than oil energy unit 
- EGIX has a higher volatility than oil-indexed prices 
- The spread between min. and max. prices for the given price series is bigger 
for oil-indexed prices 
- Russian oil-indexed gas and EGIX are correlated 
- Russian long-term prices are hardly influenced by EGIX market prices  
- EGIX market price does not mirror oil market prices 
- Churn rates at European hubs are still rather small and give just a small 
market share, which can not represent the whole market 
- European hubs do not have safety measures to prevent manipulation by an 
oligopolistic supply side 
 
So on the basis of my data, I can agree to the fact that the oil-indexation does nut 
fully reflect market prices of natural gas. Furthermore the oil-indexation favours the 
supply side. On the other hand a decoupling of oil and gas prices seems to take 
place at the time of writing but it cannot be fully proved on basis of correlations.  
To sum up I can state that Stern can be generally supported on basis of the EGIX 
data when it comes to suggesting that oil-indexation is not market-based pricing. The 
link between oil and gas prices seems to be in a trend of decoupling. The EGIX might 
have the potential to become a significant factor in gas-pricing formulas. It seems to 
reflect the current market, but of course just based on a very minor market share. So 
the question that has to be asked is if the churn rate of the EEX is significant enough 
in order to publish an index, which is supposed to serve as a derivative for the whole 
market. Additionally instruments in order to prevent EGIX market manipulations are 
vacant at the time writing. It is of course to young in order to function as a significant 
instrument and also it reflects just a little market share at the time of writing, but it 
should be under further investigation. 
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When it comes to risks of hub-based pricing it should be taken under consideration 
that the gas supply side is more or less an oligopoly consisting of few major players, 
which might have an incentive to manipulate the market to their favour, so for further 
investigation the author suggests the following question: 
 
- The churn rate of European gas hubs is generally low. How would a change to 
market-indexed pricing based on hubs with low liquidity be a victim to the 
formation of a kind of gas OPEC, which would be able to manipulate the 
market via volumes or price setting? 
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8. Appendix 
 
8.1. List of conversions for chapter 6.2 
 
1 barrel of oil equivalent = 1,6995 MWh114 
€/MWh = 11,164 €/1000 cubic meter (based on: 1bcm=11.164.000 MWh) 
 
8.2. Additional graphs and tables for chapter 6.2 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 8.1: Russian natural gas long-term supply price, border price Germany (€/1000 cubic meters), 
2008-2012 
                                                
114 http://www.conversion-website.com/energy/barrel_of_oil_equivalent_to_megawatt_hour.html, 
17.6.2012 
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Graph 8.2: EGIX (€/1000 cubic meters), 2008-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 8.3: Crude oil world average price (€/barrel), 2008-2012 
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Graph 8.4: Dated Brent (€/barrel), monthly 2008-2012 
 
 
 
 
Graph 8.5: EGIX (€/MWh), 2008-2012 
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Graph 8.6: Dated Brent, (€/MWh), 2008-2012 
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Table 8.1: Dated Brent, daily (€/MWh), descriptive statistics and t-test 
 
 
Table 8.2: Russian natural gas long-term supply price (€/1000 cubic meters), EGIX (€/1000 cubic 
meters), Average oil world price (€/barrel), Dated Brent (€/barrel), EGIX (€/MWh), dated Brent 
(€/MWh), T-test  
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8.3. $/€ conversion for the Dated Brent daily, graph 6.4 
 
Conversion series taken from:  
http://www.finanz-links.de/waehrung/historische-devisenkurse.htm 
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8.4. Data set Brent daily, graph 6.4 
 
 
Date	  
€/$	  
Exchange	  
rate	  
Time	  series	  	  Brent	  
crude	  oil	  spot	  price	  
daily	  $/barrel	  
Time	  series	  	  Brent	  
crude	  oil	  spot	  price	  
daily	  €/barrel	  
02-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,47	   97	   66,04	  
03-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,48	   98	   66,43	  
04-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,47	   96	   65,19	  
07-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,47	   94,19	   63,97	  
08-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,47	   96,37	   65,54	  
09-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,47	   96,76	   65,91	  
10-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,47	   92,8	   63,29	  
11-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,48	   91,86	   62,10	  
14-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,49	   92,58	   62,16	  
15-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,49	   90,87	   61,04	  
16-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,48	   88,1	   59,56	  
17-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,47	   88,96	   60,55	  
18-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,47	   89,66	   61,10	  
22-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,45	   88,11	   60,79	  
23-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,46	   87,06	   59,74	  
24-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,47	   87,69	   59,80	  
25-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,47	   90,96	   61,86	  
28-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,48	   90,91	   61,61	  
29-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,48	   92,49	   62,61	  
30-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,48	   92,46	   62,43	  
31-­‐Jan-­‐2008	   1,49	   91,58	   61,59	  
01.Feb.08	   1,49	   91,41	   61,39	  
04.Feb.08	   1,48	   91,09	   61,43	  
05.Feb.08	   1,47	   89,6	   61,00	  
06.Feb.08	   1,46	   88,73	   60,69	  
07.Feb.08	   1,46	   88,55	   60,78	  
08.Feb.08	   1,45	   91,45	   63,01	  
11.Feb.08	   1,45	   93,93	   64,59	  
12.Feb.08	   1,45	   94,28	   64,85	  
13.Feb.08	   1,46	   93,82	   64,32	  
14.Feb.08	   1,46	   95,92	   65,58	  
15.Feb.08	   1,47	   96,96	   66,08	  
19.Feb.08	   1,47	   97,03	   65,82	  
20.Feb.08	   1,47	   97,88	   66,78	  
21.Feb.08	   1,47	   97,52	   66,18	  
22.Feb.08	   1,48	   96,07	   64,70	  
25.Feb.08	   1,48	   97,43	   65,76	  
26.Feb.08	   1,49	   99,05	   66,59	  
27.Feb.08	   1,50	   98,28	   65,33	  
28.Feb.08	   1,51	   99,83	   66,02	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29.Feb.08	   1,52	   100,9	   66,53	  
03-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,52	   101,83	   66,98	  
04-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,52	   98,6	   64,84	  
05-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,52	   100,95	   66,43	  
06-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,53	   103,47	   67,54	  
07-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,54	   104,66	   67,89	  
10-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,53	   105,33	   68,66	  
11-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,54	   106,78	   69,43	  
12-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,55	   107,99	   69,77	  
13-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,56	   109,18	   70,09	  
14-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,56	   109,16	   70,15	  
17-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,58	   104,41	   66,21	  
18-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,58	   105,35	   66,80	  
19-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,57	   102,65	   65,42	  
20-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,54	   99,78	   64,70	  
25-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,56	   99,91	   64,17	  
26-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,57	   102,83	   65,46	  
27-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,58	   103,89	   65,81	  
28-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,58	   102,68	   65,00	  
31-­‐Mar-­‐2008	   1,58	   102,33	   64,72	  
01.Apr.08	   1,57	   98,69	   63,02	  
02.Apr.08	   1,56	   98,85	   63,24	  
03.Apr.08	   1,55	   102,31	   65,90	  
04.Apr.08	   1,57	   102,21	   65,01	  
07.Apr.08	   1,57	   105,98	   67,53	  
08.Apr.08	   1,57	   105,05	   66,94	  
09.Apr.08	   1,57	   107,46	   68,33	  
10.Apr.08	   1,59	   107,37	   67,63	  
11.Apr.08	   1,58	   107,15	   67,68	  
14.Apr.08	   1,59	   108,32	   68,26	  
15.Apr.08	   1,58	   110,84	   70,03	  
16.Apr.08	   1,59	   110,95	   69,66	  
17.Apr.08	   1,59	   111,34	   70,15	  
18.Apr.08	   1,58	   110,67	   70,13	  
21.Apr.08	   1,59	   111,35	   70,04	  
22.Apr.08	   1,59	   113,54	   71,27	  
23.Apr.08	   1,59	   115,34	   72,36	  
24.Apr.08	   1,58	   114,85	   72,83	  
25.Apr.08	   1,56	   116,62	   74,78	  
28.Apr.08	   1,56	   115,7	   74,03	  
29.Apr.08	   1,56	   113,86	   73,12	  
30.Apr.08	   1,55	   111,12	   71,51	  
02-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,55	   111,92	   72,40	  
05-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,55	   115,68	   74,83	  
06-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,55	   119,88	   77,20	  
07-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,54	   120,27	   77,95	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08-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,53	   119,85	   78,09	  
09-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,55	   123,54	   79,92	  
12-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,54	   122,89	   79,64	  
13-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,55	   123,11	   79,56	  
14-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,54	   121,18	   78,49	  
15-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,55	   122,76	   79,33	  
16-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,55	   122,98	   79,35	  
19-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,56	   122,19	   78,44	  
20-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,56	   124,12	   79,37	  
21-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,58	   127,28	   80,80	  
22-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,58	   129,04	   81,90	  
23-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,57	   129,72	   82,40	  
27-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,58	   128,92	   81,80	  
28-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,57	   128,93	   82,35	  
29-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,56	   129,33	   83,17	  
30-­‐May-­‐2008	   1,55	   127,85	   82,44	  
02.Jun.08	   1,55	   128,5	   82,79	  
03.Jun.08	   1,56	   126,28	   80,99	  
04.Jun.08	   1,55	   121,72	   78,70	  
05.Jun.08	   1,54	   122,36	   79,44	  
06.Jun.08	   1,56	   132,81	   85,15	  
09.Jun.08	   1,58	   134,43	   85,17	  
10.Jun.08	   1,55	   135,24	   87,11	  
11.Jun.08	   1,55	   134,52	   86,70	  
12.Jun.08	   1,54	   132,11	   85,69	  
13.Jun.08	   1,53	   134,29	   87,57	  
16.Jun.08	   1,55	   133,9	   86,62	  
17.Jun.08	   1,55	   131,27	   84,82	  
18.Jun.08	   1,55	   129,12	   83,34	  
19.Jun.08	   1,55	   131,84	   85,16	  
20.Jun.08	   1,56	   134,28	   86,02	  
23.Jun.08	   1,55	   134,54	   86,68	  
24.Jun.08	   1,56	   135,37	   86,95	  
25.Jun.08	   1,56	   131,59	   84,36	  
26.Jun.08	   1,57	   136,82	   86,97	  
27.Jun.08	   1,57	   139,38	   88,51	  
30.Jun.08	   1,58	   138,4	   87,79	  
01.Jul.08	   1,58	   140,67	   89,17	  
02.Jul.08	   1,58	   141,24	   89,36	  
03.Jul.08	   1,59	   143,95	   90,62	  
07.Jul.08	   1,57	   139,62	   89,21	  
08.Jul.08	   1,57	   134,15	   85,52	  
09.Jul.08	   1,57	   133,91	   85,21	  
10.Jul.08	   1,57	   135,81	   86,46	  
11.Jul.08	   1,58	   143,68	   90,74	  
14.Jul.08	   1,58	   142,43	   89,88	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15.Jul.08	   1,60	   136,02	   85,07	  
16.Jul.08	   1,59	   133,31	   83,91	  
17.Jul.08	   1,58	   134,16	   84,65	  
18.Jul.08	   1,58	   129,34	   81,78	  
21.Jul.08	   1,59	   129,34	   81,56	  
22.Jul.08	   1,59	   127,18	   79,89	  
23.Jul.08	   1,57	   126,86	   80,59	  
24.Jul.08	   1,57	   125,43	   80,01	  
25.Jul.08	   1,57	   124,7	   79,26	  
28.Jul.08	   1,57	   125,67	   79,81	  
29.Jul.08	   1,57	   125,77	   80,08	  
30.Jul.08	   1,56	   122,46	   78,56	  
31.Jul.08	   1,56	   124,1	   79,50	  
01.Aug.08	   1,56	   124,16	   79,72	  
04.Aug.08	   1,56	   121,87	   78,29	  
05.Aug.08	   1,55	   116,5	   75,22	  
06.Aug.08	   1,55	   114,47	   73,96	  
07.Aug.08	   1,55	   116,94	   75,59	  
08.Aug.08	   1,51	   113,03	   74,98	  
11.Aug.08	   1,50	   110,54	   73,63	  
12.Aug.08	   1,49	   108,98	   73,11	  
13.Aug.08	   1,49	   110,68	   74,27	  
14.Aug.08	   1,49	   111,82	   75,01	  
15.Aug.08	   1,47	   108,8	   73,87	  
18.Aug.08	   1,47	   109,33	   74,35	  
19.Aug.08	   1,47	   109,02	   74,28	  
20.Aug.08	   1,47	   108,72	   73,79	  
21.Aug.08	   1,48	   117,24	   79,14	  
22.Aug.08	   1,48	   113,99	   76,98	  
25.Aug.08	   1,48	   109,74	   74,31	  
26.Aug.08	   1,46	   112,2	   76,86	  
27.Aug.08	   1,48	   113,05	   76,56	  
28.Aug.08	   1,48	   113,54	   76,87	  
29.Aug.08	   1,47	   113,49	   77,02	  
02.Sep.08	   1,45	   104,94	   72,29	  
03.Sep.08	   1,44	   103,88	   71,93	  
04.Sep.08	   1,45	   103,41	   71,38	  
05.Sep.08	   1,42	   102,51	   71,95	  
08.Sep.08	   1,42	   101,08	   71,11	  
09.Sep.08	   1,41	   98,94	   69,95	  
10.Sep.08	   1,41	   96	   68,11	  
11.Sep.08	   1,39	   96,01	   68,90	  
12.Sep.08	   1,41	   94,37	   67,09	  
15.Sep.08	   1,42	   90,45	   63,92	  
16.Sep.08	   1,43	   85,85	   60,17	  
17.Sep.08	   1,42	   86,09	   60,52	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18.Sep.08	   1,45	   90,89	   62,67	  
19.Sep.08	   1,42	   93,46	   65,65	  
22.Sep.08	   1,46	   100,43	   68,92	  
23.Sep.08	   1,47	   100,72	   68,37	  
24.Sep.08	   1,47	   102,09	   69,50	  
25.Sep.08	   1,47	   100,45	   68,33	  
26.Sep.08	   1,46	   100,88	   68,91	  
29.Sep.08	   1,43	   95,96	   66,88	  
30.Sep.08	   1,43	   93,52	   65,38	  
01-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,41	   92,19	   65,47	  
02-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,39	   88,88	   63,93	  
03-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,38	   88,95	   64,30	  
06-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,36	   84,71	   62,13	  
07-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,36	   83,17	   61,01	  
08-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,37	   80,77	   58,82	  
09-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,37	   81,65	   59,68	  
10-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,36	   74,58	   54,92	  
13-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,36	   74,37	   54,53	  
14-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,38	   74,98	   54,52	  
15-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,36	   66,86	   49,07	  
16-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,35	   64,14	   47,49	  
17-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,34	   66,05	   49,28	  
20-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,34	   67,45	   50,25	  
21-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,32	   65,99	   50,05	  
22-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,28	   62,95	   49,02	  
23-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,28	   65,06	   50,79	  
24-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,26	   60,57	   48,09	  
27-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,25	   59,34	   47,62	  
28-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,25	   58,87	   47,00	  
29-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,28	   64	   50,12	  
30-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,30	   60,86	   46,69	  
31-­‐Oct-­‐2008	   1,28	   60	   47,03	  
03.Nov.08	   1,28	   60,32	   47,04	  
04.Nov.08	   1,28	   62,78	   48,97	  
05.Nov.08	   1,29	   61,09	   47,47	  
06.Nov.08	   1,28	   56,14	   43,96	  
07.Nov.08	   1,28	   56,84	   44,56	  
10.Nov.08	   1,29	   57,08	   44,28	  
11.Nov.08	   1,27	   54,76	   42,96	  
12.Nov.08	   1,25	   52,47	   41,88	  
13.Nov.08	   1,25	   51,32	   40,97	  
14.Nov.08	   1,27	   50,7	   40,00	  
17.Nov.08	   1,27	   50,82	   40,14	  
18.Nov.08	   1,27	   49,1	   38,81	  
19.Nov.08	   1,26	   48,35	   38,27	  
20.Nov.08	   1,25	   45,79	   36,51	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21.Nov.08	   1,26	   44,91	   35,64	  
24.Nov.08	   1,28	   49,51	   38,76	  
25.Nov.08	   1,28	   47,51	   37,09	  
26.Nov.08	   1,29	   49,39	   38,18	  
28.Nov.08	   1,27	   47,72	   37,50	  
01-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,26	   47,58	   37,74	  
02-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,27	   45,64	   35,95	  
03-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,26	   44,39	   35,17	  
04-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,26	   43,83	   34,73	  
05-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,27	   37,04	   29,25	  
08-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,29	   40,02	   31,13	  
09-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,28	   39,77	   30,98	  
10-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,29	   39,34	   30,44	  
11-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,32	   43,54	   32,95	  
12-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,33	   42,38	   31,77	  
15-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,35	   45,02	   33,32	  
16-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,37	   42	   30,68	  
17-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,41	   41,84	   29,76	  
18-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,46	   40,19	   27,50	  
19-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,39	   39,52	   28,35	  
22-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,40	   38,08	   27,26	  
23-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,40	   35,27	   25,23	  
24-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,40	   34,45	   24,60	  
29-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,43	   34,16	   23,94	  
30-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,41	   35,22	   24,98	  
31-­‐Dec-­‐2008	   1,39	   35,82	   25,74	  
02-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,39	   42,94	   30,97	  
05-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,36	   45,84	   33,75	  
06-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,33	   48,89	   36,67	  
07-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,36	   46,23	   34,01	  
08-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,36	   42,94	   31,53	  
09-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,37	   42,34	   30,94	  
12-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,34	   40,86	   30,51	  
13-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,33	   43,05	   32,46	  
14-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,32	   42,27	   32,09	  
15-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,31	   42,32	   32,34	  
16-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,33	   43,42	   32,72	  
20-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,29	   41,22	   31,88	  
21-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,29	   39,9	   30,91	  
22-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,30	   42,42	   32,67	  
23-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,28	   43,13	   33,71	  
26-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,30	   48	   36,95	  
27-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,32	   42,86	   32,53	  
28-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,33	   42,86	   32,32	  
29-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,31	   43,13	   32,90	  
30-­‐Jan-­‐2009	   1,28	   44,17	   34,46	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02.Feb.09	   1,28	   42,96	   33,67	  
03.Feb.09	   1,28	   43,15	   33,58	  
04.Feb.09	   1,28	   43,68	   34,08	  
05.Feb.09	   1,28	   43,92	   34,23	  
06.Feb.09	   1,28	   44,49	   34,77	  
09.Feb.09	   1,30	   47,23	   36,31	  
10.Feb.09	   1,30	   45,88	   35,38	  
11.Feb.09	   1,29	   44,24	   34,19	  
12.Feb.09	   1,28	   47,23	   36,80	  
13.Feb.09	   1,28	   43,36	   33,81	  
17.Feb.09	   1,26	   39,69	   31,42	  
18.Feb.09	   1,26	   39,41	   31,29	  
19.Feb.09	   1,27	   42,36	   33,34	  
20.Feb.09	   1,26	   42,19	   33,51	  
23.Feb.09	   1,28	   41,27	   32,25	  
24.Feb.09	   1,28	   40,18	   31,48	  
25.Feb.09	   1,28	   42,37	   33,11	  
26.Feb.09	   1,28	   45,15	   35,32	  
27.Feb.09	   1,26	   44,41	   35,12	  
02-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,26	   42,6	   33,82	  
03-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,26	   42,72	   33,86	  
04-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,26	   46,07	   36,69	  
05-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,26	   44,45	   35,40	  
06-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,27	   43,48	   34,35	  
09-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,26	   44,55	   35,46	  
10-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,28	   44,99	   35,20	  
11-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,28	   43,2	   33,79	  
12-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,28	   42,19	   33,01	  
13-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,29	   44,97	   34,85	  
16-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,30	   44,12	   33,83	  
17-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,29	   45,53	   35,18	  
18-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,31	   45,22	   34,44	  
19-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,37	   48,03	   35,13	  
20-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,35	   49,27	   36,36	  
23-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,36	   51,84	   38,24	  
24-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,35	   51,32	   38,00	  
25-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,35	   51,46	   38,14	  
26-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,36	   51,89	   38,13	  
27-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,33	   50,81	   38,22	  
30-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,32	   49,05	   37,18	  
31-­‐Mar-­‐2009	   1,33	   46,13	   34,66	  
01.Apr.09	   1,32	   45,92	   34,67	  
02.Apr.09	   1,34	   50,89	   38,00	  
03.Apr.09	   1,34	   50,48	   37,60	  
06.Apr.09	   1,35	   50,91	   37,72	  
07.Apr.09	   1,33	   50,62	   38,19	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08.Apr.09	   1,32	   52,06	   39,35	  
09.Apr.09	   1,33	   52,33	   39,43	  
14.Apr.09	   1,33	   52,06	   39,21	  
15.Apr.09	   1,32	   51,31	   38,95	  
16.Apr.09	   1,32	   51,83	   39,28	  
17.Apr.09	   1,31	   52,02	   39,84	  
20.Apr.09	   1,30	   49,06	   37,84	  
21.Apr.09	   1,29	   48,69	   37,65	  
22.Apr.09	   1,29	   48,5	   37,46	  
23.Apr.09	   1,31	   48,29	   37,00	  
24.Apr.09	   1,32	   50,29	   38,01	  
27.Apr.09	   1,31	   48,67	   37,08	  
28.Apr.09	   1,30	   48,64	   37,44	  
29.Apr.09	   1,33	   50,22	   37,86	  
30.Apr.09	   1,33	   50,3	   37,89	  
04-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,32	   53,26	   40,28	  
05-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,34	   53,16	   39,66	  
06-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,33	   55,07	   41,34	  
07-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,34	   56,63	   42,38	  
08-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,34	   56,02	   41,73	  
11-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,36	   55,99	   41,25	  
12-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,37	   56,52	   41,31	  
13-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,36	   56,84	   41,72	  
14-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,36	   56,25	   41,47	  
15-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,35	   56,33	   41,67	  
18-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,35	   56,51	   41,88	  
19-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,36	   57,12	   41,96	  
20-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,37	   59,1	   43,17	  
21-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,38	   58,02	   42,13	  
22-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,40	   58,7	   42,01	  
26-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,39	   59,05	   42,46	  
27-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,39	   61,28	   44,08	  
28-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,39	   63,47	   45,81	  
29-­‐May-­‐2009	   1,41	   64,98	   46,09	  
01.Jun.09	   1,42	   66,6	   46,84	  
02.Jun.09	   1,42	   67,67	   47,53	  
03.Jun.09	   1,42	   66,15	   46,56	  
04.Jun.09	   1,41	   67,68	   48,02	  
05.Jun.09	   1,42	   67,77	   47,80	  
08.Jun.09	   1,39	   67,61	   48,76	  
09.Jun.09	   1,40	   68,94	   49,39	  
10.Jun.09	   1,41	   70,52	   50,01	  
11.Jun.09	   1,40	   71,71	   51,34	  
12.Jun.09	   1,40	   70,62	   50,43	  
15.Jun.09	   1,39	   68,49	   49,45	  
16.Jun.09	   1,39	   70,52	   50,77	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17.Jun.09	   1,38	   68,95	   49,82	  
18.Jun.09	   1,39	   69,96	   50,26	  
19.Jun.09	   1,39	   70,48	   50,59	  
22.Jun.09	   1,39	   66,13	   47,72	  
23.Jun.09	   1,40	   66,36	   47,47	  
24.Jun.09	   1,40	   68,47	   48,81	  
25.Jun.09	   1,39	   68,82	   49,37	  
26.Jun.09	   1,41	   68,1	   48,31	  
29.Jun.09	   1,41	   69,75	   49,62	  
30.Jun.09	   1,41	   68,11	   48,19	  
01.Jul.09	   1,41	   68,52	   48,61	  
02.Jul.09	   1,40	   65,74	   46,79	  
06.Jul.09	   1,39	   63,12	   45,42	  
07.Jul.09	   1,40	   61,54	   43,90	  
08.Jul.09	   1,39	   59,71	   42,95	  
09.Jul.09	   1,40	   59,17	   42,29	  
10.Jul.09	   1,39	   58,43	   42,03	  
13.Jul.09	   1,40	   58,25	   41,68	  
14.Jul.09	   1,40	   60,48	   43,23	  
15.Jul.09	   1,41	   61,25	   43,47	  
16.Jul.09	   1,41	   62,02	   43,89	  
17.Jul.09	   1,41	   63,54	   45,10	  
20.Jul.09	   1,42	   64,64	   45,47	  
21.Jul.09	   1,42	   65,93	   46,35	  
22.Jul.09	   1,42	   65,36	   46,06	  
23.Jul.09	   1,42	   68,06	   47,83	  
24.Jul.09	   1,42	   68,82	   48,37	  
27.Jul.09	   1,43	   69,78	   48,90	  
28.Jul.09	   1,42	   68,53	   48,16	  
29.Jul.09	   1,41	   65,79	   46,65	  
30.Jul.09	   1,41	   68,82	   48,97	  
31.Jul.09	   1,41	   70,08	   49,57	  
03.Aug.09	   1,43	   72,9	   50,97	  
04.Aug.09	   1,44	   73,82	   51,32	  
05.Aug.09	   1,44	   74,39	   51,62	  
06.Aug.09	   1,44	   74,61	   51,92	  
07.Aug.09	   1,44	   74,21	   51,69	  
10.Aug.09	   1,42	   73,79	   51,96	  
11.Aug.09	   1,42	   71,58	   50,53	  
12.Aug.09	   1,42	   74,03	   52,24	  
13.Aug.09	   1,43	   73,76	   51,61	  
14.Aug.09	   1,43	   71,33	   49,90	  
17.Aug.09	   1,41	   68,65	   48,78	  
18.Aug.09	   1,41	   68,66	   48,69	  
19.Aug.09	   1,41	   72,81	   51,59	  
20.Aug.09	   1,42	   73,75	   51,78	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21.Aug.09	   1,43	   73,71	   51,44	  
24.Aug.09	   1,43	   74,34	   51,90	  
25.Aug.09	   1,43	   73,1	   51,03	  
26.Aug.09	   1,43	   70,74	   49,57	  
27.Aug.09	   1,43	   70,68	   49,54	  
28.Aug.09	   1,44	   72,8	   50,68	  
31.Aug.09	   1,43	   69,02	   48,36	  
01.Sep.09	   1,43	   68,78	   48,05	  
02.Sep.09	   1,42	   67,6	   47,54	  
03.Sep.09	   1,43	   66,78	   46,59	  
04.Sep.09	   1,43	   65,84	   46,16	  
08.Sep.09	   1,45	   69,2	   47,81	  
09.Sep.09	   1,45	   69,76	   48,04	  
10.Sep.09	   1,45	   68,96	   47,41	  
11.Sep.09	   1,46	   68,76	   47,12	  
14.Sep.09	   1,46	   66,91	   45,95	  
15.Sep.09	   1,46	   66,53	   45,53	  
16.Sep.09	   1,47	   68,51	   46,70	  
17.Sep.09	   1,47	   71,56	   48,64	  
18.Sep.09	   1,47	   70,72	   48,09	  
21.Sep.09	   1,47	   68,11	   46,47	  
22.Sep.09	   1,48	   69,65	   47,12	  
23.Sep.09	   1,48	   67,43	   45,61	  
24.Sep.09	   1,48	   64,99	   44,01	  
25.Sep.09	   1,47	   64,6	   44,04	  
28.Sep.09	   1,47	   65,43	   44,66	  
29.Sep.09	   1,45	   64,63	   44,42	  
30.Sep.09	   1,46	   65,82	   44,95	  
01-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,45	   67,12	   46,17	  
02-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,45	   66,5	   45,75	  
05-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,46	   65,26	   44,65	  
06-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,47	   68,51	   46,54	  
07-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,47	   67,65	   46,04	  
08-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,48	   68,47	   46,38	  
09-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,48	   69,45	   47,08	  
12-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,48	   70,75	   47,92	  
13-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,49	   70,81	   47,64	  
14-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,49	   72,16	   48,49	  
15-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,49	   73,14	   49,21	  
16-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,49	   74,58	   50,16	  
19-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,49	   75,86	   50,85	  
20-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,50	   76,51	   51,11	  
21-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,49	   77,74	   52,10	  
22-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,50	   78,36	   52,24	  
23-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,50	   77,72	   51,74	  
26-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,50	   76,45	   50,90	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27-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,49	   76,69	   51,56	  
28-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,48	   75,11	   50,80	  
29-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,48	   77,18	   52,19	  
30-­‐Oct-­‐2009	   1,48	   74,91	   50,61	  
02.Nov.09	   1,48	   75,56	   51,15	  
03.Nov.09	   1,47	   75,68	   51,63	  
04.Nov.09	   1,48	   78,21	   52,98	  
05.Nov.09	   1,49	   78,02	   52,48	  
06.Nov.09	   1,49	   75,51	   50,81	  
09.Nov.09	   1,50	   77,18	   51,51	  
10.Nov.09	   1,50	   77,07	   51,50	  
11.Nov.09	   1,50	   76,99	   51,20	  
12.Nov.09	   1,49	   75,18	   50,38	  
13.Nov.09	   1,49	   74,81	   50,32	  
16.Nov.09	   1,50	   77,14	   51,55	  
17.Nov.09	   1,49	   77,36	   52,01	  
18.Nov.09	   1,50	   78,64	   52,58	  
19.Nov.09	   1,49	   76,45	   51,44	  
20.Nov.09	   1,48	   75,61	   51,04	  
23.Nov.09	   1,50	   78,14	   52,20	  
24.Nov.09	   1,50	   75,35	   50,34	  
25.Nov.09	   1,51	   76,57	   50,77	  
27.Nov.09	   1,49	   76	   50,95	  
30.Nov.09	   1,50	   77,77	   51,77	  
01-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,51	   78,68	   52,20	  
02-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,51	   76,96	   51,00	  
03-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,51	   77,76	   51,43	  
04-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,51	   77,74	   51,59	  
07-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,48	   76,18	   51,52	  
08-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,48	   74,93	   50,72	  
09-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,48	   73,63	   49,86	  
10-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,47	   70,91	   48,14	  
11-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,48	   70,07	   47,48	  
14-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,46	   71,19	   48,60	  
15-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,45	   71,33	   49,05	  
16-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,46	   73,34	   50,37	  
17-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,43	   71,28	   49,70	  
18-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,43	   71,87	   50,13	  
21-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,44	   72,74	   50,63	  
22-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,43	   71,64	   50,17	  
23-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,43	   73,87	   51,74	  
24-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,44	   75,15	   52,19	  
28-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,44	   76,59	   53,17	  
29-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,44	   76,65	   53,11	  
30-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,43	   77,62	   54,14	  
31-­‐Dec-­‐2009	   1,44	   77,91	   54,08	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04-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,44	   79,05	   54,94	  
05-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,44	   79,27	   54,89	  
06-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,44	   80,14	   55,85	  
07-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,43	   80,57	   56,33	  
08-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,43	   80,06	   56,09	  
11-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,45	   80,14	   55,16	  
12-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,45	   79,38	   54,82	  
13-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,46	   77,57	   53,27	  
14-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,45	   77,61	   53,58	  
15-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,44	   76,85	   53,46	  
19-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,43	   75,18	   52,65	  
20-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,41	   75,09	   53,13	  
21-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,41	   74,13	   52,71	  
22-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,41	   72,73	   51,45	  
25-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,42	   72,18	   51,01	  
26-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,41	   72,63	   51,57	  
27-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,41	   72,75	   51,70	  
28-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,40	   70,65	   50,47	  
29-­‐Jan-­‐2010	   1,40	   71,2	   50,98	  
01.Feb.10	   1,39	   71,58	   51,45	  
02.Feb.10	   1,39	   73,94	   53,05	  
03.Feb.10	   1,40	   75,77	   54,18	  
04.Feb.10	   1,38	   71,3	   51,49	  
05.Feb.10	   1,37	   70,11	   51,21	  
08.Feb.10	   1,37	   69,62	   50,91	  
09.Feb.10	   1,38	   70,4	   51,16	  
10.Feb.10	   1,37	   70,4	   51,24	  
11.Feb.10	   1,37	   72,35	   52,74	  
12.Feb.10	   1,36	   71,49	   52,67	  
16.Feb.10	   1,36	   74,82	   54,82	  
17.Feb.10	   1,37	   74,89	   54,56	  
18.Feb.10	   1,36	   76,61	   56,47	  
19.Feb.10	   1,35	   76,88	   56,87	  
22.Feb.10	   1,36	   76,95	   56,47	  
23.Feb.10	   1,36	   76,44	   56,30	  
24.Feb.10	   1,35	   77	   56,84	  
25.Feb.10	   1,35	   74,38	   55,14	  
26.Feb.10	   1,36	   76,36	   56,27	  
01-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,35	   76,07	   56,24	  
02-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,35	   77,5	   57,20	  
03-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,36	   78,66	   57,66	  
04-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,37	   77,88	   56,98	  
05-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,36	   79,2	   58,31	  
08-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,37	   78,94	   57,78	  
09-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,36	   78,77	   58,10	  
10-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,36	   80,29	   58,99	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11-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,37	   79,44	   58,17	  
12-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,38	   79,38	   57,67	  
15-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,37	   77,08	   56,24	  
16-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,37	   79,45	   57,90	  
17-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,38	   80,28	   58,36	  
18-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,37	   80,09	   58,63	  
19-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,35	   78,37	   57,85	  
22-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,35	   78,09	   57,97	  
23-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,35	   79,17	   58,56	  
24-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,33	   78,03	   58,50	  
25-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,34	   78,64	   58,88	  
26-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,34	   77,98	   58,40	  
29-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,35	   79,89	   59,31	  
30-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,35	   79,46	   58,94	  
31-­‐Mar-­‐2010	   1,35	   80,37	   59,63	  
01.Apr.10	   1,35	   82,63	   61,35	  
06.Apr.10	   1,34	   85,05	   63,49	  
07.Apr.10	   1,33	   84,49	   63,34	  
08.Apr.10	   1,33	   82,63	   62,15	  
09.Apr.10	   1,34	   82,77	   61,84	  
12.Apr.10	   1,36	   85,21	   62,72	  
13.Apr.10	   1,36	   83,44	   61,43	  
14.Apr.10	   1,36	   85,81	   63,03	  
15.Apr.10	   1,35	   86,9	   64,16	  
16.Apr.10	   1,35	   84,81	   62,66	  
19.Apr.10	   1,34	   83,09	   61,86	  
20.Apr.10	   1,35	   84,73	   62,83	  
21.Apr.10	   1,34	   84,55	   63,22	  
22.Apr.10	   1,33	   84,58	   63,41	  
23.Apr.10	   1,33	   86,09	   64,68	  
26.Apr.10	   1,33	   86,72	   65,10	  
27.Apr.10	   1,33	   85,59	   64,40	  
28.Apr.10	   1,32	   84,59	   63,87	  
29.Apr.10	   1,33	   86,82	   65,49	  
30.Apr.10	   1,33	   86,19	   64,73	  
03-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,32	   88,09	   66,54	  
04-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,31	   85,39	   65,24	  
05-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,29	   82,31	   63,69	  
06-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,27	   80,21	   63,02	  
07-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,27	   76,48	   60,00	  
10-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,30	   78,08	   60,21	  
11-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,27	   79	   62,21	  
12-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,27	   78,7	   62,04	  
13-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,26	   79,41	   63,09	  
14-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,25	   76,43	   61,18	  
17-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,23	   73,87	   59,82	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18-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,24	   75,12	   60,44	  
19-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,23	   71,86	   58,57	  
20-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,23	   69,56	   56,40	  
21-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,25	   70,45	   56,37	  
24-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,24	   69,62	   56,33	  
25-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,22	   67,18	   54,96	  
26-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,23	   70,59	   57,35	  
27-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,23	   73,56	   60,02	  
28-­‐May-­‐2010	   1,24	   73	   58,95	  
01.Jun.10	   1,22	   73,08	   60,12	  
02.Jun.10	   1,22	   72,78	   59,57	  
03.Jun.10	   1,23	   73,12	   59,60	  
04.Jun.10	   1,21	   71,84	   59,57	  
07.Jun.10	   1,20	   71,09	   59,44	  
08.Jun.10	   1,19	   71,43	   59,81	  
09.Jun.10	   1,20	   73,68	   61,35	  
10.Jun.10	   1,20	   74,33	   61,71	  
11.Jun.10	   1,21	   73,28	   60,43	  
14.Jun.10	   1,22	   75,11	   61,32	  
15.Jun.10	   1,23	   75,29	   61,42	  
16.Jun.10	   1,23	   76,12	   62,00	  
17.Jun.10	   1,24	   77,52	   62,70	  
18.Jun.10	   1,24	   77,05	   62,28	  
21.Jun.10	   1,24	   78,53	   63,38	  
22.Jun.10	   1,23	   78,08	   63,70	  
23.Jun.10	   1,23	   75,22	   61,30	  
24.Jun.10	   1,23	   75,17	   61,30	  
25.Jun.10	   1,23	   76,21	   61,99	  
28.Jun.10	   1,23	   76,66	   62,13	  
29.Jun.10	   1,22	   74,21	   60,84	  
30.Jun.10	   1,23	   74,94	   61,07	  
01.Jul.10	   1,23	   71,73	   58,18	  
02.Jul.10	   1,25	   71,75	   57,18	  
06.Jul.10	   1,26	   73,08	   58,10	  
07.Jul.10	   1,26	   72,97	   58,06	  
08.Jul.10	   1,27	   74,56	   58,89	  
09.Jul.10	   1,26	   75,2	   59,51	  
12.Jul.10	   1,26	   74,35	   59,14	  
13.Jul.10	   1,26	   76,45	   60,82	  
14.Jul.10	   1,27	   76,63	   60,32	  
15.Jul.10	   1,28	   75,52	   58,87	  
16.Jul.10	   1,30	   75,55	   58,12	  
19.Jul.10	   1,30	   76,29	   58,88	  
20.Jul.10	   1,28	   76,31	   59,41	  
21.Jul.10	   1,28	   75,75	   59,10	  
22.Jul.10	   1,29	   77,59	   60,38	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23.Jul.10	   1,29	   77,27	   59,91	  
26.Jul.10	   1,29	   77,9	   60,24	  
27.Jul.10	   1,30	   75,52	   57,95	  
28.Jul.10	   1,30	   76,66	   59,01	  
29.Jul.10	   1,31	   78,6	   60,14	  
30.Jul.10	   1,30	   77,5	   59,49	  
02.Aug.10	   1,31	   81,93	   62,67	  
03.Aug.10	   1,32	   83,6	   63,23	  
04.Aug.10	   1,32	   83,76	   63,43	  
05.Aug.10	   1,32	   82,9	   62,88	  
06.Aug.10	   1,32	   81,28	   61,69	  
09.Aug.10	   1,33	   81,54	   61,53	  
10.Aug.10	   1,31	   79,89	   60,83	  
11.Aug.10	   1,30	   77,83	   59,80	  
12.Aug.10	   1,28	   76,63	   59,91	  
13.Aug.10	   1,28	   75,14	   58,71	  
16.Aug.10	   1,28	   74,56	   58,16	  
17.Aug.10	   1,29	   76,74	   59,67	  
18.Aug.10	   1,29	   75,1	   58,31	  
19.Aug.10	   1,28	   74,84	   58,30	  
20.Aug.10	   1,27	   73,48	   57,81	  
23.Aug.10	   1,27	   73,08	   57,53	  
24.Aug.10	   1,26	   70,61	   55,99	  
25.Aug.10	   1,26	   70,74	   56,08	  
26.Aug.10	   1,27	   74,5	   58,69	  
27.Aug.10	   1,27	   75,16	   59,12	  
30.Aug.10	   1,27	   76,05	   59,88	  
31.Aug.10	   1,27	   75,51	   59,55	  
01.Sep.10	   1,28	   75,53	   59,01	  
02.Sep.10	   1,28	   74,93	   58,46	  
03.Sep.10	   1,28	   75,03	   58,46	  
07.Sep.10	   1,27	   75,78	   59,46	  
08.Sep.10	   1,27	   77,48	   61,02	  
09.Sep.10	   1,27	   77,87	   61,24	  
10.Sep.10	   1,27	   77,54	   60,94	  
13.Sep.10	   1,28	   78,52	   61,34	  
14.Sep.10	   1,29	   78,89	   61,39	  
15.Sep.10	   1,30	   78,46	   60,40	  
16.Sep.10	   1,31	   78,89	   60,32	  
17.Sep.10	   1,31	   77,43	   59,29	  
20.Sep.10	   1,31	   79,42	   60,75	  
21.Sep.10	   1,31	   78,76	   60,03	  
22.Sep.10	   1,34	   77,29	   57,83	  
23.Sep.10	   1,33	   77,69	   58,31	  
24.Sep.10	   1,34	   78,73	   58,70	  
27.Sep.10	   1,35	   77,71	   57,66	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28.Sep.10	   1,35	   79,14	   58,80	  
29.Sep.10	   1,36	   78,79	   57,89	  
30.Sep.10	   1,36	   80,77	   59,18	  
01-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,37	   82,69	   60,24	  
04-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,37	   83,42	   60,87	  
05-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,38	   83,35	   60,49	  
06-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,39	   85,01	   61,35	  
07-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,40	   83,67	   59,89	  
08-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,39	   83,88	   60,46	  
11-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,39	   83,08	   59,62	  
12-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,38	   82,99	   59,99	  
13-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,40	   84,01	   60,19	  
14-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,41	   83,55	   59,25	  
15-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,41	   81,94	   58,16	  
18-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,39	   82,3	   59,23	  
19-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,39	   81,12	   58,53	  
20-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,39	   81,68	   58,93	  
21-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,40	   81,28	   57,99	  
22-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,39	   80,75	   57,95	  
25-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,40	   81,91	   58,38	  
26-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,39	   82,62	   59,39	  
27-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,38	   81,27	   58,88	  
28-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,39	   82,97	   59,88	  
29-­‐Oct-­‐2010	   1,39	   82,47	   59,52	  
01.Nov.10	   1,39	   84,06	   60,36	  
02.Nov.10	   1,40	   84,71	   60,43	  
03.Nov.10	   1,40	   85,33	   60,89	  
04.Nov.10	   1,42	   86,83	   60,96	  
05.Nov.10	   1,41	   87,05	   61,81	  
08.Nov.10	   1,39	   87,15	   62,62	  
09.Nov.10	   1,39	   87,93	   63,05	  
10.Nov.10	   1,38	   87,92	   63,85	  
11.Nov.10	   1,37	   88,08	   64,29	  
12.Nov.10	   1,37	   86,07	   62,77	  
15.Nov.10	   1,36	   85,49	   62,74	  
16.Nov.10	   1,36	   83,98	   61,70	  
17.Nov.10	   1,35	   83,36	   61,84	  
18.Nov.10	   1,36	   83,7	   61,33	  
19.Nov.10	   1,37	   83,17	   60,82	  
22.Nov.10	   1,36	   82,34	   60,34	  
23.Nov.10	   1,35	   82,37	   61,03	  
24.Nov.10	   1,33	   84,53	   63,37	  
26.Nov.10	   1,33	   84,78	   63,64	  
29.Nov.10	   1,32	   85,9	   64,95	  
30.Nov.10	   1,30	   86,02	   66,18	  
01-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,31	   88,56	   67,53	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02-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,32	   89,37	   67,94	  
03-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,32	   90,65	   68,44	  
06-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,33	   91,25	   68,71	  
07-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,34	   90,78	   67,93	  
08-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,32	   89,74	   67,98	  
09-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,32	   89,93	   68,06	  
10-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,32	   89,54	   67,61	  
13-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,33	   90,4	   68,14	  
14-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,34	   90,63	   67,46	  
15-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,34	   91,33	   68,36	  
16-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,32	   91,09	   68,81	  
17-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,33	   91,11	   68,71	  
20-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,31	   91,31	   69,45	  
21-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,32	   93,11	   70,78	  
22-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,31	   93,55	   71,35	  
23-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,31	   93,63	   71,67	  
27-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,31	   93,08	   70,86	  
28-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,32	   93,52	   70,88	  
29-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,31	   93,52	   71,19	  
30-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,33	   92,5	   69,65	  
31-­‐Dec-­‐2010	   1,34	   93,23	   69,77	  
03-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,33	   95,82	   71,79	  
04-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,34	   93,52	   69,68	  
05-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,32	   95,07	   71,95	  
06-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,31	   94,95	   72,53	  
07-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,30	   94,25	   72,72	  
10-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,29	   95,05	   73,67	  
11-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,29	   96,8	   74,76	  
12-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,30	   97,86	   75,43	  
13-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,32	   97,86	   74,14	  
14-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,33	   97,86	   73,31	  
18-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,34	   97,83	   73,17	  
19-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,35	   98,42	   72,87	  
20-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,35	   96,27	   71,46	  
21-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,35	   96,84	   71,62	  
24-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,36	   96,76	   71,30	  
25-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,36	   96,76	   71,17	  
26-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,37	   96,04	   70,20	  
27-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,37	   96,48	   70,34	  
28-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,37	   97,06	   70,80	  
31-­‐Jan-­‐2011	   1,37	   98,97	   72,28	  
01.Feb.11	   1,38	   100,4	   72,99	  
02.Feb.11	   1,38	   101,3	   73,39	  
03.Feb.11	   1,37	   101,69	   73,98	  
04.Feb.11	   1,36	   99,43	   72,94	  
07.Feb.11	   1,36	   99,44	   73,37	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08.Feb.11	   1,36	   99,25	   72,79	  
09.Feb.11	   1,36	   100,16	   73,39	  
10.Feb.11	   1,36	   100,74	   74,05	  
11.Feb.11	   1,35	   99,93	   73,89	  
14.Feb.11	   1,34	   103,12	   76,73	  
15.Feb.11	   1,35	   102,48	   75,85	  
16.Feb.11	   1,35	   102,78	   76,08	  
17.Feb.11	   1,36	   103,45	   76,29	  
18.Feb.11	   1,36	   102,2	   75,00	  
22.Feb.11	   1,37	   106,82	   78,16	  
23.Feb.11	   1,37	   109,77	   79,94	  
24.Feb.11	   1,38	   113,91	   82,71	  
25.Feb.11	   1,38	   111,47	   81,00	  
28.Feb.11	   1,38	   112,27	   81,16	  
01-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,38	   113,34	   81,98	  
02-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,38	   116,89	   84,65	  
03-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,39	   114,42	   82,61	  
04-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,40	   115,71	   82,90	  
07-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,40	   116,58	   83,11	  
08-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,39	   112,32	   80,82	  
09-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,39	   115,19	   82,70	  
10-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,38	   114,07	   82,56	  
11-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,38	   114,07	   82,82	  
14-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,39	   112,95	   80,98	  
15-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,39	   111,11	   80,03	  
16-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,40	   110,96	   79,54	  
17-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,40	   114,18	   81,53	  
18-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,41	   114,13	   80,77	  
21-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,42	   114,92	   80,96	  
22-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,42	   115,63	   81,37	  
23-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,41	   115,65	   81,81	  
24-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,41	   115,41	   81,69	  
25-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,41	   115,45	   81,79	  
28-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,40	   115,95	   82,63	  
29-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,41	   115,58	   82,17	  
30-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,41	   115,35	   81,87	  
31-­‐Mar-­‐2011	   1,42	   116,94	   82,31	  
01.Apr.11	   1,41	   118,63	   83,89	  
04.Apr.11	   1,42	   120,07	   84,32	  
05.Apr.11	   1,42	   122,87	   86,74	  
06.Apr.11	   1,43	   123,01	   86,02	  
07.Apr.11	   1,43	   122,9	   86,05	  
08.Apr.11	   1,44	   126,3	   87,70	  
11.Apr.11	   1,44	   126,46	   87,61	  
12.Apr.11	   1,45	   121,33	   83,85	  
13.Apr.11	   1,45	   122,7	   84,66	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14.Apr.11	   1,44	   122,74	   85,23	  
15.Apr.11	   1,45	   124,63	   86,25	  
18.Apr.11	   1,43	   121,69	   85,25	  
19.Apr.11	   1,43	   121,35	   84,85	  
20.Apr.11	   1,45	   124,26	   85,61	  
21.Apr.11	   1,46	   123,64	   84,78	  
26.Apr.11	   1,46	   124,55	   85,21	  
27.Apr.11	   1,47	   124,94	   85,18	  
28.Apr.11	   1,48	   126,59	   85,57	  
02-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,48	   126,64	   85,35	  
03-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,48	   124,01	   83,90	  
04-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,49	   121,55	   81,68	  
05-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,48	   111,93	   75,56	  
06-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,45	   113,69	   78,40	  
09-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,44	   113,21	   78,63	  
10-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,44	   117,82	   82,06	  
11-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,44	   115,66	   80,56	  
12-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,42	   112,87	   79,75	  
13-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,43	   113,08	   79,19	  
16-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,41	   113,72	   80,41	  
17-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,42	   109,39	   77,19	  
18-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,42	   112,54	   79,10	  
19-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,43	   113,2	   79,36	  
20-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,42	   111,25	   78,14	  
23-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,40	   110,13	   78,55	  
24-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,41	   112,52	   79,86	  
25-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,41	   114,47	   81,36	  
26-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,42	   115,06	   81,21	  
27-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,43	   114,85	   80,51	  
31-­‐May-­‐2011	   1,44	   117,18	   81,46	  
01.Jun.11	   1,44	   116,15	   80,61	  
02.Jun.11	   1,45	   114,3	   79,05	  
03.Jun.11	   1,45	   115,09	   79,44	  
06.Jun.11	   1,46	   115,4	   79,06	  
07.Jun.11	   1,47	   116,14	   79,27	  
08.Jun.11	   1,46	   118,43	   81,07	  
09.Jun.11	   1,46	   119,95	   82,08	  
10.Jun.11	   1,45	   118,71	   81,95	  
13.Jun.11	   1,44	   120,49	   83,94	  
14.Jun.11	   1,44	   120,35	   83,30	  
15.Jun.11	   1,43	   114,67	   80,23	  
16.Jun.11	   1,41	   114,69	   81,41	  
17.Jun.11	   1,43	   113,74	   79,71	  
20.Jun.11	   1,42	   112,21	   78,83	  
21.Jun.11	   1,44	   112,02	   77,94	  
22.Jun.11	   1,44	   113,59	   78,90	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23.Jun.11	   1,42	   108,27	   76,18	  
24.Jun.11	   1,42	   104,79	   73,69	  
27.Jun.11	   1,42	   104,57	   73,61	  
28.Jun.11	   1,43	   107,57	   75,43	  
29.Jun.11	   1,44	   111,49	   77,29	  
30.Jun.11	   1,45	   111,71	   77,29	  
01.Jul.11	   1,45	   109,82	   75,80	  
05.Jul.11	   1,45	   113,21	   78,29	  
06.Jul.11	   1,43	   113,55	   79,31	  
07.Jul.11	   1,42	   117,4	   82,40	  
08.Jul.11	   1,42	   117,4	   82,43	  
11.Jul.11	   1,41	   117,35	   83,49	  
12.Jul.11	   1,40	   117,36	   83,98	  
13.Jul.11	   1,41	   118,46	   84,18	  
14.Jul.11	   1,42	   117,38	   82,65	  
15.Jul.11	   1,41	   118,06	   83,46	  
18.Jul.11	   1,40	   117,05	   83,34	  
19.Jul.11	   1,42	   118,18	   83,46	  
20.Jul.11	   1,42	   118,52	   83,42	  
21.Jul.11	   1,42	   118,25	   83,15	  
22.Jul.11	   1,44	   118,99	   82,68	  
25.Jul.11	   1,44	   118,27	   82,25	  
26.Jul.11	   1,45	   118,14	   81,64	  
27.Jul.11	   1,44	   117,99	   81,68	  
28.Jul.11	   1,43	   118,16	   82,86	  
29.Jul.11	   1,43	   115,93	   81,30	  
01.Aug.11	   1,44	   116,37	   80,73	  
02.Aug.11	   1,42	   116,02	   81,88	  
03.Aug.11	   1,43	   113,74	   79,54	  
04.Aug.11	   1,42	   110,22	   77,46	  
05.Aug.11	   1,42	   106,92	   75,54	  
08.Aug.11	   1,42	   103,06	   72,45	  
09.Aug.11	   1,43	   103,63	   72,64	  
10.Aug.11	   1,44	   103,84	   72,28	  
11.Aug.11	   1,41	   107,82	   76,24	  
12.Aug.11	   1,43	   108,17	   75,91	  
15.Aug.11	   1,43	   108,89	   76,10	  
16.Aug.11	   1,44	   109,69	   76,39	  
17.Aug.11	   1,45	   111,37	   76,93	  
18.Aug.11	   1,44	   108,36	   75,41	  
19.Aug.11	   1,44	   109,37	   76,03	  
22.Aug.11	   1,44	   108,83	   75,51	  
23.Aug.11	   1,45	   110,35	   76,30	  
24.Aug.11	   1,44	   111,91	   77,54	  
25.Aug.11	   1,44	   111,91	   77,59	  
26.Aug.11	   1,44	   112,29	   77,97	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30.Aug.11	   1,44	   115,59	   80,26	  
31.Aug.11	   1,45	   116,48	   80,61	  
01.Sep.11	   1,43	   116,43	   81,51	  
02.Sep.11	   1,43	   115,92	   81,32	  
06.Sep.11	   1,41	   113,29	   80,35	  
07.Sep.11	   1,40	   117,5	   83,71	  
08.Sep.11	   1,40	   117,99	   84,01	  
09.Sep.11	   1,38	   115,1	   83,30	  
12.Sep.11	   1,37	   114,75	   84,03	  
13.Sep.11	   1,36	   114,08	   83,61	  
14.Sep.11	   1,37	   113,1	   82,38	  
15.Sep.11	   1,38	   116,71	   84,60	  
16.Sep.11	   1,38	   116,26	   84,49	  
19.Sep.11	   1,36	   112,89	   82,76	  
20.Sep.11	   1,37	   114,39	   83,44	  
21.Sep.11	   1,36	   114,26	   83,79	  
22.Sep.11	   1,34	   109,21	   81,21	  
23.Sep.11	   1,34	   109,17	   81,29	  
26.Sep.11	   1,35	   107,9	   79,93	  
27.Sep.11	   1,36	   109,54	   80,67	  
28.Sep.11	   1,36	   108,52	   79,61	  
29.Sep.11	   1,36	   107,08	   78,65	  
30.Sep.11	   1,35	   105,42	   78,07	  
03-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,33	   103,61	   77,74	  
04-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,32	   101,84	   77,26	  
05-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,33	   103,77	   77,81	  
06-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,33	   104,38	   78,66	  
07-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,34	   106,56	   79,32	  
10-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,36	   109,49	   80,55	  
11-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,36	   109,22	   80,27	  
12-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,38	   112,44	   81,68	  
13-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,37	   112,45	   81,92	  
14-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,38	   114,33	   82,81	  
17-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,38	   112,92	   81,97	  
18-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,37	   112,08	   81,95	  
19-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,38	   111,76	   80,82	  
20-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,38	   109	   78,95	  
21-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,38	   111,6	   80,88	  
24-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,39	   111,67	   80,59	  
25-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,39	   112,11	   80,55	  
26-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,39	   110,43	   79,29	  
27-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,40	   112,45	   80,10	  
28-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,42	   110,01	   77,69	  
31-­‐Oct-­‐2011	   1,40	   108,43	   77,44	  
01.Nov.11	   1,36	   106,97	   78,50	  
02.Nov.11	   1,38	   110,82	   80,25	  
 161 
03.Nov.11	   1,38	   110,76	   80,42	  
04.Nov.11	   1,38	   112,22	   81,48	  
07.Nov.11	   1,37	   114,75	   83,50	  
08.Nov.11	   1,38	   115,61	   83,85	  
09.Nov.11	   1,36	   115,29	   84,57	  
10.Nov.11	   1,36	   113,32	   83,23	  
11.Nov.11	   1,37	   114,43	   83,83	  
14.Nov.11	   1,37	   112,57	   82,41	  
15.Nov.11	   1,35	   111,9	   82,69	  
16.Nov.11	   1,35	   111,91	   82,99	  
17.Nov.11	   1,35	   109,25	   81,05	  
18.Nov.11	   1,36	   107,82	   79,42	  
21.Nov.11	   1,35	   105,98	   78,75	  
22.Nov.11	   1,35	   107,77	   79,62	  
23.Nov.11	   1,34	   106,83	   79,80	  
25.Nov.11	   1,32	   106,08	   80,19	  
28.Nov.11	   1,33	   109,38	   81,94	  
29.Nov.11	   1,33	   111,25	   83,42	  
30.Nov.11	   1,34	   111,22	   82,89	  
01-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,35	   108,83	   80,66	  
02-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,35	   109,59	   81,11	  
05-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,34	   110,18	   81,97	  
06-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,34	   110,16	   82,25	  
07-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,34	   110,07	   82,28	  
08-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,34	   108,23	   80,71	  
09-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,34	   107,91	   80,63	  
12-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,33	   107,82	   81,37	  
13-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,32	   109,25	   82,88	  
14-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,30	   105,72	   81,37	  
15-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,30	   104,52	   80,28	  
16-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,31	   104	   79,61	  
19-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,30	   104,55	   80,18	  
20-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,31	   107,8	   82,45	  
21-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,31	   108	   82,73	  
22-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,30	   108,98	   83,53	  
23-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,31	   109,28	   83,69	  
28-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,31	   107,54	   82,25	  
29-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,29	   106,89	   82,93	  
30-­‐Dec-­‐2011	   1,29	   108,09	   83,54	  
03-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,30	   111,12	   85,38	  
04-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,29	   113,37	   87,56	  
05-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,28	   113,59	   88,52	  
06-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,28	   111,96	   87,63	  
09-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,27	   111,07	   87,26	  
10-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,28	   113,3	   88,46	  
11-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,27	   111,66	   87,80	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12-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,27	   112,97	   88,70	  
13-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,28	   109,88	   86,04	  
17-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,28	   110,55	   86,43	  
18-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,28	   109,81	   85,58	  
19-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,29	   109,54	   84,84	  
20-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,29	   108,5	   84,10	  
23-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,30	   109,46	   84,09	  
24-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,30	   108,38	   83,35	  
25-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,29	   108,48	   83,82	  
26-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,31	   109,08	   82,98	  
27-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,31	   110,5	   84,06	  
30-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,31	   110,24	   84,09	  
31-­‐Jan-­‐2012	   1,32	   110,26	   83,68	  
01.Feb.12	   1,32	   111,96	   84,98	  
02.Feb.12	   1,31	   110,96	   84,74	  
03.Feb.12	   1,32	   112,56	   85,53	  
06.Feb.12	   1,30	   115,47	   88,54	  
07.Feb.12	   1,31	   116,86	   89,12	  
08.Feb.12	   1,33	   117,18	   88,28	  
09.Feb.12	   1,33	   118,4	   89,10	  
10.Feb.12	   1,32	   118,13	   89,57	  
13.Feb.12	   1,33	   118,73	   89,58	  
14.Feb.12	   1,32	   118,3	   89,83	  
15.Feb.12	   1,31	   120,25	   91,85	  
16.Feb.12	   1,30	   121	   93,21	  
17.Feb.12	   1,32	   120,69	   91,72	  
21.Feb.12	   1,32	   120,85	   91,40	  
22.Feb.12	   1,32	   123,07	   93,02	  
23.Feb.12	   1,33	   124,53	   93,63	  
24.Feb.12	   1,34	   124,89	   93,12	  
27.Feb.12	   1,34	   126,46	   94,46	  
28.Feb.12	   1,35	   124,02	   92,18	  
29.Feb.12	   1,34	   122,23	   90,92	  
01-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,33	   125,76	   94,47	  
02-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,32	   125,93	   95,28	  
05-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,32	   126,68	   95,82	  
06-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,32	   125,03	   95,06	  
07-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,31	   125,37	   95,56	  
08-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,32	   127,96	   96,63	  
09-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,32	   128,08	   97,10	  
12-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,31	   127,27	   97,01	  
13-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,31	   128,14	   98,14	  
14-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,31	   126,98	   97,21	  
15-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,31	   123,63	   94,68	  
16-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,31	   125,09	   95,37	  
19-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,32	   125,76	   95,63	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20-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,32	   124,38	   94,24	  
21-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,32	   123,89	   93,68	  
22-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,32	   122,49	   93,03	  
23-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,32	   125,21	   94,56	  
26-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,33	   125,85	   94,80	  
27-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,33	   125,25	   93,94	  
28-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,33	   124,41	   93,28	  
29-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,33	   123,23	   92,85	  
30-­‐Mar-­‐2012	   1,34	   123,41	   92,40	  
 
 
Table 8.3: Europe Brent spot price FOB 
Sources: Wikiposit.org, US Department of Energy  
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